When livelihoods take a battering ... Mapping the 'New Gold Rush' in Zimbabwe's Angwa-Pote Basin.
AbstractThe paper analyses the gold panning saga in Zimbabwe's mineral-rich Mashonaland West Province. It focuses on the Angwa-Pote Basin in the wake of the deteriorating economy and the land redistribution programme. Of particular interest are the ramifications of massive job losses in mining, commercial farming and urban areas on alluvial gold panning, which in many instances is the only resort for scores of embattled households. It is argued that traditional methods of checking the negative outcomes of gold panning have been rendered impotent. The discussion examines this fast evolving gold rush by positioning it within the wider national and local contexts. The contributing factors to the rise and persistence of this phenomenon are explained at length. Finally, the conclusion is made that if deeper insights into the new gold rush are to be gained more research is necessary.
Introduction
Since 2000, the livelihood situation in Zimbabwe has taken a turn for the worse. By mid 2005, the local currency had lost 99 per cent of its value (Clemens and Moss 2005); incomes in real terms had tumbled by over 98 per cent compared to their 1990 value, 'wiping out the income gains of the past 52 years' (EIU 2006:27); unemployment, poverty and the cost of living had all skyrocketed to unprecedented levels (Gono 2005). By the end of 2006, inflation was over 1,280 per cent (Gono 2007:24); latest estimates put unemployment at 70 per cent, and the poverty headcount ratio at 70 per cent (IMF 2005, Gono 2007). Some argue that unemployment in 2006 was 85 per cent, and poverty was over 90 per cent (ICG 2007).
For decades, gold panning has been one of the few remaining coping strategies--taken here to mean 'the specific efforts, both behavioural and psychological, that people employ to master, tolerate, reduce, or minimize stressful events' (Taylor 1998)--for a cross section of Zimbabweans. What the country's economic crisis means for survival is that viable alternative livelihood opportunities for people relying on gold panning for survival have not come up. At the same time livelihood options for households adversely affected by the crisis have drastically dwindled. As a result, households engaged in gold panning have stayed put while others who find themselves with nothing to fall back on join the scramble for the precious, and indeed lifesaving, mineral. Thus gold panning still remains one of the few remaining coping strategies for many. A survey and projection of the socio-economic situation in Zimbabwe, shows that it is inconceivable to expect a letup in the relentless pressure on livelihoods (EIU 2006). This means more gold panning at least in the short to medium term.
Unsurprisingly, there has been a major boost in gold panning as the original panners soldier on and new entrants continue flocking in. This new wave of arrivals has created what to all intents and purposes is the 'new gold rush'. By comparison, the pre-2000 gold rush, was small with fewer and relatively homogenous fortune-seekers trickling into, and even fewer, settling on, the gold panning sites (Kamete 1992, 1999). The original panners were homogenous in the sense that there were mostly people of similar socioeconomic status and background, dominated by former farm workers and mineworkers, most of them immigrants or their descendants. In contrast to the original almost homogenous gold-panner population, the current population is an assortment of people with vastly different backgrounds and origins. They are united by one common aspect, namely livelihoods in distress.
This paper examines the implications of this dramatic deterioration in socio-economic indicators on gold panning. It begins by surveying the discourses on alluvial gold panning in Zimbabwe. This is followed by an outline of the post-2000 socio-economic developments and how they impinge on livelihoods. The discussion then analyses the framework within which the events and processes in the Angwa-Pote basin are unfolding. Following this is an exploration of the key participants in the new gold rush. The paper concentrates on the key factors that have caused and facilitated the rush. It examines the situation on the ground with a view to charting out the most fruitful agendas for enquiry into the enduring gold panning saga.
Terms of the debate
In the Global South, there is no shortage of urban and rural households that occasionally face risks and experience economic shocks and stress that undermine their livelihoods. These compromise the survival of the households, thereby increasing vulnerability and insecurity. What Zimbabwe has been experiencing since 2000 amounts to a shock which has generated risks and spawned vulnerability and insecurity (Clemens and Moss 2005, ICG 2005, 2006). Some of these risks and shocks, such as drought and floods, are natural disasters, while others, like economic and political crises, are human-made. As the World Bank (2000:161) notes, 'economic crises and natural disasters can bring deep and sudden collapses in national output--and sharp increases in income poverty'. Once the shocks hit them, the victims have to devise coping strategies, which in most cases are perceived as temporary reactions to a transient setback (see Valdivia nd). In the face of shock and stress, households are forced to 'organise their labour, time and other resources so as to protect ... their consumption' (de la Rocha and Grinspun 2000:55). This is so because the '... survival strategies derive largely from "private" initiatives implemented at the household and community levels' (de la Rocha and Grinspun 2000:56). Thus, in situations in which external relief--in the form of help from outside the household or community--cannot be counted on, relief and survival in this respect depends solely on the capacity of the household or community to cope and its ability to adapt. De la Rocha and Grinspun (2000:55) aptly describe these responses as 'private adjustments'. Under these circumstances, the resilience of livelihoods that are taking a battering depends to a large extent on the capabilities of the affected people to adapt to the shock and stress (Yaro 2004:34).
In an insightful work on income risk, but which could also usefully be applied to livelihood stress and shock, Dercon (2000:2) distinguishes between idiosyncratic and common risks. In this context, a common shock 'affects everyone in a particular community' or geographical location, whereas an idiosyncratic shock 'only affects a particular individual in this community' or location. By their selective nature, idiosyncratic shocks can be absorbed within the community but common shocks, because they hit everybody, 'cannot be shared' (Dercon 2000:3). Due to their suddenness and ferocity as well as their spatial and demographic scale, Zimbabwe's socio-economic crises can be described as common shocks.
In private adjustments, assets, both tangible and intangible, as well as people's livelihood capabilities and activities are instrumental in cushioning victims from shocks and stress (see Chambers and Conway 1991:7). Assets 'shape livelihood strategies,' which are 'expressed in the set of activities that a family pursues' (Valdivia nd:2). Where social security is non-existent, and social safety nets are overwhelmed to the point of failing to cope, tangible assets are important. This should work where, for example, income shocks are temporary and the situation is expected to normalise fairly quickly. Under these circumstances it is possible for households to draw on their savings or some form of insurance, to smooth consumption by dealing with the consequences of the shock or stress (see Dercon 2000, Morduch 1995). If the shock, such as an economic crisis, persists for an extended period, the assets may be decimated and affected households find themselves having to develop survival strategies that 'focus on long-term survival and wellbeing' (Dercon 2000:3).
