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The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II
World War II marked the apogee of industrialized “total war.” Great powers savaged one another. Hostilities engulfed the globe. Mobilization extended to virtually every sector of every nation. Air war, including the terror bombing of civilians, emerged as a central strategy of the victorious Anglo-American powers. The devastation was catastrophic almost everywhere, with the notable exception of the United States, which exited the strife unscathed and unmatched in power and influence. The death toll of fighting forces plus civilians worldwide was staggering.
The Violent “American Century” addresses the U.S.-led transformations in war conduct and strategizing that followed 1945—beginning with brutal localized hostilities, proxy wars, and the nuclear terror of the Cold War, and ending with the asymmetrical conflicts of the present day. The military playbook now meshes brute force with a focus on non-state terrorism, counterinsurgency, clandestine operations, a vast web of overseas American military bases, and—most touted of all—a revolutionary new era of computerized “precision” warfare. By contrast to World War II, postwar death and destruction has been comparatively small. By any other measure, it has been appalling—and shows no sign of abating.
The winner of numerous national prizes for his historical writings, including the Pulitzer and the National Book Award, Dower draws heavily on hard data and internal U.S. planning and pronouncements in this concise analysis of war and terror in our time. In doing so, he places U.S. policy and practice firmly within the broader context of global mayhem, havoc, and slaughter since World War II—always with bottom-line attentiveness to the human costs of this legacy of unceasing violence.
The Violent “American Century” addresses the U.S.-led transformations in war conduct and strategizing that followed 1945—beginning with brutal localized hostilities, proxy wars, and the nuclear terror of the Cold War, and ending with the asymmetrical conflicts of the present day. The military playbook now meshes brute force with a focus on non-state terrorism, counterinsurgency, clandestine operations, a vast web of overseas American military bases, and—most touted of all—a revolutionary new era of computerized “precision” warfare. By contrast to World War II, postwar death and destruction has been comparatively small. By any other measure, it has been appalling—and shows no sign of abating.
The winner of numerous national prizes for his historical writings, including the Pulitzer and the National Book Award, Dower draws heavily on hard data and internal U.S. planning and pronouncements in this concise analysis of war and terror in our time. In doing so, he places U.S. policy and practice firmly within the broader context of global mayhem, havoc, and slaughter since World War II—always with bottom-line attentiveness to the human costs of this legacy of unceasing violence.
184 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2017
About the author
John W. Dower
32 books125 followersJohn W. Dower is the author of Embracing Defeat, winner of the National Book Award and the Pulitzer Prize; War without Mercy, winner of the National Book Critics Circle Award; and Cultures of War. He is professor emeritus of history at MIT. In addition to authoring many books and articles about Japan and the United States in war and peace, he is a founder and codirector of the online “Visualizing Cultures” project established at MIT in 2002 and dedicated to the presentation of image-driven scholarship on East Asia in the modern world. He lives in Boston, Massachusetts.
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Displaying 1 - 27 of 27 reviews
May 10, 2017
Excellent critique of post WWII US military foreign policy. The collection of essays is slight, but the critique is presented in a clear, concise, incisive manner with a well-executed economy of style; every sentence adds to the overall argument.
First off, when I critique US military policy (and I am very critical in a general sense) I think there are a few things to note about arguments on its (potential) benefits.
One, it provides a massive amount of jobs and an avenue for people who may have few opportunities to climb the economic ladder. But in a way this can be critiqued, because if military is the only avenue for some to climb the economic ladder then I see that as an indictment of the rest of the system/economy and the lack of opportunities it is presenting for wide swathes of the populace.
Secondly, investment in military generates tons of spin-off technologies/innovations. Sadly, war and threat of war are great incentives for innovation. You could argue that we could still make massive investments in science and technology at the (non-military) government level and reap major benefits (in fact we do, but are actually underinvesting in this arena imo). But there is no getting around the spin-off tech benefits of military science/tech investment. One can question efficiency of use of resources though, that is a major problem with our special-interests captured war machine.
Thirdly, yes there is benefit to be derived from projecting hard power and trying to contain what are considered security threats. But there is also blowback in various ways as well. You conduct yourself like an imperial empire you will extract certain benefits, but also end up stoking certain negative consequences as well; the underlying resentment, hate, anger can manifest and explode in variety of ways.
Anyways, with that out of the way, here is the crux of John Dower's argument:
US military policy in the post-world war II era has been a source of great pain and instability in the world. We have misused our power, often chasing ghosts and fighting ideologies with the most despicable of techniques and in the process manifested a staggering level of hypocrisy. There have been massive violations in terms of human rights, egregious wastage and inefficiency with the war machine/military industrial complex growing and growing and always needing more and more resources, and the growth of the surveillance state has involved massive infringements upon civil society. And for a country not involved in a major conflict (although this point is debatable, we are in perpetual war mode and conducting armed operations to one degree or another in sooo many theaters) we are pouring trillions of dollars into the perpetual, inefficient, bloated, special-interests captured Keynesian funded operation that is our imperial war machine. Is this sustainable? Not to me it isn't, not in the long term.
There are some great essays, including ones that examine how the military-industrial complex derives funding, namely through the exploitation of fear in the public realm (back in the day invoking "communism," and now the new forever war that gets the dollars flowing is the Great War on Terror). This line sums it up:
"Fear of ominous existential enemies primed the political pump to maintain support for a massive military machine."
