Xander's Reviews > The Theory of Moral Sentiments

Adam Smith is usually remembered for his works on political economy as layed out in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). And even then, most experts and laymen approach this one-sided version of Smith in a myopic view. In general, this picture of Smith is summed up as: “human beings are driven primarily by selflove and rationally pursue their self-interest. Happiness consists in the fulfilment of this pursuit, and is best accommodated by an absolute free exchange of material means.”

This is not meant as a straw men, but as a simplification of the common understanding of Adam Smith’s theories. What most people forget is that 17 years prior to his Wealth of Nations, Smith had already published a very fundamental first work, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), which, ironically, actually served as the framework for the book he is most remembered for.

In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith treats of two different questions: In what consists virtue? And how does the mind produce moral judgements? In other words: what is virtue and how do we know what actions, of ourselves or of other people, are virtuous and what actions are vicious?

The book itself spans more than 400 pages, and is as broad as it is deep in its treatment of all the issues and intricacies involved in the building up of a moral theory. Fortunately, Smith’s main ideas and the general framework can be summed up rather easily.

Sentiments are the building blocks of our morality. Whenever we act or see someone else act we feel all sorts of emotions. These emotions determine, largely, whether we approve or disapprove of the said action. Contrary to the earlier mentioned (simplistic) interpretations of Smith, we feel emotions when we observe actions of ourselves or others due to sympathy. Of course the degree to which we can sympathize with others and the degree to which our own emotions are stirred in our breasts when observing the actions of someone else differs according to the involved action, the person involved, its consequences and motives, etc.

This view seemingly sets the door wide open to moral relativism: every action has its own unique character, consequences and motives – and hence every action becomes a unique object for our moral judgements. But Smith’s conception of sympathy actually blocks this road: human nature is such that we seek self-approvement as well as the approvement of others. This view is deeply rooted in a universal conception of human beings: we are all similar in our constitution, notwithstanding race, gender, class, and what not. We want to love ourselves and to be loved by others, and this immediately puts restraint on certain (types of) actions and an incentive on certain (types of) other actions.

Actually, what Smith does is synthesize three different conceptions of virtue into a bigger, more general framework which offers broad outlines for our moral actions yet is not bogged down by the particularism and casuistry of most moral philosophy. Smiths synthesis allows for systematic theorizing yet fully accords with the vagueness and ambiguity of practical morality.

For Smith, actions are valued on three accounts: propriety, prudence and beneficence. An action is proper when it suits the situation and social expectations, meaning that virtue (on this account) consists in self-command – we have to control our appetites and desires in order to make our actions fit the social context. An action is prudent when it serves the pursuit of self-interests, meaning that virtue consists in adapting our actions to our own goal (self-happiness). An action is beneficent when it serves the interests of others, meaning that virtue consists in adapting our actions to the goal of others (happiness).

This moral triad – propriety, prudence, beneficence – is in reality a dynamic process in which an equilibrium is constantly sought. When we act too proper this will hamper our own happiness as well that of others. Similarly when we emphasize our own happiness (or that of others) over all the rest, this will hamper the happiness of others (or that of ourselves). In other words, whenever we tend to stray too far in one direction, we suffer the social consequences of our actions and we are dragged back to a viable moral equilibrium.

Most of the time this being dragged back to a viable moral equilibrium is only an imagination. That is, we intuitively feel or consciously reflect the undesirability of said action and its effects on the world. So here we see Smiths dualism between self-love and love of others dragging us in two different directions: even if we would literally only act out of self-love, others will start to hate us, refuse to cooperate with us, and disapprove of our character, making us suffer in isolation and feeling the pain of rejection.

Now, the final question is: How do we evaluate actions? How do our moral judgements come to pass? Based on all of the above, the answer to this question is easy to see. Partisanship blinds us and pulls us from the moral equilibrium: whether we view our actions solely from our perspective or from the perspective of others, and whether we view the actions of others solely from our perspective or from the perspective of others – all of these positions of judgments are highly partisan. So what do we do? We imagine an impartial spectator, who views the actor, his or her actions, and the person who is the intended object of the said action.

This spectator is neutral regarding to actor, action and object and views the emotions of all involved from an impartial perspective. This allows for the evaluation of the propriety of the emotions, but also for judgements about the intensity of these emotions, the effects of the action on all involved, etc. In effect, this means we unconsciously adapt our emotions to the situation and we integrate the effects of our actions upon others in our own motivations and feelings.

Now, having said all this – and remembering the fact that Smith viewed this theory of moral sentiments as the framework of ordering society – it is easy to see how the current and common view of Smith as the promotor of free market capitalism is rather one-sided and myopic.

In The Theory of Moral Sentiment Smith actually says that any society which promotes the safety and welfare of all its citizens has to draw up institutions which regulate social interactions -be they political, economic, cultural, or whatnot – in such a way that they deeply resonate with our own nature and are perfectly in line with the moral equilibrium as sketched above. That is, regulations should seek to strike a balance between different moral values: self-interest, interest of others, and the general interest.

Smith explicitly states (in his Wealth of Nations): if regulations benefit the workmen they are just and equitably, if regulations benefit the masters [i.e. the wealthy, the powerful] they are not necessarily just and equitable. What Smith means is that within political economics plural institutional structure and social values triumph the profit motive. A society in which the many suffer from poverty and danger for the benefit of the view is not a just and equitable society. The key role of government is to order society in such a way that the general welfare is promoted – and in so far as free market enterprise accords with this general interest it should be promoted, but in so far as it threatens individual freedom and the welfare of the powerless and poor, it should be regulated.

Basically, Smith means that justice should be the foundation of society; laws regulate and order society in such a way that the safety and the welfare of all is promoted; subjecting politics, economics, and morality to natural justice – that is, the conception of a universal human nature and the intrinsic value of every person due to this common constitution.

This, by the way, is a highly outdated religious conception of the world and of society, yet also a very modern one at that: the recognition of the fundamental equality of all human beings according to their similar nature, and thus similar desires, flaws, weaknesses, perfections, etc. And it goes fully against the current transcendental idealist conceptions of justice, like e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Rawls – which seek a perfection which is non-existent and thus are doomed to fail as moral theories.

Smith on the other hand, and the whole realism tradition at that, base their moral theories on actual human beings in the actual world where actual actions actually make a difference. This is more of a comparative approach than the earlier mentioned social contractivist thinking. We can theorize about how unjust slavery is and speculate on all sorts of things related, yet what matters is the actual effects of the institution of slavery on actual people and how a society in which slavery exist actually differs from societies in which slavery is forbidden. This latter approach is not only much more in touch with reality, it also spurs us to action in cases of injustice much more than any idealist approach is able to do. For Smith what matters is the actual promotion of actual justice and equity in this world, instead of theorizing about it. This is deeply rooted in the empiricist tradition of the Enlightenment and it is easy to see how this view inspired later thinkers as diverse as Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill. I can’t help by ending this review of an amazing book by one of the founding fathers of liberalism with quoting Karl Marx, emphasizing both the importance of Smith for all sorts of later thinkers notwithstanding their political views as well as the need to understand Smith in a complete sense instead of the common one-sided, myopic view:

“Philosophers have thus far only tried to interpret the world; the point is to actually change it.”