Normally, faced with enduring economic crises and shocks, 'poor people are unlikely to have enough savings or self-insurance to see them through bad times ...' and, particularly in the Global South, 'they have little or no access to insurance schemes, whether social or market based' (World Bank 2000:162). Not surprisingly, after their assets inevitably run out, victims of shocks and stress have to find other survival strategies. As the following discussion will show, this is exactly what happened to many Zimbabweans in the wake of the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 and the ensuing economic crisis that claimed major victims among the low and middle-income households in the urban centres, mining settlements and communal and resettlement areas. Having experienced a sustained battering of their livelihoods, and there being no large-scale external intervention to avert what was to all intents and purposes a disaster, the countless victims of the systemic national economic crisis had to find a way to hang on. Having little or no physical and financial assets to fall back on, or having depleted these assets, most victims had to 'mobilise their labour power so as to secure a livelihood' (de la Rocha and Grinspun 2000:56). In actual fact, this labour is just about the only thing they have to see them through the crisis. Many of these people sought, and found refuge in, alluvial gold panning.
Positioning the discussion
Alluvial gold panning in Zimbabwe deserves attention. This is so because the practice is 'big' in terms of the population involved, its spatial extent, its environmental impacts, the sensational goings-on, and the money involved. With respect to the population, more than 500,000 Zimbabweans (Mukumbira 2002), or about five per cent of the official national population, are directly involved in gold panning. The numbers are increasing at a phenomenal rate (ILAB 2003). In terms of spatial distribution, gold panning is virtually everywhere. All corners of the country that happen to have the precious mineral are affected. Rivers where the practice has been reported include the Angwa, Mazowe, Munyati/Sanyati, Manyame, Mupfure, Gweru, Shurugwi, Bubi, Mzingwane, Lupane, and Gwanda (Love 2002).
This is not surprising, considering the confirmed lucrative nature of the venture. Estimates indicate that in a week (sometimes a day), gold panners make more money than the monthly minimum wage of the average industrial worker, which at the end of 2006 was under ZW$50,000--equivalent to US$200 at the official controlled exchange rate, but a mere US$10 on the more realistic market-related parallel market--this in the face of a poverty datum line of ZW$352,000 (OSISA 2007, Zava 1997, Mukumbira 2002, Phiri 2002). Any venture that churns out such monetary rewards cannot escape notice from 'money-seekers', observers and analysts.
Another factor that brings attention to gold panning is its known impact on the environment. The environmental record of alluvial gold panning is perhaps more dreadful than that of any of the coping strategies adopted by vulnerable groups. Standing in harm's way are resources like water, vegetation, aquatic life, rivers and the land itself (IMERCSA 2000). Gold panning hits the press and creates public attention because it is a site of collective informalised activity that attracts crime and vice. Being full-fledged settlements and complex communities, gold panning sites are the subject of many unflattering reports. As demonstrated by the print and electronic media, there is no shortage of captivating tales from gold panning settlements. They range from the juicy and sensational to the scary and hair-raising.
All the above factors combined make the widespread and expanding practice of gold panning a fruitful arena for academic research, journalistic writing, environmental activism, policy dialogue and strategy, as well as a host of countless debates and arguments. It is unlikely that alluvial gold panning is going to lose the kind of attention it has garnered. Obviously, much has been written on gold panning. Especially after 1990 there has been a lot of writings on gold panning in Zimbabwe. However, what is decidedly lacking in these discussions is a detailed examination of the practice and the key stakeholders as important subjects of enquiry in their own right. This article looks at the issues that are not normally the subject of the mainstream discourse on gold panning.
A lot of the studies on gold panning have focussed on the environmental implications of the practice (Kamete 1992, Maponga 1996, UNCTAD 1995, Love 2002, Shoko 2002). In this category there are papers that are of a purely technocratic nature, whose main aim is to measure environmental impact, help in developing sustainable practices of alluvial gold panning, and/or come up with an effective regulatory regime. Most official reports, especially those prepared for the wider international audience, lean towards this environmental analysis (Goz 2002).
The report by IMERCSA (2000) is representative of the environmental slant of these studies. Complaining about 'hundreds of thousands' of gold panners, the report laments that the culprits 'use the most destructive horizontal tunnelling method of extracting the mineral'. Predictably, the campaign goes on to pinpoint the exact damage to the environment. This is achieved through standard descriptions, namely, 'riverbanks often collapse, resulting in loss of vegetation, erosion and siltation', and, 'chemicals such as mercury are often used adjacent to the water bodies, contaminating rivers and streams'. Sectoral reports such as this one dominated the analysis of gold panning in the 1980s and early 1990s.
However, from the late 1990s there has been some discussion of legal, social, economic and other non-conventional issues relating to gold panning, among them child labour, gold trading and smuggling (Maponga and Musabayana 1996, Coakley 2000, Global March 2000, ILAB 2003). These have introduced a refreshing diversity and have highlighted new dimensions to the debate. By going beyond the usual and predictable ecological debates, these analyses have shown the 'other face' of the practice of gold panning that was almost hidden for decades.
Popular media reports are slightly more diversified in their approach. They focus on sensational issues such as farmers abandoning land for gold panning, the entry of women into the sub-sector, legalisation, deaths and conflicts (Mukumbira 2002, News 24 2002, IRIN 2002, Daily News February 20, 2003, Nyathi 2003). Though rich in description and detail, by their very nature, these reports do not have much in the way of background and contextual material. They are not rich in analytical and interpretive value either. However, put together they provide interesting and useful insights.
After a lull towards the close of the century, the post-2000 period has seen alluvial gold panning becoming a hot and topical issue once again. In addition to the usual focus on environmental concerns, there has been an increase in interest on the role of gold panning as a coping strategy for vulnerable groups. But brevity and a lack of analysis seem to be norm in this respect. For example, some humanitarian organisations regularly include in their reports, appeals and updates, a line or two on gold panning (Fewsnet 2002, Come to Zion 2002, Haw 2002, IFRC 2002, WFP 2003). Of this group, Refugee International (2003) probably has the longest paragraph so far on gold panning. It captures the essence of what all agencies report. In its September 2002 report, Refugee International stated:
Men, women and children clandestinely engage in panning for gold in rivers. A decision to engage in an illegal activity such as gold panning may require frequent relocations to follow the sources. But not everyone who attempts to earn money this way is successful.
