The semi-apologists and the war against terrorism.
In the hours after the twin towers came crashing down, a tidal wave of support for a war against terrorism swept across the country; Americans had not been so united about anything in over a haft-century. But almost immediately, an undertow of perverse opinion was created by the "semi-apologists" -- those who deplore the acts of terrorism but, at the same time, shift an appreciable amount of the blame onto America. In so doing, they not only minimize the acts of terrorism, but suggest that those acts would stop if America would only behave more nobly.Terrorism as a generic term can include the systematic use of terror against a military enemy. But the war we have declared is against the terrorism practiced and openly proclaimed by Osama bin Laden and his ilk, which primarily targets civilians. In 1998, one of bin Laden's organizations stated that the killing of American civilians was "the individual duty of every Muslim." It should go without saying that at least such murderous terrorism against innocent civilians breaks the bounds of civilized behavior and, on its face, can bear no excuse; unfortunately, it cannot go without saying. It is this kind of terrorism for which the semi-apologists do offer back-door excuses.
Their voices may seem no more than the usual chorus emanating from members of the anti-American and/or anti-Israel brigade, not likely to detract from the prevailing sense of outrage against these acts of serial homicide against civilians. But that outrage may not be enough. We may be facing a civilizational challenge much more difficult to understand than those of 20th-century fascism and bolshevism. Beyond aggressive military, diplomatic, and law enforcement action -- and to sustain those action fronts long enough -- this is destined to become an extended war for the minds of the American people. If their understanding of the real and portentous nature of this terrorism falters, the West, America, and Israel could suffer grievously.
The exculpatory note is found most clearly in the familiar refrain of the semi-apologists about the "root causes" of bin Laden's terrorism: the role of this country in visiting abject poverty on the Arab and Muslim world; and the arrogance and disrespect America generally shows towards that world, notably in its support of Israel. Noam Chomsky, M.I.T. professor and pied piper to generations of college students, deplored the terrorist attacks, but then explained that they were committed out of feelings that "the US obstructs freedom and democracy, as well as material plenty for others. In the Middle East, for example, the United States supports Israeli oppression of Palestinians." Susan Sontag famously wrote in The New Yorker that while the slaughter in New York was inexcusable, it should really be seen as "an attack on the world's self-proclaimed superpower, undertaken as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions."
Rabbi Michael Lerner wrote in his magazine Tikkun that, while the terrorism was deplorable, it was partly explained by resentment about "the hoarding of the world's resources by the richest society in the world, and our frantic attempts to accelerate globalization with its attendant inequalities of wealth." The publications of the "Mobilization for Global Justice" -- a sponsor of the often riotous "anti-globalism" protests against the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund -- have been a venue for these semi-apologies.
And then there have been the universities. George Wright, a professor of political science at the University of California, voiced the refrain heard at many campus "peace vigils" when he said, "We should try to understand why there are people in the world that hate the United States." He explained that the terrorism in New York and Washington was an attack on America's economic dominance and leadership in "globalization." At the University of Texas, Professor Robert Jensen indicated that the mass murder in New York was "no more despicable than the massive acts of terrorism ... that the United States has committed during my lifetime." A Rutgers professor told her students that the "ultimate cause [of the terrorism] is the fascism of US foreign policy over the past many decades."
Cynthia McKinney, Congresswoman from Atlanta, eminently qualified as a semi-apologist in a letter she sent to Prince Alwaleed bin Talai of Saudi Arabia. Mayor Giuliani had rejected the ten million dollars given in aid of New York's terrorist victims by the prince, who expressed his distaste for the slaughter while, at the same time, suggesting that the unfortunate American support for Israel had been a reason for it, In her letter to the prince, Congresswoman McKinney rebuked the mayor and moved swiftly beyond her description of the terrorist attack as "heinous," to state that "there are a growing number of people in the United States who recognize, like you, that the US policy in the Middle East needs serious examination." She approvingly quoted an Israeli peace group statement that "Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza strip is the root cause of the violence and hatred."
It is relatively easy, but not enough, to counter that causative logic by examining the expressed motivations of Osama bin Laden and the Qaeda terrorist network. Bin Laden has himself clearly explained his "root causes"; they do not notably include Muslim poverty, for which he offers no program, nor are they centered on the Palestinian cause. His primary purpose is to bring down the "quietist" Islamic regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In an interview in an Arabic language magazine in November 1996, his main attack is on "the police states in the Arab world," starting with Saudi Arabia, from which he had been ejected. "In particular," he said, "the role of the religious organization in the country of the two sacred mosques is of the most ominous of roles." Those "weak and soft" clerics have corrupted Muslim youth with the connivance of the Saudi regime, which "placed the honest scholars in the jails."