I tend to think that some military interventions can be warranted, but when you are overly focused on using military as spearhead against ideologies you are probably going to metastasize the original cancers if you aren't smart about things (this too often includes having basically zippo understanding of regional history/nuances, but rushing like a bull into the china shop anyways because hubris). In too many cases we've poured gasoline onto the original fires. Another important note that Dower documents and critiques: be careful of the bedfellows you choose and support. Dower's examination of CIA history is particularly damning. You can preach freedom, liberty, democracy, human rights as much as you want, but as one often sees these terms are weaponized and used to camouflage the dark underbelly of our actions and belie a serious double standard/hypocrisy. Actions speak louder than words, and the record is appalling.
There were several essays on nuclear weapons and nuclear policy. Very highly critical of the "delicate balance of terror" thinking that dominated policy circles, including cavalier attitudes of nuclear brinksmanship and provocation. Here are a few excerpts:
"Predicatably absent from the most of these alarming prognostications was the fact that US nuclear policy itself was and remains a major provocation in the atomic arc of instability... The ceaseless US quest to maintain massive "technological asymmetry" militarily is guaranteed to keep arms races of every sort going."
What is interesting are the sources and policy experts that did a 180 from the old school nuclear brinksmanship/delicate balance of terror policy. My god this even includes Kissinger! I'm not a fan of Kissinger but it was interesting to see him, the hardest coldest cruelist realist in the game, embrace the "Global Zero" concept for nuclear weapons.
One final note on the concept of American exceptionalism:
"The mystique of exceptional virtue does not accommodate serious consideration of irresponsibility, provocation, intoxication with brute force, paranoia, hubris, reckless and criminal activities, or even criminal negligence."
This quote is important for me because it encompasses the main problems with the concept of American exceptionalism. Such a concept allows a double standard whereby we sidestep accountability and responsibility because we are supposedly operating in a framework of higher virtue; we cannot be held to the common international standards and rules because of our very exceptionalism. It is sneaky and dangerous, and ends up being a slippery-slope into permitting ourselves anything. We do not abide critique and analysis of our actions because of our very exceptionalism, such critique is often not tolerated and thus precludes serious honest dialogue about our policies. We invoke liberty, democracy, freedom, wrapped into the concept of American exceptionalism, but as so often happens this invocation gives us carte-blanche and permits us anything, even the most extraordinary actions/crimes that literally go against these basic concepts which we supposedly champion. It is disingenuous and the deep hypocrisy seriously damages our credibility. Ultimately it is very counter-productive, hurts a lot of people, and provides ammunition (ideological propaganda) to our enemies.
PS. This is a good article by military historian Andrew Bacevich that asks hard-hitting questions of the military establishment and political leaders. Takes contemporary media establishment to ask, fully justified imo. Mirrors much of Dower's critique: http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176277/
First off, when I critique US military policy (and I am very critical in a general sense) I think there are a few things to note about arguments on its (potential) benefits.
One, it provides a massive amount of jobs and an avenue for people who may have few opportunities to climb the economic ladder. But in a way this can be critiqued, because if military is the only avenue for some to climb the economic ladder then I see that as an indictment of the rest of the system/economy and the lack of opportunities it is presenting for wide swathes of the populace.
Secondly, investment in military generates tons of spin-off technologies/innovations. Sadly, war and threat of war are great incentives for innovation. You could argue that we could still make massive investments in science and technology at the (non-military) government level and reap major benefits (in fact we do, but are actually underinvesting in this arena imo). But there is no getting around the spin-off tech benefits of military science/tech investment. One can question efficiency of use of resources though, that is a major problem with our special-interests captured war machine.
Thirdly, yes there is benefit to be derived from projecting hard power and trying to contain what are considered security threats. But there is also blowback in various ways as well. You conduct yourself like an imperial empire you will extract certain benefits, but also end up stoking certain negative consequences as well; the underlying resentment, hate, anger can manifest and explode in variety of ways.
Anyways, with that out of the way, here is the crux of John Dower's argument:
US military policy in the post-world war II era has been a source of great pain and instability in the world. We have misused our power, often chasing ghosts and fighting ideologies with the most despicable of techniques and in the process manifested a staggering level of hypocrisy. There have been massive violations in terms of human rights, egregious wastage and inefficiency with the war machine/military industrial complex growing and growing and always needing more and more resources, and the growth of the surveillance state has involved massive infringements upon civil society. And for a country not involved in a major conflict (although this point is debatable, we are in perpetual war mode and conducting armed operations to one degree or another in sooo many theaters) we are pouring trillions of dollars into the perpetual, inefficient, bloated, special-interests captured Keynesian funded operation that is our imperial war machine. Is this sustainable? Not to me it isn't, not in the long term.
There are some great essays, including ones that examine how the military-industrial complex derives funding, namely through the exploitation of fear in the public realm (back in the day invoking "communism," and now the new forever war that gets the dollars flowing is the Great War on Terror). This line sums it up:
"Fear of ominous existential enemies primed the political pump to maintain support for a massive military machine."
I tend to think that some military interventions can be warranted, but when you are overly focused on using military as spearhead against ideologies you are probably going to metastasize the original cancers if you aren't smart about things (this too often includes having basically zippo understanding of regional history/nuances, but rushing like a bull into the china shop anyways because hubris). In too many cases we've poured gasoline onto the original fires. Another important note that Dower documents and critiques: be careful of the bedfellows you choose and support. Dower's examination of CIA history is particularly damning. You can preach freedom, liberty, democracy, human rights as much as you want, but as one often sees these terms are weaponized and used to camouflage the dark underbelly of our actions and belie a serious double standard/hypocrisy. Actions speak louder than words, and the record is appalling.
