Australia and Indonesia: Rebuilding Relations After East Timor.
Australia's intervention in East Timor in late 1999 caused a major rupture in the country's relations with Indonesia, which are currently the worst they have been in three decades. Rebuilding a stable partnership with Jakarta remains imperative, given the Republic's proximity to Australia and the key role that the archipelago plays in wider Southeast Asian multilateralism. Achieving this will not be easy, given the absence of the sentimental ballast that had come to characterize government-to-government relations for much of the 1990s. Any policies that are instituted will have to build on those diplomatic openings that do exist while moving to ensure that potential pitfalls -- of which there are many -- do not escalate to assume unwarranted significance and importance on the bilateral agenda.Introduction
In late 1999, Australia undertook a commitment to one of the country's most significant external military operations since the Vietnam War -- the intervention to stem the violence and bloodshed that was unleashed following East Timor's August vote to separate from Indonesia. The action represented a major shift in Canberra's traditional accommodationist policy towards Jakarta, undermining a key relationship that for much of the 1990s had been emphasized as the crucial linchpin for Australia's wider engagement with Southeast Asia.
This article analyses the current impasse between Australia and Indonesia, and assesses the future prospects for relations between the two countries. It considers what sort of partnership is realistically feasible under present conditions and outlines basic building blocks to further bilateral co-operation and interaction. The potentially explosive issue of defence ties is also discussed and gauged in terms of the extent that these can (and, indeed, should) be re-instituted. The central theme running throughout the article is that despite several very real challenges, a renewed Canberra-Jakarta partnership built on practicalities (rather than sentiment) is certainly possible. Provided this is carefully managed, relations between the two countries may yet recover and, indeed, prosper.
Background to the Breakdown in Australian-Indonesian Relations: The East Timor Intervention
The main priority that has guided Australian foreign and security policy for most of the 1990s has been to shape and consolidate a partnership with Indonesia -- Canberra's most important regional partner and the state upon which its wider Southeast Asian engagement policy depends. During the Paul Keating era (1991-96), Indonesia became the principal focus of Australian foreign policy. Between April 1992 and December 1995, the Prime Minister made no less than six visits to the country, achieving the unprecedented Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) in 1995, which committed both states to consult one another and, if necessary, implement joint measures to meet common challenges. [1]
Although perhaps not as explicit in his overtones towards Jakarta, the current Liberal-Nationalist coalition led by John Howard has been equally cognizant of the need to manage a stable relationship with Indonesia. In 1997, the government secured an important Maritime Delimitation Treaty (DMT), which settled all frontiers between the two countries in the Arafura and Timor Seas and eastern Indian Ocean. [2] This was then followed by a period of intense diplomatic activity aimed at lobbying the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to relax the conditions attached to the restructuring of Indonesia's loans at the height of the Asian financial crisis. [3] Rationalizing the policy in New York, Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, made the point, "being seen through the IMF to bully and cajole [Jakarta] into a particular political paradigm will [merely]... invite a negative and lasting backlash from Indonesians [to the complete detriment of our regional engagement effort]." [4]
East Timor has functioned as something of a test for Canberra's longstanding policy of seeking closer relations with Indonesia. Although Australia is the only Western state to have formally acknowledged Jakarta's claim to sovereignty over the territory -- granting de jure recognition in 1979 -- the topic has been passionately debated within the country. Historically, there is great emotional attachment to East Timor as a result of the World War II experience and the critical role that the island's populace played in supporting Australian (and Dutch) guerrilla operations against occupying Japanese forces. [5] There has also been an active and ongoing media interest in the Indonesian annexation, not least because of the Indonesian military's highly questionable human rights record in the province. The sizeable East Timorese refugee community in Australia, which currently numbers around 20,000, has further complicated the situation, helping to highlight the issue as a crucial test-case for Canberra's commitment to, and emphasis on, liberal democracy and basic humanitarian standards. [6]
While the salience of this domestic debate is something that neither the Keating nor the Howard government has been able to ignore, for most of the 1990s the cause of East Timorese self-determination (and, arguably, human rights) was sacrificed for the sake of maintaining the wider strategic partnership with Indonesia. Indeed, this overall policy stance remained in place even after the prospect of formal independence became a realistic possibility following Soeharto's forced resignation in May 1998 and his replacement by B.J. Habibie. Reflecting this, Australia repeatedly argued that East Timor should remain an integral part of the Indonesian Republic. Canberra also affirmed confidence in the unilateral ability of Indonesia's national armed forces, the TNI, [7] to maintain order and security in the province, and actively sought to moderate the vocal international criticism of Jakarta that was gathering at this time. [8]
It was only in late 1998 that Australia began to exhibit a shift in its overall stance on East Timor. In December of that year, Prime Minister Howard personally wrote to Habibie urging a gradual Indonesian disengagement from East Timor, possibly along the lines of the Matigon Accords, which had been used to resolve the situation in New Caledonia. [9] Canberra's activism gathered pace during the first few months of 1999, particularly after Habibie's surprise announcement that he was prepared to let the East Timorese decide for themselves whether or not they wished to accept a wider autonomy package and, thereby, remain part of Indonesia. Certainly, from January onwards, official rhetoric in Australia began to show an increasing preference for accelerated independence (as opposed to the earlier predilection for a prolonged period of self-rule), possibly under the initial aegis of an international monitoring team.