In a similar fashion, various mission reports by embassies, nongovernmental organisations and aid agencies, give gold panning a passing, if not contemptuous, reference probably with a view to giving the impression that gold panning is not the ideal solution to hunger, poverty and general vulnerability (SC-UK 2002).
Of the strands of discourses and reports in gold panning surveyed above, none appears to be concerned with the people involved in gold panning; there is not much interest in gold panning as a survival practice or way of life, though this might be beginning to change. They are all preoccupied with the implications of the practice or some other peripheral aspects like pointing out its unimportant socio-economic role or reporting on some exciting event or process associated with gold panning. The people and the practice are important only in so far as they fit into these agendas. In an attempt to address this analytic deficiency, this paper continues my efforts to focus on neglected or underplayed issues, particularly the agency of the various participants and how they are affected by and in turn affect the social, institutional and legal framework in alluvial gold panning (Kamete 1992, 1999).
The unfolding scenario: a question of battered livelihoods
The study: context and methods
The 2002 study that is the basis of this paper was a follow-up to an earlier study that took place in 1999, less than a year before Zimbabwe's controversial FTLRP. Both studies took place in the Angwa-Pote Basin of Mashonaland West Province (MWP), the 'agricultural capital' of Zimbabwe (see Map 1). This mineral-rich province, home to some of Zimbabwe's largest mining settlements, is also the most urbanised province in the country.
In the intervening period, several key developments took place in MWP. Most of these were part of the broader national social, economic and political developments. Like the whole country, what the province began to experience was a relentless battering of livelihoods. Figure 1 depicts this onslaught on livelihoods. The next few paragraphs analyses this worsening situation.
Less than a year after the 1999 study, the FTLRP, dubbed the Third Chimurenga by its proponents, was launched. The programme has been credited with two distinct negative developments on the national economy with corresponding damage to society. The first one is the destruction of the large-scale commercial agricultural sector. The virtual disappearance of the sector saw over 300,000 farm workers displaced without jobs and, for most of them, with no homes (Sachikonye 2003, see also Hartnack 2005:173). The second was the virtual decimation of commerce and industry, in particular those sectors with extensive backward and forward linkages to the agricultural sector (Gono 2005, IMF 2005). This is attributable to the drastic curtailment of activities on commercial farms which occurred within months of the eruption of land occupations (Fewsnet 2002). Many of the firms in the agro-industrial sector and related service industries found themselves without markets and/or input suppliers (cf IMF 2005). Because of its huge mining operations, MWP had a third strand, namely the continued closure of mines and the downscaling of mining operations as world market prices continued to tumble, and the national economy continued on its downward spiral.
After a few days in the field, the influx of new entrants became evident. The 2002 study that was originally intended to remap the conflict between livelihoods and environmental preservation developed another dimension. The new dimension sought to focus on the new entrants who had come into the area after 1999. The investigation was operationalised by means of a survey, which sought to capture some key attributes of the new arrivals. Because of the 'thinness' of the survey, which was carried out with the help of six undergraduate students and 30 school leavers in the area, the exercise was able to cover the whole basin. What the survey sought to map were among other things, the background and geographic origin of the arrivals, their reason for joining the 'new gold rush' and their residence.
As noted above, all this was happening when the national economy was already in crisis (Bond and Manyanya 2002). Real Gross Domestic Product which had fallen by 2.7 per cent in 2001, was set to tumble by a further 4.4 per cent in 2002; the Gross National Product per capita, which had risen to US$601.8 in 1995, had fallen to US$479.2 by the beginning of 2002; and the consumer price inflation which had closed the previous year at 122.1 per cent, would rise to 198.9 by the end of 2002 (IMF 2005:27-30). The land reform programme exacerbated a situation that was already unfolding (Robertson 2003, Good 2002, CIA 2002). The unfavourable weather conditions that characterised the years prior to and after the launch of the FTLRP could not have come at a worse time.
The sum effect of the adversities was the crippling of the livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of households. Some found themselves without incomes and/or homes; others saw their incomes severely eroded; yet others experienced a reduction in reliable income sources. These people had to find a way to take care of their immediate survival logistics. The Angwa-Pote basin in MWP became a popular destination for some of these beleaguered people. By the third quarter of the year 2002, more than 3,000 people whose livelihoods had taken a battering had found their way to this gold-rich basin situated between Chinhoyi and Karoi (see Map 1). Most had come for the gold or its spin-offs.
A commodity chain analysis of gold panning
It is difficult to come up with a definitive commodity chain for alluvial gold panning. There is a complex array of activities, processes, networks and actors. It is, therefore, difficult to conclusively generalise whether the gold-panning 'commodity chains' are producer- or buyer-driven (see Gereffi 2001). The exact nature is contingent upon a particular set of circumstances, which themselves are fluid. These commodity chains are dynamic local constructs which change over time. As shown in the transactional perspective summarised in Table 1 the commodity chains in gold panning have multidirectional links and interactions involving numerous and disparate players. This has a bearing on the technical and social organisation of interlinkages among extraction, buying, selling and supporting activities. This is mainly a result of the chaotic and uncontrolled nature of the operations and transactions.
Under ideal circumstances, the chains would involve four sets of actors: producers (panners/ mining claim owners), middlemen (registered gold dealers/mining claim owners), the legal final buyer and exporter (Fidelity Printers and Refiners, a subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe), and a vast array of incidental, ancillary and supporting actors (shop owners/ itinerant traders/vendors/ public transport operators/ hairdressers, etc). The reality, however, is that there are many other actors as shown in Table 1. Among them are illegal gold dealers, smugglers and criminal elements. Consequently, the range of activities involved in gold panning is all but generalisable. In addition, there are multiple leakages which result in the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) not buying all the gold as is stipulated by law. A substantial proportion is directly smuggled, or sold to smugglers, even by registered dealers, a fact acknowledged by the RBZ governor (Gono 2005, 2006). In fact, rather than sell to dealers, legal or illegal, some panners choose to smuggle their gold to South Africa or Zambia.