There were several essays on nuclear weapons and nuclear policy. Very highly critical of the "delicate balance of terror" thinking that dominated policy circles, including cavalier attitudes of nuclear brinksmanship and provocation. Here are a few excerpts:
"Predicatably absent from the most of these alarming prognostications was the fact that US nuclear policy itself was and remains a major provocation in the atomic arc of instability... The ceaseless US quest to maintain massive "technological asymmetry" militarily is guaranteed to keep arms races of every sort going."
What is interesting are the sources and policy experts that did a 180 from the old school nuclear brinksmanship/delicate balance of terror policy. My god this even includes Kissinger! I'm not a fan of Kissinger but it was interesting to see him, the hardest coldest cruelist realist in the game, embrace the "Global Zero" concept for nuclear weapons.
One final note on the concept of American exceptionalism:
"The mystique of exceptional virtue does not accommodate serious consideration of irresponsibility, provocation, intoxication with brute force, paranoia, hubris, reckless and criminal activities, or even criminal negligence."
This quote is important for me because it encompasses the main problems with the concept of American exceptionalism. Such a concept allows a double standard whereby we sidestep accountability and responsibility because we are supposedly operating in a framework of higher virtue; we cannot be held to the common international standards and rules because of our very exceptionalism. It is sneaky and dangerous, and ends up being a slippery-slope into permitting ourselves anything. We do not abide critique and analysis of our actions because of our very exceptionalism, such critique is often not tolerated and thus precludes serious honest dialogue about our policies. We invoke liberty, democracy, freedom, wrapped into the concept of American exceptionalism, but as so often happens this invocation gives us carte-blanche and permits us anything, even the most extraordinary actions/crimes that literally go against these basic concepts which we supposedly champion. It is disingenuous and the deep hypocrisy seriously damages our credibility. Ultimately it is very counter-productive, hurts a lot of people, and provides ammunition (ideological propaganda) to our enemies.
PS. This is a good article by military historian Andrew Bacevich that asks hard-hitting questions of the military establishment and political leaders. Takes contemporary media establishment to ask, fully justified imo. Mirrors much of Dower's critique: http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/176277/
November 12, 2017
Dower has been one of my favourite historians since undergrad, and in this short but powerful book he takes us through American military strategy and engagement since WWII, showing the reader how the US military has been engaged in a ceaseless string of wars/covert operations in the name of rearranging geopolitical affairs to suit the interests of America. Particularly useful is his look at covert operations in Latin America. Of necessity a somewhat superficial study given the length of the book, it’s a valuable summation.
May 18, 2017
The fundamental length of this book stands at some 125 or so pages long, which is impressive considering what John Dower manages to do in that number of pages. In every chapter and every subject he covers, he clearly defines each one in a way that's not only easy to understand, but ties in and sets additional groundwork for every other concept in the book. This is further reinforced by the way he presents his evidence, history, and analysis. Every specific war he talks about is given: a background significant enough in detail to be able to see what causes it; correlations and causations with explanations of where certain variables play certain parts; casualty counts with acknowledgements of potential constraints and inflations; and definitions of what constitutes casualties and how far they extend. Although, the book isn't entirely about ratting off statistics; everything ties into painting the picture of the lead-ups to every war, as well as the consequential outcomes in every relevant field of analysis. At 125 pages, it isn't going to go into every individual war at outstandingly deep detail, but it's definitely enough to serve as a springboard into the overall subject of the wars this country wages, and how they relate not only to ourselves, but the international communities and their own responses to us, in turn.
September 23, 2023
Some staggering numbers in here ($6 TRILLION spent on our failed wars in Iraq in Afghanistan (without even accounting for postwar costs like medical care and pensions for soldiers, not to mention the obvious opportunity cost of having so many people out of the workforce)!!), incredibly well researched, so much information in such a short read. Definitely worth your time
My only complaint is that it wasn’t longer
(By the way $6 trillion is over $20,000 per American at the time of the start of the invasions)
My only complaint is that it wasn’t longer
(By the way $6 trillion is over $20,000 per American at the time of the start of the invasions)
February 22, 2018
Few historians today through the depth of their scholarship and persuasiveness of their arguments confront the myth of American exceptionalism as effectively as John W. Dower.
Professor emeritus at MIT, Dower is considered an authority on Japan; Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, about the U.S. occupation, won a Pulitzer Prize. Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq was a superb comparative analysis of imperial folly and the mechanisms of mass destruction, written after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II is Dower's latest book, and, unlike his past works, this one can be read in a few hours. With nine short essays and copious footnotes, 'The Violent American Century' weighs in at 167 pages.
But a book does not need to be long to be potent. Dower takes on the "declinists," personified by Steven Pinker, who argue "war and lethal conflict have declined steadily, significantly, even precipitously since World War II." Pinker declares "today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species existence." (Tell that to the Iraqis or the people of Afghanistan).
Dower concedes the "number and deadliness of global conflicts have indeed declined since World War II." But he adds "this so-called postwar peace was, and still is, saturated in blood and wracked with suffering." Moreover, the U.S. seems to have learned little from its past mistakes, guaranteeing that the pattern of disastrous foreign interventions will repeat.
Dower has tried over the years to come to a statistical reckoning with U.S. violence, and in this short volume he presents the most accurate available estimates of the human toll of our nation's post-war foreign policy.