This more overt stance proved to be critical in helping to define negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal, the former colonial power in East Timor and the state recognized by the United Nations as holding legal sovereignty over the territory. These talks culminated with the May 1999 comprehensive agreement on East Timor, which provided for a "popular consultation" (Jakarta assiduously rejected any use of the terms "vote" or "referendum") on the province s constitutional future. Three months later, a secret ballot -- overseen by an international police monitoring force (UNAMET) -- took place, which returned an overwhelming result against autonomy (78.5 per cent) and, by implication, in favour of independence. [10]
It was with the unprecedented civil violence that followed this vote, however, that the true extent of the shift in Australia's Indonesia policy became most apparent. Canberra was not only one of the most vocal critics of Jakarta's inability to control the highly destructive scorched earth campaign unleashed by pro-integrationist militias (many of whom were either actively or passively supported by the armed forces). [11] Together with the United States, it also strongly pressured Jakarta to concede to the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force to forcibly restore order in the province. Four thousand five hundred Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel were subsequently dispatched to form the backbone of an International Force East Timor (INTERFET), whose deployment on 20 September 1999 effectively signalled the end of Jakarta's twenty-five years of rule over the territory [12]
Events between late 1998 and February 2000 marked a significant departure from both Howard's earlier and traditional Australian policy towards Indonesia and East Timor, and require some explanation. Several factors appeared to have played a role in encouraging the shift.
First, assessments carried out by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) began to suggest that Indonesia could simultaneously handle its own traumatic transition towards democracy while dealing with the loss of East Timor. Secondly, a comprehensive government review, which sought the opinions of Timorese political leaders and refugees on the question of autonomy versus independence, determined that even a nominal connection to Jakarta would probably be unacceptable to the majority of the territory's population. Thirdly, personal interjections by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer fed into an increasingly active diplomatic line vis-a-vis Indonesia. Of particular importance was his insistence that, just as in Cambodia, Australia was faced with a historic opportunity to craft a resolution to a long-standing conflict that was more significant to Australian security and of greater moment for domestic political debate. [13] Finally, the totally unexpected announcement by Habibie in January 19 99 that a rejection of his offer of autonomy would effectively result in separation and independence changed the entire geopolitical context of the East Timor conflict. This not only provided an opening for the more activist agenda that Downer was beginning to push at this time but it also effectively presented the Australian Government with a fait accompli that simply could not be ignored. [14]
The increasingly turbulent situation that followed the August 1999 consultation, however, provided the most pressing rationale for direct intervention. As one U.S. State Department official remarked: "There is a massacre quotient above which some sort of involvement inevitably has to occur." [15] Growing revelations that much of the pro-integrationist violence was occurring with the active, or at least tacit, support of the Indonesian military merely reinforced the moral argument for adopting a more active and forceful stance to the East Timor issue. Because this was expressed through an increasingly mobilized and media-driven public mindset, it left Canberra with little choice but to act. In the judgement of two local experts, "no Australian government could have survived if it stood by and did nothing." Embassy officials in Washington further believe that had there been no move to stem the violence unleashed by the pro-integrationist militias, the country's standing as a responsible regional power would al so have been severely undermined, particularly in the estimation of democratically minded states such as the Philippines and Thailand. [16]
The Current Australian-Indonesian Impasse
The most immediate impact of Australia's actions in East Timor has been felt in terms of the country's bilateral partnership with Indonesia, which is currently the worst it has been for three decades. In 1999, the widely hailed AMS was terminated. In justifying the move, Feisal Tanjung, Indonesia's Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, specifically asserted that Canberra's actions in East Timor were inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the Agreement. [17] Since then, relations have continued to deteriorate amid a surge of national sentiment, which has targeted Australian expatriates in Java and outlying provinces as well as diplomatic missions in Jakarta and Surabaya. [18] One particularly serious incident occurred in November 2000 when the Australian Ambassador, John McCarthy, was attacked and placed in personal danger by a rioting crowd of several dozen proJakarta protesters. According to diplomatic sources, the Indonesian police deliberately failed to contain the incident, wh ich occurred during the opening of an Australian insurance office in Mahassa, southern Sulawesi. [19]
Indicative of the poor state of relations that presently exists between the two countries has been the severance of virtually all high-level governmental and official contacts. Military-to-military links --including joint training and exercises, both of which were extremely strong prior to the East Timor crisis -- have been curtailed and show no sign of being resumed in the near future. Ministerial relations have also been reduced to the most basic level of common interest and certainly do not embrace anywhere near the range of issues that were commonplace during the 1990s. [20]
For many Indonesians, Australia's actions in East Timor were tantamount to a betrayal of trust from what had hitherto been a very close and supportive friend. Having been one of the few countries to have explicitly recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor and having consistently backed Jakarta's position in the province since 1976, it was regarded as particularly irksome that Canberra should have been at the forefront of moves that eventually led to the territory's independence. [21] The fact that this occurred when Indonesia was already experiencing considerable internal social, political, and economic difficulties only served to fuel national misgivings. In the words of one analyst, "Australia became a very bad friend at a very bad time." [22]
Further exacerbating local discontent are entrenched suspicions that Australia deliberately orchestrated the vote in East Timor and has since sought to encourage secessionism in other parts of Indonesia. Not only has there been a tendency (incorrectly) to equate the policies of the central Australian Government with the actions of independent human rights activists and lobbyists that have called for greater international mediation in areas such as Aceh and (especially) Irian Jaya. There has also been an assumption that Australia (and the international community in general) will inevitably come to support independence in Irian Jaya simply because it is Christian -- which is itself a misapplied lesson from the East Timor experience. Significantly, these views have been embraced and aired not only by hardliners in the TNI, but also by senior politicians in Jakarta, including two successive Ministers of Defence, Juwono Sudarsono and Mohamad Mahfud. [23]
The practical effect of these perceptions has been to underscore Australia as, at best, an unnecessary and, at worst, an actively hostile state that is seeking to undermine Indonesia's stability and position in Southeast Asia. Indeed, the idea that Canberra constitutes a "regional appendix", which should be neither recognized nor embraced as part of the wider Southeast Asian family has begun to take on added currency in Indonesia, to the extent that it now forms official dictat among certain government officials and ministries.