The 'new gold rush': examining the arrivals
Table 2 maps the new entrants into the gold rush. The distribution of entrants by category is also shown in the table. The table identifies three main categories, namely (1) those whose sources of livelihoods have been destroyed, (2) those whose source of livelihoods have been eroded, and (3) those out to ward off poverty and/or make a quick buck. For the purposes of this discussion, the participants in the new gold rush are those who joined the stampede in the post-2000 period.
Livelihoods stolen
New arrivals whose livelihoods had been 'stolen' are those whose sources of income had been 'taken away' from them by events and processes beyond their control. Robbed of their livelihood, they are victims of wider socioeconomic developments in the country. As suggested in the label 'livelihoods stolen', people in this category had lost their sources of livelihood in that they were no longer on any payroll and had to find alternative means of survival. The livelihoods had been 'stolen' in the sense that vicissitudes were a result of involuntary loss of employment. In most cases it was totally unanticipated, which implies that those affected were not prepared for the adversity and had to come up with quick solutions to their losses. In July 2002, this category made up about 56 per cent (1,876 people) of the 3,355 post-1999 arrivals. It comprised ejected farm workers, retrenched urban workers and retrenched mine workers. Table 3 examines this category, the injury suffered and what the members look for in the new gold rush.
The 1,060 ejected farm workers constituted about 57 per cent of the 'stolen livelihoods' category, and a third of the total new arrivals. From the ten farms studied in a parallel research project (Hlupo 2002) more than 1,000 heads of households with a total dependency load of some 7,000 had by mid-2002 lost their only means of survival. A large majority of the households were male-headed with female heads making up more than 20 per cent of the affected household heads. They are of varying ages ranging from early teens to the late sixties. These were people with no formal qualifications other than skills acquired during their experience as general labourers or some other on-the-job training like motor mechanics, tractor driving, bricklaying and tobacco grading.
In Mashonaland West the ejected farm-workers reacted to their misfortune in three ways before joining the new gold rush. These are: joining land invasions, relocating to urban centres, and registering for official land allocation. Some households joined the stampede into land occupations. However, before they had settled down government ordered them to leave the farms, which had either been de-listed or allocated to others. They were soon back on the road, unemployed and homeless.
A few were misled by promised (and seemingly significant) severance packages, which ranged between ZW$30,000 and ZW$150,000 (Hlupo 2002). This amounted to between US$545 and US$2,727 at the controlled official exchange rate; but on the parallel market it was equivalent to between US$200 to US$1,000. Believing that they could make it in urban areas, they crammed the small and medium size towns in MWP. Particularly favoured destinations were Banket, Raffingora, Trelawney, Karoi, Norton and Darwendale (see Map 1). Under pressure from the urban cash economy, the severance packages soon ran out.
Others tried their luck in the official land redistribution programme. Very few of those ejected from farms got land through the laid-down procedures. In fact in the farms surveyed by Hlupo (2002), out of more than 1,000 farm workers, less than 10 were allocated land on the farms where they had been living and working for most of their lives (Sachikonye 2003). The farm workers, seen as close allies of the white farmers, and by extension, members of the opposition political party, were deliberately sidelined by ruling party faithfuls who sat on land allocation committees (Hlupo 2002). On some farms there were some arrangements designed to accommodate ex-farm workers after the forcible eviction of their employers. On one farm, near Chinhoyi, for example, all former workers were promised continued residence and a couple of acres of farming land.
Having lost both jobs and homes, and having failed in their initial coping strategies, some of the displaced farm workers joined the new gold rush in search of a source of income and a place to stay. Owing to the dramatic relaxation in controls, such as those guiding settlement and operations on mining claims--which was more like a breakdown in law and order--these home and income seekers subsequently joined the resident panning populations, boosting the number of 'permanent' residents in the Angwa-Pote basin. As shown above, in July 2002, the ex-farm workers numbering over 1,000 people made up 56 per cent of new entrants whose livelihood had been stolen and about a third of all new arrivals. A survey carried out by Sachikonye (2003:62) between October and November 2003 revealed that four per cent of the 956 affected commercial farm workers interviewed had taken up gold panning as a coping mechanism. He mentions MWP as dominating this category.
The 386 people hit by urban retrenchments contributed about 12 per cent of the population in the new gold rush and 23 per cent of victims of stolen livelihoods. The continuing loss of employment in the province has been largely attributable to the downsizing or closure of firms, most of them in the agro-industrial sector resulting from two related factors, viz, the disappearance of the commercial farming sector and the deteriorating national economic conditions. By mid-2002, in the province about 30 agro-industrial firms employing no less than 800 people had closed down directly due to the loss of business precipitated by the drastic reduction of activity in the large-scale commercial farming sector (Hlupo 2000). A few downstream and upstream firms folded up because of the loss of business in the agro-industrial sector. These were mainly small-scale service industries that relied on business from and into the decimated sector. The affected businesses were in the urban centres of Chinhoyi, Kadoma, Chegutu, Norton, Banket, Karoi, Trelawney, Raffingora and Darwendale (Map 1).
Two in five of the adversely affected urbanites had a place to call home --either rented (65 per cent) or owned (35 per cent)--in the formal or informal settlements in the towns they came from. Not surprisingly, many of them came to the panning sites primarily for a source of income. They stay on site for a few days and after making some money go back home to attend to domestic business and lead their 'normal' life. Even in this subcategory, however, there are a few (13 per cent) who had been sharing or renting accommodation in the towns that opted to join the ranks of resident gold panners.
The loss of jobs and homes in the mining sector in Mashonaland West has been phenomenal. These losses started long before the land redistribution programme. However, the contribution of the programme to the plagues affecting the national economy cannot be cast aside as insignificant in the worsening of the woes plaguing the mining sector. The closure of mines (see Map 1), particularly copper mines (Mhangura, Shackleton and Alaska) and chrome mines (Mutorashanga, Sutton and Vanad), as well as the drastic downsizing at gold mines (Muriel and Dalny) left thousands of households--most of them headed by people of Malawian, Zambian and Mozambican origin--stranded with neither a home nor a source of income (see SC-UK 2003).