We are told by the "declinists" that wars are less frequent and less destructive than the mammoth clashes of World War II. True. And in the post-Cold War period, the U.S. has never lost in a single war anywhere near the casualties of the Korean or Vietnam War.
That is cold comfort, however, when one considers the bloodshed in Iraq and that war's ripple effects that have destabilized the Greater Middle East, leading to even more human suffering for which there is no end in sight. Iraq of 2003 wasn't bombed quite like Japan of 1945, but it didn't need to be: It is widely accepted that at least hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians died as direct and indirect results of the violence triggered by the U.S. invasion in '03. Millions were displaced.
It is estimated that the U.S.-backed Contra revolution in the 1980s cost the lives of nearly 30,000 Nicaraguans, according to historian John Coatsworth (cited by Dower on p. 68). "All told, Coatsworth estimates that the Cold War in Central America saw nearly three hundred thousand deaths in a population of thirty million." While "peace" may have come to Central America after the Cold War, the legacy of that violence persists, something that statistical quantification cannot convey. The "declinists" must understand that wars don't end; they migrate to our minds, yes?
"Concentrating on fatalities and their averred downward trajectory also draws attention away from broader humanitarian catastrophes." p. 5
"Such upbeat quantification invites complacent forms of self-congratulation." p. 2
It is commonly stated that U.S. foreign policy has changed or evolved. It is no longer a bipolar world, and the U.S. is in fact the world's only superpower now. But Dower argues that the Cold War world was much more complicated than is now perceived; beneath the headline of U.S. versus USSR the challenges were not so clear-cut. The world has always been a messy, complicated place, and when the vision of monolithic communism collided with reality it produced disaster.
"In 1987, an organization founded by more than a dozen disillusioned former CIA officials issued a statement denouncing 'U.S. covert operations that killed, wounded, and terrorized millions of people whose countries were not at war with the United States, nor possessed the capabilities to do remarkable physical hurt to the United States, who themselves bore the United States no ill will nor cared greatly about the issues of 'communism' or 'capitalism.'" p. 52
Moreover, U.S. foreign policy contained consistencies underneath the apparent variations. "Communism" became "terror." 9/11 and the Global War on Terror turned out not to be a "new kind of war." The U.S. blundered into Afghanistan and Iraq as it did Vietnam, just with more modern weapons but the same failure to understand the people being "liberated." Torture did not appear after 9/11 with the Bush administration. In the 1960s, U.S. operatives trained Central and South American officers in torture in the army's School of Americas courses.
What's more, behold this paradigm. Even as the world becomes more "peaceful" and our enemies increasingly lightly-armed, non-state actors, the United States' capacity for violence and war-making is as stupendous as ever: a modernized nuclear arsenal (approved by Obama) will cost $1 trillion over three decades; at least 800 bases across the globe and hundreds of "floating bases" -- Navy warships -- to go with them; covert operations forces operate in about 150 (!) nations; drone strikes kill terrorists and civilians in countries with which the U.S. is not at war; and literally hundreds of thousands of private contractors are employed in the battle space as well as in intelligence gathering.
The privatization of war/intelligence remains one of the most dangerously underappreciated aspects of the erosion of our democracy. Dower describes the post-9/11 public and private "security" complex as "more gargantuan, cumbersome, compartmentalized, faction-ridden, redundant, wasteful, corrupt, and nontransparent than anything the nation had seen before."
With peace like this, who needs war?
Professor emeritus at MIT, Dower is considered an authority on Japan; Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, about the U.S. occupation, won a Pulitzer Prize. Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor / Hiroshima / 9-11 / Iraq was a superb comparative analysis of imperial folly and the mechanisms of mass destruction, written after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The Violent American Century: War and Terror Since World War II is Dower's latest book, and, unlike his past works, this one can be read in a few hours. With nine short essays and copious footnotes, 'The Violent American Century' weighs in at 167 pages.
But a book does not need to be long to be potent. Dower takes on the "declinists," personified by Steven Pinker, who argue "war and lethal conflict have declined steadily, significantly, even precipitously since World War II." Pinker declares "today we may be living in the most peaceable era in our species existence." (Tell that to the Iraqis or the people of Afghanistan).
Dower concedes the "number and deadliness of global conflicts have indeed declined since World War II." But he adds "this so-called postwar peace was, and still is, saturated in blood and wracked with suffering." Moreover, the U.S. seems to have learned little from its past mistakes, guaranteeing that the pattern of disastrous foreign interventions will repeat.
Dower has tried over the years to come to a statistical reckoning with U.S. violence, and in this short volume he presents the most accurate available estimates of the human toll of our nation's post-war foreign policy.
We are told by the "declinists" that wars are less frequent and less destructive than the mammoth clashes of World War II. True. And in the post-Cold War period, the U.S. has never lost in a single war anywhere near the casualties of the Korean or Vietnam War.
That is cold comfort, however, when one considers the bloodshed in Iraq and that war's ripple effects that have destabilized the Greater Middle East, leading to even more human suffering for which there is no end in sight. Iraq of 2003 wasn't bombed quite like Japan of 1945, but it didn't need to be: It is widely accepted that at least hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians died as direct and indirect results of the violence triggered by the U.S. invasion in '03. Millions were displaced.
It is estimated that the U.S.-backed Contra revolution in the 1980s cost the lives of nearly 30,000 Nicaraguans, according to historian John Coatsworth (cited by Dower on p. 68). "All told, Coatsworth estimates that the Cold War in Central America saw nearly three hundred thousand deaths in a population of thirty million." While "peace" may have come to Central America after the Cold War, the legacy of that violence persists, something that statistical quantification cannot convey. The "declinists" must understand that wars don't end; they migrate to our minds, yes?