One of the key challenges that has emerged for Australia, therefore, is how to rebuild a positive partnership with Indonesia, which avoids possible pitfalls that could further strain bilateral relations. Such an undertaking is important for at least three reasons.
First, Indonesia constitutes Australia's largest and most important regional neighbour. As such, it necessarily occupies a crucial place in foreign policy and defence calculations. The existence of an openly antagonistic state so close to the country's shores is something that no government would seek to court, let alone countenance through active indifference.
Secondly, a stable relationship will allow Canberra to play a constructive role in Indonesia's future development, which will, itself, contribute to peace and stability in the so-called Inner Arc surrounding Australia's northern approaches.
Thirdly, Indonesia remains Australia's natural bridge to Southeast Asia. Although it is true that Jakarta's regional standing has suffered over the last three years as a result of pressing internal problems, the Republic continues to hold considerable sway in ASEAN and its associated forums. This abiding influence is something that can be used forcefully either in support or against Canberra's wider engagement efforts, particularly given lingering concerns in several Southeast Asian capitals over the way Australia portrayed its intervention in East Timor (as a U.S. deputy). [24]
Rebuilding Australian-Indonesian Relations: What Type of Partnership?
It is extremely unlikely that Australian-Indonesian relations will ever return to the heady days of the Paul Keating era. Not only were the highly close contacts that existed at that time largely a product of the personal affinity between the Australian Prime Minister and President Soeharto, but the fallout from the East Timor intervention has also fundamentally transformed the way both states view one another. In particular, it has destroyed the notion that Jakarta and Canberra necessarily need to engage one another on the basis of a uniquely "special" partnership. The future Australian-Indonesian relationship will almost certainly be based on practicalities rather than sentiment, where working together is seen as a matter of necessity and propinquity, not of the heart. [25]
Such a state of affairs will obviously not lend itself to the type of unprecedented cordiality that characterized the AustralianIndonesian partnership during much of the 1990s, and particularly between 1990 and 1995. One of the remarkable features of that period was the inability of what would, under normal circumstances, be major diplomatic minefields to upset the course of wider bilateral relations. [26] The marginal damage wrought by the 1991 Dili massacre was, perhaps, the clearest indication of this, although the limited fallout engendered by Howard's failure to quickly denounce the quasiracist policies of populist Australian politician Pauline Hanson after her One Nation party rose to prominence in 1996 was, in many ways, just as indicative. [27]
In the absence of such "sentimental ballast", it will be far easier for disputes and controversies -- both major and minor -- to have a prominent and direct impact on bilateral relations. The key for Canberra over the next few years will be to shape policies that constructively build on those diplomatic openings that do exist, while moving to ensure that potential pitfalls -- of which there are many -- do not escalate to assume unwarranted significance and importance on the bilateral agenda.
Stabilizing Australian-Indonesian Relations: Basic Building Blocks
Restoring some semblance of stability to the Australian-Indonesian relationship will take time. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that it may take as long as ten years before a fully constructive partnership re-emerges. While this may be somewhat of an overstatement, the chaotic situation that currently besets Indonesia undoubtedly works against a rapid resumption of ties. The most significant problem in this regard is the lack of strong centralized leadership in Jakarta. Since assuming the presidency in October 1999, Abdurrahaman Wahid has "successfully" managed to undermine much of his political capital through an erratic leadership style that has been characterized by "off-the-cuff" comments, abrupt changes in policy direction and impulsive, largely unnecessary, Cabinet reshuffles. [28] Reflecting on these tendencies, Amien Rais, the Chair of the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly (and a possible successor to Wahid) has remarked: "[For Indonesians] there are three mysteries in life: when they are going to die, the weather, and what their President is going to say or do next." [29]
Compounding the situation has been the President's general inability to decisively confront the myriad problems currently facing Indonesia, which range from a corrupt and dysfunctional civil service to a badly faltering economy, ongoing separatist tensions, and a demoralized (but still highly dangerous) security apparatus. [30] This failing has exacerbated tensions between Wahid and numerous competing centres of power, including secular nationalists, radical Islamists, members of the former political all-pervasive Golkar Party, Vice-President Megawati Sukarnoputri and, perhaps most seriously, the military. [31]
All this has served to obfuscate the clarity of Canberra's future strategy in Indonesia, not least because it has made it difficult to know what sort of relationships to build and with whom. As James Cotton has observed, Australia will almost certainly have to wait for things to settle down in Indonesia -- for the country to sort itself out -- before any substantive progress on rebuilding ties can begin. [32]
This being said, there are certain things that can be done, which should help at least to lay the foundation for a future working relationship. Most importantly, Australia can seek to engage Indonesia in areas of common interest. Several commentators have highlighted East Timor as representing an obvious issue to concentrate on in this regard. It has been suggested, for instance, that a triangular partnership be established to deal with such things as seabed resource allocations, refugee resettlement, language policy, civil institution-building, infrastructural and capital development, and the control of militias that continue to operate from West Timor. [33]
Certainly, these areas are important. However, it is probably too soon for Australia and Indonesia to attempt to work together on such substantive matters. Because Canberra's role in the INTERFET intervention remains an extremely sensitive and raw issue in Jakarta, there exists very little room for meaningful diplomatic bargaining and negotiation on issues related to East Timor. This was specifically recognized by both Indonesian and Australian analysts attending a twoday forum on bilateral confidence-building measures held in Canberra in November 2000. [34]