The 430 affected by mine closures and the downsizing of mining operations constituted slightly more than one eighth (12.8 per cent) of the new arrivals in the Angwa-Pote basin and 23 per cent of the victims of stolen livelihoods. Like farm workers, a huge proportion (more than 80 per cent) of the ex-mine workers who joined the new gold rush became resident panners. Although their tenure is by no means secure, a few entrants from the closed mines still stay on the mining settlements. This is especially the case along the Great Dyke (Map 1). Like some of their urban counterparts, those lucky enough to have a home come to the site primarily to pan for gold. They erect some form of temporary shelter in the basin, but regularly go 'home' where some household members are still domiciled and some children still attend school.
Livelihoods crippled
Those with crippled livelihoods have had their livelihoods severely impaired by the erosion of incomes and the concomitant skyrocketing of the cost of living. The category hit by this malady is made up of 786 people, constituting about a quarter of the new arrivals (see Table 4). The fact that by mid-2002 the Zimbabwean dollar had shed off more than 98 per cent of its 1990 value is a telling revelation (Zimind 2002). The dramatic tailspin in the national economy experienced after 1997 and speeded up by the post-2000 crises hastened the erosion of incomes (Bond and Manyanya 2002). The treble digit inflation rate that began hitting in late 2001 did not help matters.
The inadequacy of the incomes propelled these people into all sorts of income generating ventures, among them the informal sector, cross-border trading (see Mupedziswa and Gumbo 2000), crime and gold panning. With respect to gold panning, the primary mission of those in this category is to raise money mainly to finance rising household expenditure. The ease of entry that characterises gold panning, and the virtual paralysis of law enforcement in the Angwa-Pote basin (see below), coupled with exaggerated stories of overnight riches attracted a sizable number of the victims of crippled livelihoods to the basin.
The first subcategory of victims of crippled livelihoods comprises members of households who still hold formal paid jobs in urban areas. They make up 29 per cent of the category and seven per cent of all new entrants. They come mainly from urban centres of Banket, Chegutu, Kadoma, Norton, Chinhoyi, Karoi, Trelawney, Raffingora and Darwendale. The second subcategory (14 per cent of the crippled livelihoods category, and three per cent of new entrants) comprised people who were still employed at mines. Most were based in mining settlements around Banket, Kadoma, Chinhoyi and Chegutu. As noted these two subcategories had steady, albeit inadequate, incomes that were continuously declining in real value. They joined the new gold rush primarily to supplement their meagre and eroded incomes.
At the time of the study, most still had occupancy of houses at their places of employment with reasonable security of tenure. They were part-time gold panners, appearing only during weekends, public holidays, and when they are on official leave; some admitted to routinely faking illness or fraudulently acquiring compassionate leave. Though they sometimes put up rudimentary structures that acted as temporary shelter, they considered their homes to be elsewhere, gold panning being only a secondary activity. However, it may have been secondary in terms of permanence but for all of them, at the time, earnings from gold panning far exceeded those from permanent jobs. On average these people took home over ZW$6,000 (US$109 at the official exchange rate; US$40 on the parallel market) a week from gold panning. For some of them especially in the urban low-income category, this was an amount that dwarfed their monthly incomes (see Zava 2002).
Ironically, many of them look down upon gold panning and regard the practice as a temporary stopgap measure to fill in the void created by eroded incomes and the rising cost of living. The people do not regard themselves as 'makorokoza', a derogatory nickname for gold panners. In their opinion the term refers only to permanent and resident panners. Males dominate the two types of victims of retrenchments, but children and women are starting to feature prominently among these self-declared elites (see Ndlovu 2002).
The third subcategory was the largest (57 per cent of category, and 13 per cent of all new arrivals), and was made up of impoverished communal and resettlement area farmers, mainly from Hurungwe, Makonde and Zvimba Rural District Councils; some came from as far as Nyaminyami, Kadoma and Chegutu Rural District Councils (see Map). The resettlement area farmers category comprises beneficiaries of the first--and much less controversial and disruptive--resettlement programme of the 1980s; they should not be confused with the 'new farmers' resettled during the Third Chimurenga. With dwindling incomes from crops and an unrelenting cash economy, they find themselves under pressure to supplement the little returns they get from selling their produce. For most of them, apart from gold panning, there is no other alternative source of income to supplement the little or nothing that farming gives them.
"Others": income, food and a quick buck
The 693 people belonging to this category constituted about 21 per cent of the new entrants. Table 5 shows the attributes of the members and what they hoped to achieve in or from alluvial gold panning. Three sub-categories made up this assorted category. Most people in this category regard their sojourn in the gold panning area as transient and set to end as soon as the original impetus that drove them into gold panning is satisfied, or fades away.
Nearly 21 per cent of this category, making up just more than four per cent of all new arrivals, comprised unsuccessful job seekers. None had ever been formally employed, and most were still actively looking for employment. School-leavers and dropouts dominated this subcategory. These were among the 300,000 people coming out of the national educational system per year but who had not successfully jostled for the less than 20,000 jobs created every year (DSEI 1997). Some of these were from towns and mining settlements, while a sizable proportion originated from the resettlement and communal areas in the province and beyond. The job seekers had joined the ranks of both the resident and non-resident panners. Some had given up any hope of securing formal employment and had grudgingly accepted gold panning as a lifelong occupation.
Also belonging to the third category were 450 newly resettled farmers (65 per cent of category, 13 per cent of total) whose capacity to produce food and earn adequate incomes had been hit hard by a lack of preparedness resulting from the FTLRP. They are the so-called 'new farmers' who had recently invaded neighbouring commercial farms. By their own admission, they were not worried about farming. They had settled on the farms to make a 'quick buck' by stripping assets, hunting animals, cutting down trees and selling firewood, and grabbing whatever they could sell. They had failed to capitalise on the early good rains. As a result they had harvested nothing from their newly acquired vast swathes of arable land. Having finished with looting the farms, they found themselves with no harvest, no incomes and no food. Consequently, they set their sights on gold panning. Due to government's erratic farming inputs programme for the new farmers (see Gono 2005), they had no inputs to talk about, and therefore nothing to sell or pawn--as most had demonstrated a predilection to do. Thus, though they had shelter, they did not have any means of sustenance.