"Concentrating on fatalities and their averred downward trajectory also draws attention away from broader humanitarian catastrophes." p. 5
"Such upbeat quantification invites complacent forms of self-congratulation." p. 2
It is commonly stated that U.S. foreign policy has changed or evolved. It is no longer a bipolar world, and the U.S. is in fact the world's only superpower now. But Dower argues that the Cold War world was much more complicated than is now perceived; beneath the headline of U.S. versus USSR the challenges were not so clear-cut. The world has always been a messy, complicated place, and when the vision of monolithic communism collided with reality it produced disaster.
"In 1987, an organization founded by more than a dozen disillusioned former CIA officials issued a statement denouncing 'U.S. covert operations that killed, wounded, and terrorized millions of people whose countries were not at war with the United States, nor possessed the capabilities to do remarkable physical hurt to the United States, who themselves bore the United States no ill will nor cared greatly about the issues of 'communism' or 'capitalism.'" p. 52
Moreover, U.S. foreign policy contained consistencies underneath the apparent variations. "Communism" became "terror." 9/11 and the Global War on Terror turned out not to be a "new kind of war." The U.S. blundered into Afghanistan and Iraq as it did Vietnam, just with more modern weapons but the same failure to understand the people being "liberated." Torture did not appear after 9/11 with the Bush administration. In the 1960s, U.S. operatives trained Central and South American officers in torture in the army's School of Americas courses.
What's more, behold this paradigm. Even as the world becomes more "peaceful" and our enemies increasingly lightly-armed, non-state actors, the United States' capacity for violence and war-making is as stupendous as ever: a modernized nuclear arsenal (approved by Obama) will cost $1 trillion over three decades; at least 800 bases across the globe and hundreds of "floating bases" -- Navy warships -- to go with them; covert operations forces operate in about 150 (!) nations; drone strikes kill terrorists and civilians in countries with which the U.S. is not at war; and literally hundreds of thousands of private contractors are employed in the battle space as well as in intelligence gathering.
The privatization of war/intelligence remains one of the most dangerously underappreciated aspects of the erosion of our democracy. Dower describes the post-9/11 public and private "security" complex as "more gargantuan, cumbersome, compartmentalized, faction-ridden, redundant, wasteful, corrupt, and nontransparent than anything the nation had seen before."
With peace like this, who needs war?
April 17, 2017
I am largely open and even sympathetic to the premise of this slim volume: that the so-called "Pax Americana" of the post WWII period is largely illusory, and that US military and covert intervention in Third World nations under the guise of stemming the tide of communism, or more recently to wage a "global war on terror" have in many ways accomplished the opposite of what was intended, but I feel like I was left wanting MORE from this book.
April 28, 2024
Proxy wars, nuclear threats, and drone fears — oh my! This book covers American warfare of the last ~100 years, even delving into the illusion of times of peace and who we were actually warring with and/or destabilizing then. It’s fine, but feels like a skim of the surface to the point where it’s easy to glaze over things or have to Google for further context. This was February’s book club pick and I just realized I’d never finished the last chapter, so here I am.
I’d recommend this to folks who are interested in military and conflict-based non-fiction.
I’d recommend this to folks who are interested in military and conflict-based non-fiction.
Read
February 11, 2019The briskest and briefest--but still heavily footnoted--overview of what American state participation in international violence has looked like over the past 75 years. It reads like the expanded essay that it is, but that might be what you're looking for. Dower cites the assumption of a supposed decline of violence ("the Long Peace" since WWII) as a jumping-off point to focus on factual data as well as shifting conceptual frameworks (or the continual massive incoherence in all directions, but hey!) to trace how American state violence has evolved, maintained itself, contradicted itself, etc.
December 7, 2017
We have 181 military bases alone in Germany, plus 122 in Japan and 83 in South Korea. The U.S. is presently spending $114 million dollars per hour for this bi-partisan permanent war machine. John tells the stories of General Lee Butler and William Perry who explained to Americans one story involving nuclear “warheads on artillery shells that could be launched from a Jeep” and another story involved “nuclear charges for large bazookas”. And how between 1977 and 1983, we know from classified data that U.S. nuclear accidents went from 43 per year to 255 per year. Here is just one of those accidents: In 1966, a B52 over Spain accidently sends not one but four hydrogen bombs towards earth. “While the nuclear warheads did not detonate, two exploded contaminating the soil, plutonium radiation that was still newsworthy a half-century later.” If only we were taught in school that “General Douglas MacArthur urged using more than thirty nuclear bombs to create a radioactive belt between North Korea and China.” And listen to General LeMay: “We killed off over a million civilian Koreans and drove several million more from their homes.” What a nice guy. Agent Orange was developed for use on Japanese rice crops but was ready for field test too late for use. Not to worry, the U.S. used it in Korea and then British enjoyed it in Malaya in 1960. Then, not to be outdone, the U.S. dropped “twenty million gallons of Agent Orange over parts of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.” War Crimes anyone?