A more realistic approach would be for Australia to undertake initiatives designed to bolster East Timorese self-sufficiency and ensure the territory's long-term viability. This would be very much to the advantage of Indonesia and, hopefully, appreciated as such. As Alan Dupont has observed:
A weak and chronically unstable East Timor could present opportunities for unwelcome external power involvement by states with radical ideologies or anti-Western leanings -- precisely the outcome that [Jakarta] has always feared ... [Equally] there is a ... risk that poverty, intercommunal tensions and entrenched political violence could lead to social unrest, which would inevitably spill over East Timor's borders, creating friction with Indonesia and other states. [35]
There are many who remain sceptical of Dili's long-term socioeconomic viability and doubt Australia's capacity to foster a polity that will not become another Melanesian dependent. Several factors are commonly stressed in this regard. On assuming full independence, East Timor will be one of the poorest countries in the world: more than 40 per cent of the population currently live on less than US$1 a day, while overall per capita income is estimated at only US$400 a year. [36] Most of the indigenous infrastructure was completely destroyed by prointegrationist militias in the aftermath of the August 1999 independence referendum, and will have to be rebuilt. The economy is based on a very narrow resource base, primarily Arabica coffee beans, sandalwood, and fish, and is mainly being sustained on "artificial" influxes of money generated by the large numbers of United Nations personnel currently stationed in the territory. [37]
In many ways, however, the prospects for East Timor are not as grim as the above prognosis suggests. There remains in place a fairly strong civil society, far more so than that which existed in Cambodia at the end of the Third Indochina War. One indicator of this is the relative lack of prostitution, despite the existence of a (U.N.) cash economy and the presence of peacekeeping troops prone to periods of inactivity and boredom. [38] In addition, both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank have indicated that generous development assistance will be forthcoming. Based on aid provided by international agencies to Mozambique and Eritrea, levels could run to as much as US$100 million per year after the emergency phase is over. [39] This will provide much needed financial breathing space for the new government to begin rebuilding infrastructure and diversifying into other areas of potential economic activity, such as tourism, agribusiness, and oil and gas exploration in the Timor Gap. [40]
Reflecting on these positive facets, Australia has declared that it is fully ready to support East Timor's transition to independence, pledging, along with Japan and Portugal, to underwrite the territory's short-term financial future. [41] The Howard government has also committed A$28 million over the next five years to defence assistance, most of which will be used to help raise an independent East Timorese army. [42]
There are many other areas where Canberra can and ought to play a useful and constructive role, not least in terms of helping to provide resolute and efficient systems for justice, law and order, education, training, and general civil administration -- all vital components of any functioning sovereign entity. By fostering development in these key sectors, Australia will be laying important groundwork for Dili's future integration and security within ASEAN. This will not only contribute to peace and stability along Indonesia's southern rim, but in so doing, it should also help to ensure that East Timor acts as a bond (rather than an obstacle) to relations between Canberra and Jakarta within the wider Southeast Asian community. [43]
Apart from East Timor, Australia must also actively look for opportunities where it can further its involvement in and with Indonesia itself. Clearly, Canberra will have to tread lightly here and avoid overtures that are likely to be perceived as overly meddlesome or imperialistic. Obviously, initiatives that seek to address sensitive internal issues, such as human rights and corruption, will have to wait until a more consistent and solid basis has been established for bilateral contacts. However, there are several confidence-building measures (CBMs) that could be instituted, which would both help to "break the diplomatic ice" presently existing between Jakarta and Canberra and, more importantly, lock in place norms and procedures for future engagement and deliberations.
At the most basic level, Australia could help to promote more intensive (and constructive) people-to-people links through tourism, educational exchanges, and by fostering an active programme of "track two" diplomacy. These contacts proved to be an important element of the stable Australian-Indonesian partnership during the 1990s, and could be effectively used to mitigate some of the "conspiranoia" that is currently besetting bilateral relations. [44] In addition, Canberra could usefully contribute to Indonesia's economic development and restructuring, both directly, by providing aid and assistance, and indirectly, by acting as an intermediary between Jakarta and international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.
On a diplomatic front, Australia should be more systematic about reaching out to the various moderate factions that continue to hold sway in Indonesia, especially in terms of emphasizing the many mutual benefits that could result from increased bilateral functional contacts and co-operation. Canberra could also think seriously about issuing a joint statement with Jakarta affirming Indonesian sovereignty over the Natuna Islands in the South China Sea. As William Tow has observed, this would be a good public relations move in the sense that it would be sure to generate a favourable response in Jakarta. [45] Moreover, it is an action that is unlikely to impact negatively on Australia's relations with other countries in Southeast Asia (with the possible exception of Vietnam, which might view this as a threat to its demarcation line on the continental shelf in the South China Sea). [45]
Perhaps the most important thing that the Australian Government could do, however, is to help develop CBMs for Irian Jaya and Aceh, the two most restive provinces in Indonesia today. Canberra has already gone to extraordinary lengths to affirm its unambiguous support for Jakarta's territorial integrity and to make it clear that the government supports the independence aspirations of neither Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) nor the Free Papua Movement (OPM). [47] However, it is essential that Australia demonstrate a practical commitment to this rhetoric by working to develop concrete measures specifically designed to dampen centrifugal tendencies and pressures. These should be finessed in conjunction with Indonesia, possibly via the "track two" diplomatic process noted above, and could include such areas as devolution, resource sharing/allocation, and law and order (particularly with regard to TNI deployments).