In order to avert starvation some affected households of these new farmers joined the new gold rush to raise money to buy basic food commodities and take care of other basic necessities. By the time the study was completed, some families had all but relocated to the panning sites. They had set up residential structures like other resident panners and taken up gold panning as a temporary full-time occupation. Investigations revealed that their tenure in the area will be determined by the extent to which their capacity to produce crops is rebuilt. This will be a function of, among other things, the weather, availability, adequacy and quality of agricultural inputs, as well as economic stability.
The third sub-category constituting the 'others' comprises opportunists whose main goal is to get rich overnight. They constituted 14 per cent of their category and three per cent of all new arrivals. They had been attracted by the mostly exaggerated stories of rich strikes by panners. While the other subcategories had joined the new gold rush to pan primarily for gold, these opportunists come in different shades. A few become gold panners; others come as gold dealers; a number of them come and go as roving traders of various inputs and commodities; others operate some form of service industry like shops, public transport as well as money lending services. By their very nature, these ones hardly take up residence in the gold panning compounds. Where residence is required (such as operating trading posts) they opt to employ some people to look after their interests.
The opportunists come from a wide cross-section of society and from all parts of the country. Some are civil servants (including the police); others are in the private sector, while others are politicians and/or self employed or indigenous 'businesspeople'. Males dominate this subcategory. Not surprisingly, the opportunists are of much better socio-economic standing than the other subcategories. Admittedly, a few are not 'straight' and are perpetrators of shady, and even downright illegal, deals. The police, community leaders and some panners are aware that a number of these people are criminals or fugitives.
The new gold rush: contributing factors
Apart from the dwindled livelihood options, some post-FTRLP developments have contributed to the new gold rush. This they have done by making gold panning an attractive and viable safety net for relieving the pressures brought about by battered livelihoods. Before the FTLRP there was a host of administrative, regulatory, legislative and informal controls that made entry into the gold panning arena an arduous and cumbersome, if not dangerous, enterprise (Kamete 1999). Though not adequately effective, in a way the controls forestalled a large-scale and sustained influx by keeping the gold panners and related actors in check.
It should be noted that apart from the Angwa-Pote basin other areas that experienced the wave of gold seekers in MWP include the Sanyati River, numerous abandoned and disused mines and some poorly policed gold rich rivers like the Musengi and Doondoo, both tributaries of the Manyame River that feeds into the Zambezi River. However, by far the biggest recipient of these people was the Angwa-Pote basin.
Figure 2 summarises the main contributory factors to the new gold rush in the Angwa-Pote basin. Location is a strong attractive force for the area (see Map 1). Situated conveniently between two urban centres (Chinhoyi and Karoi), and near a major highway (the Harare-Chirundu highway) the area cannot escape notice even from the casual traveller. This allows people to travel easily between urban centres, which in turn makes it easy for supplies to flow in as and when needed. The location also affords trouble-free access to basic services like health and education, as well as government offices situated in Chinhoyi, the provincial capital. As a result of this convenient location people can settle there without much of a 'downward movement in ... lifestyles' (Interview, with District Social Welfare Officer, July 23, 2002).
Stories, many of them highly exaggerated or completely untrue, have also had their part in drawing people to the area. Countless inflated rags-to-riches tales abound at the gold panning sites. No wonder the area continues to exert an uncanny attraction on both prospective income earners and 'income boosters' from within the province and beyond. The lifestyles of the panners--when they do return to wherever they have come from--seem to give credibility to the tales. Panners are known to be big spenders. The presence of state of the art electronic gadgets in the shacks lends credence to claims of a good life. In Zimbabwe's crisis-ridden economy this is enough 'to lure economically struggling souls into the fray' (Interview with Pastor M, claim owner, June 10, 2002).
Perhaps the biggest contributing factor has been a laxity in law enforcement. The preceding two factors--namely, location and rags-to-riches stories--have been evident since the beginning of panning in the area in the early 1980s. It was the active enforcement of laws and regulations that forestalled a mass influx into the area. The days of active law enforcement appear to have been supplanted by a permissive attitude characterised by tolerance, laxity and downright negligence. Sometimes infractions are actively condoned. Since the land invasions kicked off, there has been a discernible reluctance on the part of the agencies tasked with regulating, policing and monitoring activities in the various sectors in the area (Kamete 1999). There is widespread consensus that gold panning has been politicised to such an extent that the mere mention of certain names (such as those of some 'big fish') and events (mostly the liberation struggle) is enough to gain a suspect an instant reprieve from prosecution, let alone punishment. In this respect gold panning is experiencing what the country in general is going through in terms of a breakdown in law enforcement (Kagoro 2003).
Consequently, the risks in gold panning have been greatly reduced. In view of this, it is hardly an exaggeration to claim that the area's attraction has been further boosted by the drastic reduction in risk in the form of arrests and prosecution without a corresponding reduction in the benefits. At the time of the survey, panners could still rake in more per week than the average monthly industrial wage, this without any significant threat from law enforcement agents, either local or national. In short, gold panning has become a lucrative and safe venture. The interviews noted that the panners' perception of safety was limited to the reduction in the threat of prosecution and violence by the state. Although the physical risks in the form of public health and safety still remained--and in some respects had increased--these were not seriously considered by the panners. To them, the chance to participate in a low-risk/high-yielding venture was irresistible.
The reduction in threats has also been facilitated by the acquisition of neighbouring white owned large-scale commercial farms. A previous study (Kamete 1999) had noted that among the key stakeholders in gold panning in the Angwa-Pote basin was the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) whose membership included farmers in the catchment area of the two rivers, Angwa and Pote. The farms included Two-Tree Farm, whose owner was actively involved in ensuring that the operations were 'environmentally sustainable' (Interview with Mr B, commercial farmer, May 19, 2002). At the time of the study, the farmer had been rendered impotent; his farm had been listed for acquisition by the state. Previously, the existence of entrenched interests and their active protection resulted in legislative and regulatory controls being promptly and strictly enforced. Law enforcement agents were 'always at the beck and call' of the farmers (Interview with Ms T, District Environmental Officer, May 19, 2002). In addition, plainclothes security agents, especially members of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID), frequented the area. Obviously, under these circumstances, a gold rush was almost inconceivable. Frequently, at the behest of commercial farmers, police raids were carried out and prosecutions effected. Though the penalties were unrealistically lenient (Kamete 1999), this might have sent a message that gold panning was not a free-for-all arena and rules had to be followed.