But the regime's most grievous sin was "to permit entry into the country of the two sacred mosques to the modern day crusaders," namely the Americans. The United States is seen as the main operational enemy because it supports the regimes of Saudi Arabia and other relatively "moderate" Arab states, helping to keep them out of the hands of bin Laden and his associates. It is also seen as enemy because it corrupts these countries and their youth with Western values of democracy and cultural permissiveness. Bin Laden founded the International Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders, which issued that fatwa imposing a religious responsibility on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies, both civil and military, "in any country where this is possible."
"Jews," not "Israelis," are named, along with "Crusaders" as targets in the full title of the International Islamic Front for Jihad. Bin Laden has said, "the enmity between us [the Muslims] and the Jews goes back far in time ... and ... war between us is inevitable." The Palestin-ian cause has crept onto bin Laden's agenda in the same formulaic way in which it has appeared on the far-Left agenda in America, depicting Israel as the handmaiden of American imperialism in the Middle East. As an Egyptian columnist, Ab'd Al-Mun'im Murad, sympathetic to bin Laden's organization, A1 Qaeda, put it: "The conflict that we call the Arab-Israeli conflict is, in truth, an Arab conflict with Western and particularly American colonialism. The US treats [the Arabs] as it treated the slaves inside the American continent. To this end [the US] is helped by the smaller enemy, and I mean Israel ... the real issue is the Arab-American conflict."
A couple of weeks after the terrorist attacks on the US, Abdul Rahman Al-Rashid, in a Saudi newspaper, confessed confusion about reports that bin Laden was motivated by the Palestinian cause, writing that "never have I seen any reference [by bin Laden] to a political demand related to the occupied territories.... Of course, [there had been] general attacks on Zionism and the Jews [but] the Qaeda never made specific demands such as the establishment of a Palestinian state."
So, the "root cause" of bin Laden's terrorism is neither the poverty of the Arab and Muslim masses, nor the Israel/Palestinian conflict -- nor America's role in either. If the deprived Arab masses suddenly became prosperous, and if Israel turned over its nation to the Palestinians, bin Laden's terrorism would not be abated.
But while bin Laden's motivation often needs to be countered on that level, it is too simplistic a level for any full understanding of the challenge of this particular terrorism. The problem -- for America, the world, and Israel -- goes beyond Al Qaeda, and well beyond the motivations of bin Laden and his personal agenda. This phenomenon is finally more political than religious in nature, and is the 21st century's first global challenge to the forces of democracy and freedom.
At least the barest outlines of Muslim history must now become part of the American consciousness. The "barest outlines" of a rich and complex history are always subject to point of view, but this much seems clear and relevant: Al Qaeda is a manifestation of the radical Islamism that is one wing of a severe conflict now coming to climax within the billion-strong Muslim world. Beginning in the 18th century, the Muslim world's recession from glory was propelled by the confrontation with a European West in its high tide of triumphalist technology and imperialism. Especially after some of the more rigorous restraints of colonialism were broken, many intellectuals and politicians of the Islamic world began to support policies of accommodation to Western modernism, some of which bore fruit.
In the gamut of opinion, however, there were always opponents who alternately proposed a thorough rejection of Western modernism and a return to the past. This was the soil out of which radical Islamism grew. This point of view was dramatically projected onto the world scene in the 1960s and 1970s, after a series of events perceived as setbacks, such as the defeat of Pakistan by India, the takeover by the Shah in Iran, the dissolution of the Syrian /Egyptian United Arab Republic -- supposedly the base of the pan-Arab movement -- and, yes, the defeat of Arab forces by Israel in 1967.
Radical Islamism, however, is driven specifically by a rejection of Western modernism. And whatever merit rejectionism might have in establishing "a new cultural entity," it has, by itself, proved to have little viability on the level of economics or statecraft. Islamist economic theories, for example, tend to be general and rhetorical, not much more than an extension of that rejectionism. One Islamist economist said, "[W] e will produce according to our capabilities and consume according to virtue."
This has essentially left radical Islamism as a utopian political movement without a program for dealing with the modern world or the deprived state of their peoples. In the words of Ray Takeyh, it has been reduced to "an ideology of wrath." Michael Ignatieff of Harvard has called it "an apocalyptic nihilism." Anger will not itself result in satisfying the real desires of the Muslim masses, but if they are offered nothing else, it could indeed provide the basis for a significant global political movement.
It is obviously true that an appeal of radical Islamism for many of the Muslim people lies in their economically and politically depressed state, especially when seen against the background of the former glory and considerable achievement of the Islamic civilization. It is also obviously true that, out of both humanitarianism and self-interest, America and the West should do whatever they can effectively do to help the accommodationist states overcome their deprived conditions. But it is not true that America has had a serious historical role in creating those conditions. Nor is it clear that the remedies lie in the utopian and vague nostrums of either the radical Islamists or some of the American semi-apologists. Whether "globalism" or controlled free market capitalism will hurt those deprived masses, or are their only solution, is a matter for serious debate, not sloganeering.