The importance of developing viable CBMs on Aceh and, particularly, Irian Jaya should not be underestimated. A major outbreak of mass violence in either province would undoubtedly generate significant public pressure in Australia for some sort of stabilizing intervention, which Canberra would be extremely hardpressed to ignore. [48] If unrest breaks out in Irian Jaya, there would be the added complication of Papua New Guinea (PNG), a state that Australia is treatybound to defend. Such an obligation could present numerous difficulties, particularly if the fighting were to escalate and spill over into PNG territory. [49]
Any actual dispatch of Australian Defence Force (ADF) assets as a result of these types of considerations would be catastrophic in terms of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. Not only would Jakarta be sure to view such a deployment as direct evidence of Canberra's wider territorial designs on the Republic, but unlike East Timor, there would also be a strong likelihood of the operation being contested by the TNI and, thereby, possibly involving a substantial number of military-related casualties and deaths. The prospects for a renewal of ties under such circumstances would be negligible, quite likely destroying any chance for an Australian-Indonesian rapprochement. [50]
The physical institution of these building blocks will obviously require Indonesia to meet Australia half-way. Above all, officials in Jakarta will have to accept at "face value" that Canberra has no wish or desire to destroy the Republic's territorial integrity and will refrain from grounding policies and assessments on unfounded, speculative forecasts. Indeed, until this occurs, everything that Australia does to improve bilateral relations will be held captive to Indonesian suspicions of its "true" intentions, formed not on the basis of what has or is happening but around predictions over what will apparently happen.
Just as importantly, there needs to be a more honest and frank appreciation of the events surrounding the East Timor intervention itself. Jakarta has to accept the failure of its past policies in the province and recognize that the majority of the island's inhabitants neither saw themselves, nor wished to be considered part of Indonesia. It was this that ultimately led to the vote against autonomy (which, itself, was a product of a decision made in Jakarta), not some grand geostrategic scheme cooked up in the defence corridors of Canberra. Moreover, there has to be an appreciation of the liberal democratic ethos that underscores Australian political society and the fact that this simply would not have tolerated inaction in response to the civil violence that was unleashed following the 1999 "consultation".
Australian-Indonesian Defence Ties
As noted above, Australian-Indonesian defence relations have been completely undermined as a result of the INTERFET intervention. This is true in terms of both policy - as reflected in the termination of the AMS treaty - and working partnerships. Indeed, other than occasional low-level military educational and staff college exchanges, no physical military-to-military links currently exist between the two countries, including components that were common during the 1990s, such as land force exercises and Special Forces (SF) training. [51]
For Jakarta, the cessation of these contacts has largely been a product of the ill-feeling generated by the general fallout from the East Timor crisis. However, for Canberra, it has had more to do with ongoing concerns about military professionalism within the TNI, particularly in terms of respect for human rights and related internal security duties. Apprehensions were first elicited following widespread allegations of direct army involvement in the wave of prointegrationist violence that accompanied East Timor's independence transition, both before and after the August 1999 consultation. They have since been entrenched by confirmation of this complicity (at least with respect to certain units); evidence that SF elements continue to assist militia attacks on refugee camps in West Timor; and by the heavy-handed tactics that are now being used against groups such as GAM and OPM in Aceh and Irian Jaya respectively. [52]
It has been suggested that Australia should seek to re-engage Indonesia in the defence realm, both as a useful CBM that would have beneficial political spin-offs and as a way of helping Jakarta to create a viable and effective military structure. Moreover, ADF planners argue that because any attack on the Australian mainland would have to be staged through the Indonesian archipelago, the restoration of military ties is a matter of practical urgency as it would help to create a positive strategic shield to the north. [53]
A resumption of the military relationship has also been defended on the grounds that, despite some problems within certain SF units, the TNI remains a generally proficient structure that is capable of professional' engagement. Indeed, several commentators maintain that the close cooperation and baseline relationship established between the ADF and Indonesian army units during the 1990s had major benefits during the East Timor crisis and was one of the main factors accounting for the uncontested nature of the INTERFET deployment. [54] According to Major General Peter Cosgrove, who led the intervention force:
I believe there was a pay-off there through an understanding, hopefully some level of respect, which defused the situation that could have been much more critical. They predisposed protagonists from my level down to talk trough issues rather than to shoot through them. Maybe our astonishingly low casualty count ... is to some degree testimony to that factor. [Specifically, two benefits derived from the military relationship]. First, TNT had a clear view of our competence and determination and, secondly, I'm convinced that from time to time personal relationships and mutual respect had payoffs in minimizing and resolving misunderstandings at the level of our troops' interaction. [55]
Notwithstanding these various considerations, it is unlikely that a full resumption of military ties will occur in the near future (assuming that Jakarta would even agree to this in the first place). The involvement of certain elements of the TNI in the humanitarian crisis that broke out in East Timor is now a matter of record, even if it did not involve the full Indonesian military apparatus. This, together with ongoing concerns over army-militia links in West Timor and internal security operations in Aceh and Irian Jaya, [56] has prevented any broad political consensus from emerging in Canberra that countenances a rapid restoration of the defence programme. [57]
This is particularly true of SF contacts, largely because specialist units trained by the Australian Special Air Service (SAS), such as Kopassus, Detachment-81 (the army's main anti-terrorist squad), and KOSTRAD (the Strategic Reserves), have been the ones most closely identified with human rights abuses in East Timor and elsewhere. There is currently very little support for re-establishing links with these organizations and general agreement that, should training exchanges eventually be resuscitated, the focus must be on defence (rather than internal security) [58] and only provided after a process of careful vetting. [55]
Indicative of the present (political) aversion to rapidly re-instituting a comprehensive programme of defence co-operation with Indonesia was the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee's 2000 Report on East Timor. Published in December 2000, this specifically argued against a prompt renewal of substantive military contacts, stressing that no moves should be made in this direction until two broad criteria had been met. These conditions - and their rationalization - are important and are worth quoting in full:
The first criterion is a resolution of the refugee problem in West Timor and the neutralization of the East Timorese militias, including prevention of their incursions into East Timor. While the TNI abrogates its responsibilities in West Timor and fails to comply fully with the Indonesian Government relating to refugees and militias, it is not in the interests of Australia, East Timor, or other countries involved in the rebuilding of East Timor after the ravages of the militias and TNT in September 1999, for Australia to provide defence cooperation with Indonesia. It would almost be tantamount to condoning TNT actions during and after the destruction.