The seizure of commercial farms by the state thus removed what might be considered a constantly looming threat to errant panners and unscrupulous dealers. The virtual suspension of the sanctity of private property that came with the land occupations did much to send a signal that the 'enemy' was now paralysed and the gold seekers could do as they wished. No longer were there people who would relentlessly summon the police to deal with acts of lawlessness wherever and whenever these were observed. Thus, what had been considered a thorn in the flesh had now been removed; the panning activities could go on and even expand undisturbed, unchecked, uncontrolled and unencumbered by the authorities.
The absence of viable livelihood alternatives has also been a contributing factor to the sudden rise in the number of gold panners and the resultant unprecedented increase in activity in the area. With the national economy in crisis, jobs hard to come by, and the drought taking its toll, gold panning appears to be the only alternative that has certain and almost assured advantages to those whose livelihoods are in distress. The venture does not require heavy capital injection, skilled labour, and a host of qualifying 'entrance' criteria. This is in sharp contrast to other (available?) options such as working the land, joining the informal sector and trying one's luck in the beleaguered urban formal sector. It is even better than risky alternatives like non-politicised common crime and related unsavoury income generating projects that have not benefited from the virtual paralysis of law enforcement.
Even gold trading, a hitherto strictly controlled and strategic activity, appears to have fallen victim to this paralysis of law enforcement. This has given rise to a new breed of gold dealers. These unlicensed gold dealers and numerous other middlepersons are proliferating and operate almost with impunity (see ILAB 2003). This, of course is in violation of statutes, such as the Gold Trade Act (Chapter 21:03), and the Mines and Minerals (Custom Milling Plants) Regulations of 2002, which regulate the milling, buying and selling of gold. The increase in the number of illegal gold dealers and the almost total absence of prosecution even where violation of law is well known, is a boon to those looking for 'safe' income generating 'projects'. Unregistered gold dealers are easy to do business with as they do not ask questions and can outbid other buyers, especially the claim-owners, who are known to pay very little. Each time the mining claim owners have tried to match the higher prices of the re-engage dealers, the latter have always raised their offers.
The guarantee of a home has been instrumental in luring ejected farm workers into the Angwa-Pote basin. As noted above, some people have lost their homes on the acquired farms. They do not have adequate resources to break into the tight urban housing market. The aliens among them have no rural home or land to go back to. The overwhelming majority has not benefited from the land seizures, and can therefore not become 'new' farmers. Most of these ejected farm workers could not have found a more welcome relief from their distress than the Angwa-Pote basin. The area offered them both a source of income and land on which to build a home. The relaxation of law enforcement and controls played a pivotal role in making this a particularly enticing and safe option.
Finding a place to settle has been made easier by the laxity in controls relating to the administration of claims. Claims are no longer adequately policed and controlled. Because of the rampant politicisation described above, the embattled and outnumbered owners of claims can no longer set the rules and bar people from unconditionally taking up a piece of land for settlement on private claims. Nor can they prevent them from working on the claims and selling to whoever is the highest bidder. Prior to this, it was noted that mining claim owners had the power to decide who settled and worked on their stretch of the river. The chief condition for settling was that the settler would sell any gold acquired from a given claim to the owner of that claim. Any deviation from the set rules would be punished by physical assault, eviction from settlement and expulsion from the claim (Kamete 1999). It appears the claim owners are experiencing on a smaller scale what the large-scale commercial farmers experienced on a larger national scale. Property rights have become ineffective as a source of security and a means of excluding unwanted elements from deriving benefits from the claims.
Uncertainty relating to the state's policy on resettlement also contributed to the new gold rush. In 2001 government announced its intentions to remove people who had resettled themselves on undesignated farms, or on farms meant for the coveted A2 resettlement model. The model, announced in 2001, 'was aimed at creating a cadre of black commercial farmers' (PLRC 2003:20) who would eventually get formal leases (IRIN 2004). The state actively enforced this requirement by evicting stubborn 'self-resettled' people and destroying their homesteads. The instability and uncertainty on acquired farms made gold panning a markedly better and more stable alternative than unilateral 'self-resettlement' and land occupations. In addition, even where people had been properly resettled, drought and erratic rains contributed to gold panning remaining a better option and a more secure safety valve as it proved resilient to the vagaries.
Conclusion
The new gold rush is real. And it is set to last. This is so especially considering the fact that the original impetus will not vanish overnight. The current state of the national economy and key national policies on land, the economy and agriculture are not passing phases. As long as these aspects remain constant--which they are likely to do--the key reasons for the new gold rush will continue to be there.
In view of the foregoing, it can be argued that stolen livelihoods are not likely to be recovered in the near future; nor are crippled livelihoods going to be healed anytime soon. It is difficult for any commentator, however optimistic, to argue that 300,000 displaced and/or landless and/or homeless farm workers, will be accommodated anywhere in the ailing national economy. That the total ex-farm population displaced may amount to a staggering two million is a further blow to any prospects of a speedy exit from the rubble. Adding to this the spectre of closures and downsizing in mining, industry and commerce is enough to dampen any hope of a quick solution that will relieve pressure on gold panning.
Granted, the imperative to survive adversities brought by food shortages and poor harvests may be addressed by the return of good weather, but the other equally important variables, among them inadequate farming inputs, does not look like a transient constraint that will be corrected in a few short years. Consequently, therefore, the question of poor incomes from farming --itself a function of poor harvests and unfavourable crop pricing--will remain an enduring impetus to supplement meagre incomes. What this implies is that the 'temporary' stress on the livelihoods of communal and resettled farmers, particularly the 'new' farmers will continue to play havoc on their ability to produce enough food for sustenance.
Besides, the urge to get rich quickly will continue to dominate the survival instincts of many. Others, who may not be in dire straits but see themselves as vulnerable and wish to forestall any misfortunes, or at least keep them at arm's length, will continue to regard the gold rush as a safety valve. Though most people from this category view themselves as temporary participants in the gold panning, the resilience of the original impetus as detailed above will contribute to them extending their sojourn.