While Japan did its nastiest stuff during WWII - it said it was doing a whole noble Pan-Asian thing to remove the white man’s control. Nice rhetoric, but didn’t do much to explain the Rape of Nanking. “In Asia more generally, Japan’s failed war delivered a fatal blow to British, Dutch and French Colonialism.” “Between 1948 and 1990 the US government secured the overthrow of at least twenty-four governments in Latin America.” – so much for FDR’s Good Neighbor policy. One Latin American torture manual said to target “religious workers, labor organizers, student groups, and others in sympathy with the cause of the poor.” Section titles for the other manuals included the thoughtful “Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects” and the catchy “Implicit and Explicit Terror”. “From 1960 to 1990, the Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than many individual Latin American countries.” Carter’s Doctrine “laid the ground for an enhanced US infrastructure of war, especially in the Greater Middle East.” Amazing fact from CIA ex-operatives: “At least six million people have died as a consequence of U.S. covert operations since World War II.” What changed the world about 9/11 was “not al-Qaeda’s attack but Washington’s overreaction.” The DOD stated that “between 2011 and 2014 special operations forces deployed into more than 150 countries.” In WWI, for every 24 soldiers you had one civilian support person. By Iraq, that ratio had fallen to a 1 to 1 ratio. More than ½ of all the 1.56 million veterans have “already applied for permanent disability benefits.” At what point will the violence and the price paid for unchecked imperialism (to both sides) no longer be worth it? John leaves us all with a cool deep question we should ask at any gathering turned political: “Is unaccountability integral to exceptionalism?” great book…
While Japan did its nastiest stuff during WWII - it said it was doing a whole noble Pan-Asian thing to remove the white man’s control. Nice rhetoric, but didn’t do much to explain the Rape of Nanking. “In Asia more generally, Japan’s failed war delivered a fatal blow to British, Dutch and French Colonialism.” “Between 1948 and 1990 the US government secured the overthrow of at least twenty-four governments in Latin America.” – so much for FDR’s Good Neighbor policy. One Latin American torture manual said to target “religious workers, labor organizers, student groups, and others in sympathy with the cause of the poor.” Section titles for the other manuals included the thoughtful “Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects” and the catchy “Implicit and Explicit Terror”. “From 1960 to 1990, the Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than many individual Latin American countries.” Carter’s Doctrine “laid the ground for an enhanced US infrastructure of war, especially in the Greater Middle East.” Amazing fact from CIA ex-operatives: “At least six million people have died as a consequence of U.S. covert operations since World War II.” What changed the world about 9/11 was “not al-Qaeda’s attack but Washington’s overreaction.” The DOD stated that “between 2011 and 2014 special operations forces deployed into more than 150 countries.” In WWI, for every 24 soldiers you had one civilian support person. By Iraq, that ratio had fallen to a 1 to 1 ratio. More than ½ of all the 1.56 million veterans have “already applied for permanent disability benefits.” At what point will the violence and the price paid for unchecked imperialism (to both sides) no longer be worth it? John leaves us all with a cool deep question we should ask at any gathering turned political: “Is unaccountability integral to exceptionalism?” great book…
February 3, 2018
John Dower contrasts the popular view of “The American Century” (that is, the years 1945 to the present) as one of progress, peace and prosperity with the effects of American foreign policy abroad. It covers both the overt and secret wars America has waged over the years just enough to let curious readers explore on their own later. Overall I’d recommend this book to anyone who needs an inoculation against the popular view of America’s wars, especially a young person.
February 22, 2018
Good, but more of a historical survey than original piece of writing - mostly narrative. Makes a strong argument against a naive account of the "liberal postwar order"; whatever good America achieved, it was done amidst significant amounts of violence and bloodshed that all Americans should reckon with. Can something so Machiavellian truly be called liberal? These are important questions that Dower could have wrestled with more.
June 3, 2017
An incredibly superficial short history. Nothing new here. The most valuable chapters are towards the end, regarding the GWOT, but come on. I feel like I skimmed through a better book.
June 21, 2024
Pretprošle godine (2015) su se filozof Džon Grej (Straw Dogs) i harvardski psiholog Stiven Pinker upustili u dijalektiku glede Pinkerove knjige, Bolji anđeli naše prirode: zašto nasilje opada (2011 https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1...). U njoj je Pinker, naučni puritanac i poštovalac vojne logike, pretežno sjedeći u fotelji optimizma i razumljivo se pozivajući na statistiku, došao do u akademskim krugovima fino primljenog zaključka da: „danas živimo u najdužoj eri mira u istoriji civilizacije“.
Greju, inače pesimisti u pogledu čovječanstva, religije i nauke (a naročito vjere u nauku), ne promiče smisao statistike gdje je poslije žrtava i ljudskog sloma kroz dva velika rata (70-100 miliona mrtvih) zapravo nemoguće ne priznati da uistinu nije tako. Čak bi i brucoš na podgoričkom fakultetu političkih nauka mogao da izjavi nešto slično i da zatim ostane živ.
Pinkerova knjiga od 800 strana, poput neoliberalnog vlažnog sna – ili, na žalost, još bolje: poput masturbativne fiksacije – postala je međunarodni bestseler. Mark Cukerberg, vlasnik Fejsbuka, proglasio ju je za jednu od knjiga godine. U stvari, Pinker ne stoji samo iza te ortodoksije (ta teorija, naprotiv, nije nova), već ponajviše iza postulata da je, prije svega, moralni napredak toliko očit u današnjem svijetu (za razliku od starog), i da je shodno tome svjetska politika umnogome pozitivnija nego što joj se priznaje. A zahvaljujući dobroj politici (i samim tim, dobrim ljudima na vlasti koji, sljedstveno mudrom čovjeku, više razmišljaju o životu nego o smrti, pošto je makar ta logika svakoj klasi nadasve jasna), mi – odnosno, dobar dio svijeta – od 1945. godine živi u miru i blagostanju.