The second criterion is clear evidence that the TNI is dismantling the territorial command structure throughout Indonesia and that it is becoming a professional defence force rather than mainly an internal security force. It has been the territorial command structure that has given the TNI the power to meddle in domestic matters both nationally and right down to village levels, and given rise to gross human rights abuses perpetrated in East Timer and elsewhere in Indonesia. [60]
While a full resumption of the Australian--Indonesian defence programme remains unrealistic at this stage, there is scope for more limited co-operation. As previously noted, periodic educational activities and staff college level exchanges continue to take place. These could be expanded and further consolidated, both in their own right and as part of the broader people-to-people effort outlined above. Such contacts will be helpful not only in terms of facilitating mutual trust and understanding between Australian and Indonesian officers. They will also provide a useful mechanism for furthering greater human development, and thereby professionalism, within the TNI.
Canberra and Jakarta could also usefully collaborate in addressing proximate "soft", non-traditional military threats, such as piracy and unregulated population movements. The magnitude of these problems has greatly increased in recent years, their scope and incidence driven by the general climate of social instability in Indonesia, which has encouraged unsolicited migration, exacerbated official corruption, and fed into a proliferating parallel economy powered by both land and sea-based illicit activities. Further compounding the situation has been the difficulty of effectively securing the expansive Indonesian coastline, something that has been made no easier by the lack of resources Jakarta has been able to devote to the maritime realm since 1997 -- the year when the country's financial crisis first started to take hold. [61]
There is considerable scope for practical Australian assistance in helping to regulate these "grey area" phenomena, particularly with regard to proactive intelligence exchange, the provision of coastal surveillance technologies and the institution of joint patrols to secure strategic sea-lines of communication. [62] Collaboration of this sort would not only benefit both countries -- human smuggling and piracy in contiguous regions such as the Torres Strait and the Arafura Sea having as many implications for Canberra as Jakarta -- but it would also act as a useful "first base" from which to re-institutionalize more traditional defence links and ties if and when this becomes politically acceptable. [65]
Conclusion
There is little question that significant challenges lie ahead in terms of repairing the Australian--Indonesian relationship, particularly given the suspicion and instability that continues to underscore the general political climate in Jakarta. However, with careful and deft management, there is no reason why a renewed partnership, built on transparency, reliability, and consistency should not eventually develop. While this will almost certainly lack the empathy of the Keating era, it will provide the basis for a more business-like and frank style of engagement. Not only will this give a somewhat more "honest" character to the bilateral relationship, but it should also help to prevent latent sources of tension from festering into long-term and possibly intractable problems.
PETER CHALK is a Policy Analyst at Rand, Arlington, Virginia, USA.
NOTES
(1.) See Patrick Walters, "Australia and Indonesia", in Australia and Asia, edited by Mark McGillivray and Gary Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 173; Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1995), PP. 202-3; Nancy Viviani, "Australia and Southeast Asia", in Seeking Asian Engagement, edited by James Cotton and John Ravenhill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 155-56; and Bob Lowry, "Australia-Indonesia Security Cooperation: For Better or Worse?" Strategic Defence Studies Centre Working Paper 299 (1996), pp. 31-32.
(2.) "Fixed Relations", Weekend Australian, 15-16 March 1997.
(3.) Gary Smith, "Perspectives on Australian Foreign Policy, 1998", Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 2 (1999): 194-95; and "We're Solid in a Crisis", The Australian, 27 April 1998.
(4.) Alexander Downer, "Australia -- Stability in the Asia Pacific" (Address to the Australian-American Association, Harvard Club, New York, 8 June 1998), accessed via http://wwwww.dfat.gov.au/pmb/speeches/fa_sp/stability-asia_jun98.html .
(5.) See James Dunn, Timor. A People Betrayed (Milton, Queensland: Jacaranda Press, 1983), pp. 22-26; Michael Salla, "Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor", Australian Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2 (November 1995): 207; James Cotton, "East Timor and Australia -- Twenty-Five Years of the Policy Debate", in East Timor and Australia, edited by James Cotton (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 2000), pp. 1-2.
(6.) In the post-Cold War period, Australia has consistently defined its overall foreign policy orientation as consistent with the norms and assumptions of good international citizenship (GIG]. This asserts an aspiration towards the development of a new type of international order where state behaviour is regulated and contained within a system of common rules and universally upheld, transnational values. GIG affirms the need to implement and abide by such global activities as international law, human rights, and justice. For further details, see Evans and Grant, op. cit., pp. 8-12; David Goldsworthy, "Australia and Good International Citizenship", in The New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond, edited by Stephanie Lawson (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995), pp. 171-89; and Geoffrey Stokes, "Australians as Global Citizens: A Review", Curriculum Corporation (1996), pp. 1-10.
(7.) Tentara Nasional Indonesia. This name was officially adopted in 1999, replacing the older acronym ABRI, for Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, translated as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia.
(8.) Interview at the Australian Embassy, Jakarta, October 2000. See also Alan Dupont, "Indonesia, Australia and the Problem of East Timor", AUS-CSCAP Newsletter No. 8 (1999): 2.
(9.) These accords essentially envisaged an extended period of localized self-rule (10-15 years] to allow for the development of viable political institutions and confidence-building so that an eventual consultation on self-determination could be held in an atmosphere of trust and honesty.
(10.) Interview at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra, December 2000. See also James Cotton, "'Peacekeeping' in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure", Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 238-39.
