Miranda rule

This approach is problematic: "Using the doctrine to justify questioning suspects in non-emergency situations amounts to a deliberate end-run around the Miranda rule." (132) Dickerson made clear that legislative attempts to evade Miranda are unconstitutional; it is unclear why an executive evasion would be any less problematic.

(263) Focusing on the wide scope of the agent's questions, the court found problematic questions "about when [defendant] handled particular firearms explaining to [defendant] that fingerprints cannot be dated." (264) Admission of answers to those and similar questions, the court reasoned, would expand public safety questioning "to include nailing down by admission elements of an anticipated charging offense[.]" (265) That, concluded the court, would improperly "allow the public safety exception to swallow the Miranda rule." (266)

(143) Quarles provides "a narrow exception to the Miranda rule": it imposes a fierce imminence requirement that simply cannot justify ignoring Miranda in most two-step national security interrogation contexts.

opportunity, upholding the core Miranda rule. (30) The Court emphasized

(70) As I have observed, Chief Justice Rehnquist "recognized that in its current form Miranda poses little, if any, obstacles to law enforcement." (71) He observed that the Court had, through its narrowing of the doctrine, "reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement." (72) Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist came to the realization that the Court had transformed Miranda into "useful station house furniture."

That involved the Justice Department's decision to invoke a "public safety exception" to the Miranda rule, which requires law enforcement officials to advise suspects of their right to remain silent and to be represented by an attorney.

ACLU executive director Anthony Romero said the legal exception applies only when there is a continued threat to public safety and is "not an open-ended exception" to the Miranda rule.

Anthony Romero, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, criticised the plan to withhold the suspect's rights, saying there was "not an open-ended exception" to the Miranda rule.

Quarles, the Court later held that the Miranda rule was subject

Indeed, he lamented those ramifications even as he upheld what he acknowledged had "become part of our national culture." (29) As he put it: "It]he disadvantage of the Miranda rule is that statements which may be by no means involuntary, made by a defendant who is aware of his 'rights,' may nonetheless be excluded and a guilty defendant go free as a result." (30)

To understand the detours and dead-ends that took place during this past half-century, it is useful to divide this period into three segments: (A) the pre-Miranda era, when the central constitutional constraint on police interrogations of juveniles was the due process doctrine of involuntariness; (B) the period that began with the issuance of Miranda in 1966 and culminated with the Supreme Court's issuance of a decision in 1979 (15) clarifying the operation of the Miranda rule in juvenile cases; and (C) the period from 1979 until the Court's issuance of its two rulings on the subject of Miranda "custody" in juvenile cases--Yarborough v.

at 658 ("In recognizing a narrow exception to the Miranda rule in this case, we acknowledge that to some degree we lessen the desirable clarity of that rule.").