Srećni zbog toga što do kraja Hladnog rata (1991) nije došlo do nuklearnog razračunavanja između S.A.D. i S.S.S.R, Fukujama, a sada i Pinker, uvidjeli su da su globalni ratovi zaista postali stvar prošlosti. Ispada da je nasilje za te ljude, kaže Grej, „neka vrsta retardacije“ u današnjem društvu.
Džon Douer, dobitnik Pulicera i drugih priznanja za svoje uvide o pošastima Drugog svjetskog rata, nije sročio najnoviju knjižicu Svirepi američki vijek: rat i teror poslije Drugog svjetskog rata kako bi nužno protivslovio Pinkeru. Međutim, ne bi bilo primjereno da se nije pozvao na njegovu tezu o naizgled kužnoj antiratnoj empatiji što navodno opsijeda zapadnu politiku poput zubić vile.
Zato već u prvom poglavlju Douer nabraja cifre „koje nisu uvrštene“ u ovu tezu o vječitom miru. Iako se u jednoj instanci ne radi o mrtvima – garantovano se radi o „žrtvama“.
Postoji, naime, dijagramska linija intimno povezana s globalnim nasiljem, da ne kažem s globalnim monetarizmom, što nekim čudom ne hrli ka dolje. „Prema procjeni UN-a iz 1996. godine“, piše Douer, „37,3 miliona ljudi na planeti raseljeno je prisilnim putem. Dvadeset godina kasnije, do kraja 2015, taj broj se povećao na 65,3 miliona – uvećanje za 75% tokom dvije post-hladnoratovske dekade“, koje inače Pinkerova studija klasifikuje kao epohu „novog mira“. (Prije toga je, u eri 1945-91, navodno zahvaljujući uviđavnim političarima, vladala epoha „dugog mira“.)
Cifre i dijagrami mogu samo da nagovijeste psihološko i društveno nasilje koje podjednako trpe i borci i neborci. Predloženo je, na primjer, da jedan od šest ljudi u ratnim područjima pati od mentalnog poremećaja (za razliku od jednog od deset u normalnim vremenima). Čak i u američkoj vojsci trauma nije postala ozbiljnija briga sve do 1980, dakle pet godina nakon povlačenja iz Vijetnama, kad je post-traumatski poremećaj (PTP) zvanično prepoznat kao nezaobilazni činilac mentalnog zdravlja.
„Tokom 2008. godine, masivno istraživanje sprovedeno među 1.6 miliona američkih vojnika iskrcanih u Avganistanu i Iraku između oktobra 2001-07. godine, pokazalo je da ‘približno 300,000 osoba trenutno pati od PTP-a ili velike depresije, a da je 320,000 osoba prošlo kroz mogući TPM (ili: traumatsku povredu mozga) u toku vojnog djelovanja’. A dok su se ovi ratovi beskrajno prolongirali, pomenuti brojevi su prirodno rasli. Najzad, ako bi se posljedice ovih podataka proširile na krugove porodice ili zajednice – ili, zbilja, na populacije traumatizovane svjetskim nasiljem – te brojke bi zamamno prkosile statističkim prebrojavanjima.“
[Pentagon je 2019. godine objavio da je suicidalnost među aktivnim američkim vojnicima u periodu 2013-18. porasla za 34%. U periodu 2007-17, suicidalnost među veteranima američkih ratova uvećana je za 50%. 2016. godine je obznanjeno istraživanje koje pokazuje da su 22 veterana dnevno izvršavala samoubistvo – primjera radi, 2014. godine 7,400 veterana je sebi oduzelo život, a što čini 18% svih samoubistava u S.A.D. Tehnički gledano, četiri puta više vojnika poginulo je od sopstvene ruke, nego na dvadesetogodišnjem bojištu poznatijem kao „Globalni rat protiv terora“.]
Douerova kontra Pinkeru je i više nego ubjedljiva. Ipak, kako odgovoriti psihologu koji rešenje svih zala pronalazi u brojevima? U još komičnijoj knjizi Zlodjela (Atrocities: The 100 Deadliest Episodes in Human History, 2017) Metjua Vajta, Pinker je valjda bio prinuđen da napiše predgovor dugačak jedva pola strane i da zbog toga zasluži ime na naslovnici.
Reklo bi se da Pinker brine o ljudima, jer potencira da se istorija pretežno sastoji od hagiografije kraljeva i državnika, rijetko se osvrćući na pogrome običnih ljudi (što više nije istina). No, Vajtova Zlodjela, krcata infantilnim rangiranjem ratova po brojevima žrtava i kroz još sterilniju istoriju, te i karakterizacijom tipova konflikata (većina ratova su, saznaćemo, ništa više do „ideološki sukobi“), može u jednu ruku biti i interesantan vodič ne zato što predstavlja personalnu autorovu računicu i istorijsku denominaciju, već zbog onoga što on, u stvari, ne pominje. Jer ako imamo nesvakidašnju odrednicu „Sankcije protiv Iraka“ (prema njemu, ukupno 350,000 žrtava – dok se vjeruje da je, u periodu 1990-96, samo djece pomrlo pola miliona), tada je još toliko toga tu moglo biti inkorporirano.