(11.) Known as Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation "Clean Sweep"), this campaign led to the execution of hundreds and possibly thousands of East Timorese, the displacement of an estimated 660,000 civilians from their homes, and the destruction of as much as 70 per cent of the territory's physical infrastructure. See Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor", Survival 42, no. 3 (2000): 27; East Timor. Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. References Committee (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, December 2000), pp.92-95; "Thousands Flee in Homes in E. Timor", Washington Post, 20 July 1999; "E. Timor Rivals Plan for War, Peace", Washington Post, 25 August 1999; and "Violence-Torn E. Timor Put Under Martial Law", Washington Post, 7 September 1999.
(12.) James Cotton, "The Emergence of an Independent East Timor: National and Regional Challenges", contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no. 1 (2000): 5-9; Wade Huntley and Peter Haysel, "East Timor and Asian Security", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 31, nos. 1-2 (2000): 5, accessed via ftp://ftp.nautilus.org/napsnet/special_reports: "U.N. Security Council Approves East Timor Force", Los Angeles Times, 15 September 1999; "As Timor Smolders, Australia Expands Its Role", International Herald Thibune, 6 May 1999; and "UN Plans for E. Timor Authority", Washington Post, 16 September 1999.
(13.) Cotton, "East Timor and Australia -- Twenty-Five Years of the Policy Debate", pp. 13-16.
(14.) Interviews with Australia and Indonesia experts in Jakarta. Singapore, and Canberra, October and December 2000.
(15.) Interview at the U.S. State Department, Washington D.C., September 2000.
(16.) Interview at the Australian Embassy, Washington D.C., September 2000. See also Huntley and Haysel, "East Timor and Asian Security", p. 5.
(17.) "Indonesia Scraps Security Treaty over East Timor", Australia Associated Press, 16 September 1999; "Jakarta Severs Security Ties with Canberra", The Australian, 17 September 1999; "It's a Blow to Lose the Pact We Had to Have", The Australian, 17 September 1999; "Pattern of Dangerous Escalation Takes Hold", Australian Financial Review, 17 September 1999.
(18.) "History Binds Indonesia and Australia", Jakarta Post, 13 October 1999; and "Howard Sets Back RI-Canberra Ties", Jakarta Past, 9 December 1999.
(19.) "Indonesian Protesters Attack Australian Ambassador", Sydney Morning Herald. 22 November 2000.
(20.) Interview at the ADFA, Canberra, December 2000.
(21.) East Timor. The Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs. Defence and Trade References Committee, 1995-96. See also "Jakarta's Simmering Anger Over Timor", Australian Financial Review, 10 August 2000; "Howard Sets Back RI-Canberra Ties", Jakarta Post, 9 December 1999; and "Indonesia--Australia Ties: What Went Wrong?", Jakarta Past, 1 December 2000.
(22.) Comment made during the Indonesia--Australia Forum (IASFOR) Meeting, Canberra, 22 November 2000.
(23.) Interview at the Australian Embassy, Washington D.C. and Jakarta, September-October, 2000. Similar views were also expressed during interviews conducted at the National University of Singapore (NUS), October 2000.
(24.) It should be noted that Howard never actually made the "deputy" remark -- it was, in fact, a comment made by a journalist who was interviewing him. However, the fact that it took the Prime Minister more than five days to distance himself from the quotation was widely interpreted throughout Southeast Asia as an implicit endorsement of its substance.
(25.) Interview at the Australian Embassy, Jakarta, October 2000.
(26.) See, for instance, Evans and Grant, op. cit., p. 204.
(27.) "Ambivalence Serves Only to Marginalise Us", The Australian, 30 October 1996; "When Change Calls for Consistency", The Australian, 30 October 1996; and "A Case of Regional Identity", The Australian, 1 November 1996.
(28.) Interview at the Melbourne Hyatt, Melbourne, December 2000. See also Donald Emerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?" Foreign Affairs (May/June 2000), pp. 103-4; "Talking About a Devolution", The Economist, 6 January 2001.
(29.) Cited in Emerson, "Will Indonesia Survive", p. 103.
(30.) For a good overview of many of these problems, see Emerson, "Will Indonesia Survive?"; Tan Sri Zainal Abidin Sulong, "The Regional Impact and the Role of the Region in Indonesia's Transformation" (Paper presented at the seminar on "Indonesia's Future Challenges and Implications for the Region" organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific [CSCAP], Jakarta, 8-9 March 2000); Kerry Collison, "Indonesia: Disintegration of the Last Great Colonial Power?" Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy 28, no. 10 (2000); and "Indonesia is in Danger of Coming Apart", The Australian, 12 August 2000.
(31.) Interview at the National University of Singapore (NUS), Singapore, December 2000.
(32.) Interview at the ADFA, Canberra, December 2000.
(33.) E-mail correspondence between the author and Dr Leonard Sebastian, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, October 2000. See also Alexander Downer, "East Timor -- Looking Back on 1999", Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 1 (2000): 9-10; and Robert Klitgaard, "Unsolicited Thoughts on Helping East Timor Succeed", unpublished brief (RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, 4 February 2001).
(34.) Interview at the ADFA, Canberra, December 2000.
(35.) Alan Dupont, "East Timor's Future: Penury or Prosperity?" Pacifica Review 12, no. 1 (2000): 91.
(36.) "Australia's Acid Test at the Bottom of the Timer Sea", Financial Review, 14 October 2000.
(37.) Interview at the Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2000. See also Klitgaard, "Unsolicited Thoughts on Helping East Timor Succeed", p. 5; "Square One", Washington Post, 29 March 2000; and "Timor's Troubled Waters", The Economist, 2 December 2000.
(38.) This point was specifically emphasized by Professor James Cotton during interviews conducted at the ADFA, Canberra, December 2000.
(39.) Klitgaard, "Unsolicited Thoughts on Helping East Timor Succeed", p. 5.