Radical Islamism has not yet triumphed. It has been estimated that only 10 to 15 percent of the world's Muslims are supportive of the Ladenism that is an ultimate expression of the politics of angel More than that, the accommodationist forces still control the bulk of the established Muslim states. But that control, in many of those states, is under siege. One Muslim scholar, Carl Brown, in his book, Religion and State: The Muslim Approach to Politics, has described the situation in these words:
The accomodationist/establishment forces were not only first in the field against the Western challenge. The), have also been more important than the resistant/antiestablishment forces in terms of political power wielded. They continue to be so even today, although the cumulative weight of the Islamic radical forces may yet swing the balance to a degree unmatched during the past two centuries.
It is that "balance" that is at stake. Established regimes such as Tunisia, Algeria, Lebanon, .Jordan, Morocco, and -- notably -- Egypt, plus even the Gulf states are engaged in a struggle with Ladenist terrorism, which has targeted many of them as "secular" regimes. One political analyst in Cairo, speaking anonymously to the Western media, said that "[i]f the Muslim Brotherhood [in Egypt] was legalized and allowed to run in genuinely free elections, it would almost certainly enjoy a runaway victory." The tact that such remarks are typically made "anonymously" -- and that so many of the targeted Islamic regimes have offered such gingerly support to the coalition against terrorism -- demonstrates the precarious control held by those regimes.
Some analysts of terrorism have suggested that such nihilistic movements are usually bound to fail in the end, but in this case, their initial success could at least result in the overthrow of a number of established Muslim states and their takeover by a triumphant radical Islam. Of course, a return to more traditional religious practices would presumably ensue, but that, including the ramifications for democratic practice, might be considered an internal Islamic matter. And some accommodationist tendencies could eventually redevelop, as they may be struggling to do in Iran. But for whatever time it endures, a radical Islamism in power would, predictably, only make matters worse for a large sector of the Muslim world and open up a more destructive and confrontational chapter for the whole world. For the sake of their unflagging support of the war against terrorism, Americans should understand these consequences, even if the moral outrage at any act of terrorism continues to burn.
However, if there is a long-range battle for the American mind, the public will not be most vulnerable to the argument that America's "global" capitalism is either a credible cause of terrorism against this country, or one that should be readily abandoned. If frustration gathers, it is more likely that the public will be more vulnerable to attacks on American foreign policy in general, as exemplified by Pat Buchan-an's populist attack on American "interventionism"; and that attack will center, as it does for Buchanan as well as for the Left, on America's support of Israel in particular.
To counter that line by the semi-apologists, it would not be credible to deny that the Palestinian/Israeli conflict is a background factor in this terrorism, even though it has only recently emerged on the agenda of bin Laden. The Arab world today represents only about a fifth of the Muslim world, and is not a dominant sector of Islamic polities. However, it is the cradle of Islam and a vehement center of radical Islamism. The control of non-Arab Afghanistan by the Taliban owed much to the help of bin Laden and the incursion of Arab warriors from around the world. The result of the 1967 war in the Middle East, and the strong establishment of Israel in that area, shook the Arab world and obviously stimulated the rise of radical Islamism in that world. Israel, and its control of Jerusalem, became a symbol of the Western confrontation with Islam. This country's support of Israel (" the smaller enemy") is thus an exacerbating factor in the radical Islamist hostility to America. The cause of the Palestin-ian Arabs was not in itself high on the agenda of the Muslim world in general, nor even of the Arab states in the region. Indeed, the "Palestinian cause" did not seriously emerge until after the 1967 war. After that, however, it became a symbolic, highly exploitable item on the Arab and Islamist agenda -- especially since there was a demonstrable contretemps about land, and a Palestinian displacement intensified by the fact that surrounding Arab countries placed so many of those Palestinians in "refugee camps," rather than absorb them.
In short, it cannot be denied that American support of Israel is a factor in Islamist hostility to the US. But it is also apparent that it is neither the prime nor the prior reason for Islamic hostility, or for terrorist activity towards this country -- and neither would stop if America abandoned Israel. To the contrary, if America were to accede to terrorist demands that it pull away from Israel, it would only be seen as a terrorist success. Ensuing would not only be the immediate danger to Israel, but all the consequences of radical Islamism gaining leverage in its efforts to topple the regimes more open to future moderation.