The confirmed absence of viable and sustainable alternatives that can effectively compete with gold panning, which, as has been argued has become a low-risk /high-yield enterprise, will ensure that throngs of fortune-seekers will continue to be drawn to the Angwa-Pote basin. The deterioration in the enforcement of legal, administrative and regulatory provisions will continue 'to beckon to all who care to dirty their hands' (Interview, with Mr. B, commercial farmer, February 23, 2002), scrounging for the precious metal or are imaginative enough to tag onto the numerous backward and forward linkages.
That the new gold rush is set to be a permanent fixture on Zimbabwe's socio-economic landscape is now a fact that is almost indisputable. What is, therefore, needed is a more focused enquiry that is designed to dig deeper into this steadily expanding phenomenon so as to unravel the many fundamental issues arising from the new wave. Among the most crucial of these emerging issues is the unrelenting pressure on the physical environment. Previous investigations have resulted in valuable insights into the direct and indirect fluvial, hydrological, bio-geographical, geomorphologic and pedological implications of the practice of gold panning and its related offshoots. Now that the situation has changed and the context keeps evolving, new enquiries are needed not only on the impact, but also the implications, of the new gold rush on these environmental aspects.
It has been pointed out that the land redistribution programme is a major contributor to the burgeoning phenomenon. Just what it precisely means and its impacts on specific aspects of the gold panning sub-sector have the potential to contribute to essential policy dialogue. It also has the added potential to aid in the development of some mitigatory measures. This is important considering that the law enforcement apparatus--which has hitherto been just about the only check on the destruction emanating from the growth and operations of gold panning--has 'all but gone into hiding' (Interview, February 23, 2002), having been rendered virtually impotent by the events and processes on the socio-political front.
It does not pay to hide from the realities on the ground, because sooner or later they are bound to catch up with policy; nor does it pay to shut off this crucial survival conduit for multitudes of beleaguered Zimbabweans trying to cope with the inexorable battering of their livelihoods (Magaramombe 2001, Fewsnet 2002, Sachikonye 2003). An informed response that takes cognisance of the vital role played by the new gold rush while at the time ensuring that the livelihoods based on this practice are sustainable is probably the only form of response that may, at least in the short to medium term, bring about a situation where all the major stakeholders emerge as winners. The logistics of day-to-day survival and the need for environmental preservation will inevitably benefit from such an informed strategic move. That move, as already emphasised could be the outcome of nothing short of a comprehensive enquiry into the intricacies and workings of the new gold rush.
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Amin Y Kamete
[email protected]
A commodity chain analysis of gold panning Table 1: Gold panning's chaotic commodity chains Actor Formal role Actual practice Mining * Allow panners to * Most are non-resident and Claim live/work on claim on employ claim supervisors. Owner s condition panners sell (COs) exclusively to CO. * May hire out or sell panning equipment to * CO sets buying price. GPs. * Supposed to sell gold * Some own a retail outlet. to FPR (below). * Some demand rent from * Some have on-site GPs. milling plants * Some smuggle gold out of * Mill ore for GPs for a Zimbabwe or sell to fee. smugglers. Gold * Settles/works on CO's * Most tend to sell to Panners claim. whoever is the highest (GPs) bidder. * No formal lease, but may pay rent. * Some personally smuggle gold out of Zimbabwe. * Supposed to sell exclusively to CO. Fidelity * Legally the sole buyer * A subsidiary of the Printers & and exporter of gold. Reserve Bank of Refiners Zimbabwe (FPR) * 'Infiltrators' who buy Parasitic gold from GPs. * Most are unlicensed gold Dealers dealers who smuggle it * Often offer much higher out of Zimbabwe. prices. * Some double as roving traders in foods and * Some have 'buying other commodities. contracts' with GPs for a guaranteed price. * Some supply panning equipment to 'contracted' panners. Ancillary * Roving traders, shop * Some stay on the panning and owners, vendors for extended periods. Support (peddlers of food actors clothing, electronics). * May rent from panners or nearby rural areas. * Public transport operators. * Others build own shacks. * Service providers (eg * Some set up shop by the barbers, hairdressers, roadside--a 'no man's bodyguards, maids). land'. Opportunists * Criminal elements. * Stay on the panning site for varying periods. * Fugitives. * Some rent from panners * Commercial sex or nearby rural areas. workers. * Others build own shacks. * Operators of pirate taxis (unregistered public transport). * Unregistered gold millers. Table 2: Distribution of post 1999 arrivals in the Angwa-Pote Basin as at July 31st 2002 Category Number Percentage of: Total Category Total Stolen livelihoods Ejected farm workers 1,060 56.5 31.6 Retrenched urban workers 386 20.6 11.5 Retrenched mine workers 430 22.9 12.8 Subtotal 1,876 100.0 55.9 1,876 Crippled livelihoods Working urbanites 230 29.3 6.9 Impoverished rural farmers 450 57.3 13.4 Active mine workers 106 13.5 3.2 Subtotal 786 100.0 23.4 786 'Others' Opportunists 99 14.3 3.0 Unsuccessful job-seekers 144 20.8 4.3 'New farmers' 450 64.9 13.4 Subtotal 693 100.0 20.7 693 Grand total 3,355 Source: Survey, 2002 Table 3: Victims of stolen livelihoods Entrant sub- category Injury Quest Ex-farm Displaced and Home and workers rendered jobless work Ex-mine Rendered jobless Work and/or workers and/or homeless home Ex-urban Rendered jobless Work and/or workers and/or homeless home Table 4: Victims of crippled livelihoods Entrant sub-category Injury Quest Urbanites Real incomes eroded amid Supplementing rising cost of living incomes Villagers Impoverishment due to rising Supplementing cost of living incomes Mine workers Real incomes eroded amid Supplementing rising cost of living incomes Table 5: Examining the 'others' Entrant sub-category Driving force Quest Opportunists Self-enrichment Wealth or staving off poverty Job seekers Inability to Temporary or find 'suitable' permanent employment employment 'New farmers' Poor or no 'Emergency' harvest income
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| Author: | Kamete, Amin Y. |
|---|---|
| Publication: | Transformation |
| Article Type: | Report |
| Geographic Code: | 6ZIMB |
| Date: | Sep 1, 2007 |
| Words: | 10899 |
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