(40.) See, for instance, "Perky Future", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 February 1999; and "Economy of Scale", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1999. Estimates of the value of oil below the Timer Cap vary. However, the three main reserves at Sunrise-Troubadour, Bayu-Undan and Elang-Kakatua are projected to contain a total of 500 million barrels, which is worth roughly US$17 billion at today's prices. Under the existing provisions of the Timer Cap Treaty, 50 per cent of this would go to East Timor (the remaining half going to Australia). Dili is attempting to renegotiate the agreement to allow for a 90-10 split with Canberra. See "Australia's Acid Test at the Bottom of the Timor Sea", Financial Review, 14 October 2000; and "Timor's Troubled Waters", The Economist, 2 December 2000.
(41.) Dupont, "East Timer's Future: Penury or Prosperity?" p. 91.
(42.) "$26m Fund for Timor Rebel Force", The Australian, 24 November 2000; "East Timor to Raise Army", Border Mail, 24 November 2000; and "Timor's Troubled Waters", The Economist, 2 December 2000.
(43.) Interview at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC), Canberra, December 2000.
(44.) Comments made by Indonesian delegates attending the LASFOR Meeting, Canberra, November 2000.
(45.) Interview at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, December 2000, and March 2001.
(46.) See, for instance, Robert Manning, "Security in East Asia", in Asian Security Handbook. An Assessment of Political-Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region, edited by William Carpenter and David Wiencek (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 25; and Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region", International Security (Winter 1993/94), pp. 88-89.
(47.) Interview at the Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2000. See also "Rebel Says Australian Stance a Terrible Mistake", Sydney Morning Herald, 15 December 2000. With regard to Irian Jaya, Australia has even gone to the length of dropping all references to "West Papua" in official statements emanating out of Canberra.
(48.) Interview at the ADFA, Canberra, December 2000.
(49.) Interview at the Department of Defence, Canberra, December 2000.
(50.) Interview at the Melbourne Hyatt, Melbourne, December 2000. Similar points were raised by defence analysts during interviews at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, December 2000.
(51.) Michael Scrafton, "East Timor Hearings". Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee Hansard, 11 November 1999, p. 854; Deputy Secretary (Strategy) Hugh White, Department of Defence (DoD), "Estimates Hearings", Legislation Committee Hansard, (3 May 2000), p. 88.
(52.) East Timor. Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs Defence and Trade References Committee, pp. 201--7. See also "New Military Ties with Indonesia in Sight", Canberra Times, 11 December 2000; and "Australia Cancels Military Training with Indonesia", Associated Press, 10 September 1999.
(53.) Interview at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, December 2000.
(54.) Interview at the Australian Embassy, Jakarta, October 2000.
(55.) Major General Peter Cosgrove, cited in "Indonesian Defence Ties Helped in Timor Crisis", Associated Press, 3 March 2000; and "Ties with Indonesian Military Prevented Bloodshed: Cosgrove", Canberra Times, 17 May 2000.
(56.) Indonesian officials concede that internal security operations in Aceh and Irian Jaya, as well as other outlying regions such as Kalimantan and the Moluccas, remain issues of concern, particularly in terms of arbitrary detentions, torture, and the use of live ammunition to disperse protest crowds. Interview at the Center for Political and Area Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PPW-LIPI), Jakarta, October 2000. See also Human Rights and Pro-Independence Actions in Papua, 1999-2000, Human Rights Watch 12, no. 2 (2000); Samantha Ravich, "Eyeing Indonesia through the Lens of Aceh", Washington Quarterly 23, no. 3 (2000): 13-15; and Peter Chalk, "Aceh: Indonesia's Continuing Headache", Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor (December 2000), pp. 1-2.
(57.) Comments made during the IASFOR Meeting, Canberra, 22 November 2000.
(58.) It should be noted that several defence officials reject the argument that the SAS was involved in internal security training for Indonesian SFs. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee in November 1999, for instance, Michael Scrafton, head of the Department of Defence's (DoD) East Timor Policy Unit, affirmed: "In terms of the Indonesian army and specifically the most contentious element, Kopassus, the training has been very specific. The intention of the training with Kopassus and the Indonesian army has been in two major areas -- primarily about basic military skills training. It is nothing to do with insurgency training or managing internal security issues, but primarily in the areas of basic training and infantry skills". See East Timor. Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, p. 203.
(59.) See, for instance, Harold Crouch, "East Timor Hearings", Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence, Trade and References Committee Hansard (20 September 1999), p. 583.
(60.) East Timor. Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, p, 207. It should be noted that some important changes and reforms are now beginning to occur within the TNI with respect to civil-military relations. Among the most significant are:
* The separation of the police from the armed forces.
* Reduced military representation in Parliament (which is theoretically to be phased out altogether by 2009).
* Increased civilian control over the military (through the appointment of two non-TNI Defence Ministers, Juwono Sudarsono and Mohamad Mahfud).
At the time of writing, however, the TNI territorial structure remained very much in place, with 17 regional commands, down to the village level, still in existence.
Comments made by Lieutenant General Agus Widojo, during an informal roundtable, RAND, Washington D.C., March 2000. Many of these points were also raised during the IASFOR Meeting, Canberra, 22 November 2000.
(61.) Interview at the Australian Customs and Coast Watch, Canberra, November 1999. See also Peter Chalk, Non-Military Security and Global Order (London: Macmillan, 2000], pp. 70-71; Alan Dupont, "Unregulated Population Flows in East Asia: A New Security", Pacifica Review 9, no. 1 (1997); and "Australia Targets the Boat People", Age, 15 November 2000.
(62.) Interview at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, March 20001.
(63.) Observations made during the IASFOR Meeting, Canberra, 22 November 2000.
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| Author: | CHALK, PETER |
|---|---|
| Publication: | Contemporary Southeast Asia |
| Geographic Code: | 9INDO |
| Date: | Aug 1, 2001 |
| Words: | 8636 |
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