It may seem surprising that all the disinformation spread about the effect of America's support of Israel should have had so little initial effect on public opinion. Right after the terrorist acts in New York and Washington, surveyed American attitudes were found to have become even more favorable to Israel than before. Over the last quarter of a century, year after year, Americans have consistently said that they were more sympathetic to the Israelis than to the Arabs by a large margin. In the last 12 surveys with this language, more sympathy was expressed for the Israelis over the Palestinian Arabs by an average ratio of 45 to 13 percentage points. On September 14, that ratio was 55 to 7. Conventional wisdom once held that such favorability to Israel was tied to Israel's patent usefulness to America during the Cold War, and it was often suggested that such favorability might falter `after the end of the Cold War. That did not happen. A strong factor in the American public's sympathy for Israel has always been the felt ties of common political and social culture. When asked, a large majority of Americans have said that Israelis are "more like us," as compared with Arabs. The positive interaction of Jews with other Americans during the past half-century has clearly played a role.
On the other hand, the measure of "sympathy" may be a weak reed on which to rest the predictability of the American public's support of Israel in a crunch; it does not take into account the question of how much Americans are willing to "sacrifice" for that sympathy. In the last four Gallup polls on the subject, between May of 1998 and July, 2000, 2 out of 10 Americans have consistently held that in the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians, the United States should take Israel's side, but 7 out of 10 have said that the United States "should not take either side." According to a Newsweek poll in October 2001, about 6 out of 10 said that America's relationship with Israel was a big reason for the terrorist attack, although at the time, the same proportion of Americans shrewdly agreed that if America moved away from Israel, it would not stop the terrorism.
The evidence is that American public opinion on support of Israel, while highly favorable, is not as deep as it might be, and in a crunch for America, both that opinion and the war against terrorism could be vulnerable to this theme expressed by the semi-apologists. This Israeli-connected theme is strengthened by certain tendencies of opinion expressed by many influentials who do not qualify as semi-apologists. One such tendency is exemplified by those media and public officials who -- presumably in an attempt to be "fair" and "diplomatic" -- over-exercise the principle of equivalence. This often happens in company with a failure to acknowledge the legitimate role of self-defense in the arena of violence, as defined by the United Nations Charter. Thus, whenever there is an exchange between Palestinian terrorism and Israeli response, an abundance of media editorials will give them equal weight and call for equal subsidence. It is fair game for observers to criticize Israel when they think it overreacts or otherwise behaves unreasonably. But the automatic application of equivalence feeds the cause of those semi-apologists who are using Ladenist terrorism as a means of furthering their anti-Israeli or pro-Palestinian ideology.
An exaggerated distinction between Palestinian and Ladenist terrorism serves the same purpose. Some Palestinian terrorists may have a more limited purpose than that of Al Qaeda, which is one of the reasons that bin Laden has not had it at the top of his agenda. On the other hand, Ha'aretz recently reported that of the first one hundred Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel, 66 belonged to Hamas, 34 to the Islamic Jihad. Both of these terrorist groups had core training in Al Qaeda camps, and are part of the radical Islamist network. There is no reason to believe that they would lay down their bombs or dismantle their and-American hostility if this country were to withdraw its support of Israel. There is more reason to believe that if terrorist pressure were to cause America to withdraw its support -- to the detriment of Israel, orthodox radical Islamism would even more thoroughly rule in the Palestinian state -- to the detriment of Palestinian Arabs, and with little profit to America's image.
Perhaps the semi-apologists are most reprehensible in introducing any discussion at all of the "root causes" of a terrorism which is in itself inexcusable by any civilized and moral standards. They are largely impelled by the kind of philosophy simply expressed by the Russian anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin, that "everything that allows the triumph of the revolution is moral," voiced before him and after him by a number of nihilists, including those of radical Islamism. The tragic irony is that any serious effect the semi-apologists might have would directly contravene the "compassionate" goals in whose name they speak -- whether for the condition of the depressed Islamic or Palestinian people, or the lessening of hostility and warfare in the world.
But whatever the consequences, the acts of serial terrorism will not stop until the Ladenist movement -- beyond bin Laden himself -- is destroyed. If this war is as extended and difficult as promised, at its core will be a struggle for the minds of Americans. Under burdensome circumstances, the resolve of the American people could be weakened if they don't understand the full import of this terrorism. And that American resolve could be undermined by the specious semi-apologist suggestion that the Ladenists would refrain from terrorism if we would behave more nobly, notably by withdrawing our support from Israel.
EARL D. RABB was executive director of the San Francisco area Jewish Community Relations Council (1950-1987) and founding director of the Perlmutter Institute for Jewish Advocacy at Brandeis University (1989-1994). His latest book is Jews and the New American Scene (with S.M. Lipset), Harvard University Press, 1995.
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| Title Annotation: | following U.S. terrorist attacks |
|---|---|
| Author: | Rabd, Earl D. |
| Publication: | Midstream |
| Geographic Code: | 1USA |
| Date: | Nov 1, 2001 |
| Words: | 3890 |
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