Douer nabraja posljednjih 75 godina nestabilnosti, bojazni i krvoprolića u eri koju je Henri Lus (Luce), izdavač časopisa Life i protivnik američkog izolacionizma, desetak dana prije japanskog napada na Perl Harbor 1941. ponosito imenovao – „američkim vijekom“. Taj ultra-nacionalistički aksiom nastavio je da se razvija kao moto američke perspektive na svu predstojeću istoriju i retoriku. U suštini, Lus je nedvosmislenost vjerske dogme preobratio u neopozivu sveameričku misiju zaogrnutu terminom internacionalizma. Lako je uvidjeti kako „delikatni balans terora“, što je karakterisao Hladni rat, ni nakon njegovog svršetka nije okončan, koliko je samo isponova konfigurisan.
Nuklearna frenetičnost iz 1980-ih je umanjena, ali nam i danas, na pragu novog Hladnog rata, i dalje preostaje (od januara 2016) 15,400 nuklearnih bombi koje će nas (za)štititi od (Regan bi rekao, „buduće vanzemaljske invazije“), a od toga 93% njih u rukama dvije zemlje, Amerike i Rusije. Blizu 2,000 tih nuklearnih glava aktivne su na projektilima, ili se pak nalaze u vojnim bazama sa borbenim snagama.
Douer ističe da je nedavno najavljena nova nuklearna modernizacija samo djelić kompletnog opsega američke sile – vojne mašinerije u tolikoj mjeri masivne da je inspirisala predsjednika Obamu, dobitnika Nobelove nagrade za mir (baš zato jer je na početku prvog mandata obećao da će zaustaviti američku nuklearnu proliferaciju, a u međuvremenu je dva američka rata proširio na sedam), da stavi atipičan pozitivni naglasak na to u tradicionalnom obraćanju naciji, u januaru 2016:
„S.A.D. je najmoćnija nacija na Zemlji“, kazao je. „I tu je tačka. Tačka. Niko ne može ni da nam se primakne. Apsolutno niko. Mi više trošimo na vojsku nego narednih osam zemalja zajedno.“
Primjera radi, po pitanju konstantno povećavanog budžeta, Amerika troši na svoju policiju više od svake vojske na svijetu, osim možda kineske. S tim na umu, sigurno ima više smisla brinuti o globalnom zagrijavanju.
2017
January 23, 2020
This book dispels the idea that the world has enjoyed any sustained, American-led “new peace” since WWII. Indeed, Dower describes the many ways that America has unleashed or supported the unleashing of violence throughout the world (especially in the third world). The chapters on Cold War nuclear proliferation and the activities of the CIA are absolutely chilling. I highlighted damn-near the entire chapter on the U.S.’s extensive incursions into Latin America, including the support for right-wing terrorist organizations and dictators.
However, notions of Western Chauvinism sometimes seep through the pages, and I think the author could have spent more time detailing America’s involvement in overthrowing democratic governments in the third world (and how that has often led to sustained violence and instability).
However, notions of Western Chauvinism sometimes seep through the pages, and I think the author could have spent more time detailing America’s involvement in overthrowing democratic governments in the third world (and how that has often led to sustained violence and instability).
June 21, 2024
Good short critique on the myth of American exceptionalism and how the United States has fucked up since the end of WW2, whether that be provoking the dirty wars in Latin America, overthrowing democratically elected governments in other nations, and a lot more. This stood out to me:
"Between 1960, by which time the Soviets had dismantled Stalin's gulags, and the Soviet collapse in 1990, the numbers of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of nonviolent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. In other words, from 1960 to 1990, the Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than many Latin American countries".
"Between 1960, by which time the Soviets had dismantled Stalin's gulags, and the Soviet collapse in 1990, the numbers of political prisoners, torture victims, and executions of nonviolent political dissenters in Latin America vastly exceeded those in the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. In other words, from 1960 to 1990, the Soviet bloc as a whole was less repressive, measured in terms of human victims, than many Latin American countries".
July 12, 2017
Although this will be oversimplified for scholars of military or diplomatic history, this is a terrific overview of how violence became so prevalent during the alleged era of peace and prosperity following World War II.
Some was familiar to me, but the strength of this work is synthesizing various data streams and putting it together in a way non-academics can understand. The result is a deeper understanding of how we got into this mixed up mess of international military and political conflicts.
Some was familiar to me, but the strength of this work is synthesizing various data streams and putting it together in a way non-academics can understand. The result is a deeper understanding of how we got into this mixed up mess of international military and political conflicts.
March 28, 2022
"John Coatsworth, a distinguished scholar of Latin American economic and international history, calculates that between 1948 and 1990 the US government "secured the overthrow of at least twenty-four governments in Latin America, four by direct use of US military forces, three by means of CIA-managed revolts or assassinations, and seventeen by encouraging local military and political forces to intervene without direct US participation, usually through military coups d'etat.""
April 30, 2019
I truly enjoyed this book which details how the American government used the military to maintain speeds of influence around the world. The book details specific policies which were meant to combat communism in the past and any other sort of so-called 'hostile actors'. One example that stands from this review of American military policy involves its role in the affairs of Latin American countries.
June 9, 2018
Didn't know that much about the Invasion of Grenada but that American propagandists portrayed its success as redeeming America for the failure of the Vietnam War is an absolute embarrassment.
October 3, 2020
Pretty stunning and eye opening account of US belligerence abroad since WW2. Well written and easy to follow, packed with data and facts and not an overwhelming amount of editorializing.
January 22, 2021
Excellent and succinct overview of America's often disastrous efforts at policing the world in the 20th and 21st centuries.
August 29, 2021
A short, but really useful primer/review of a lot of the patterns and processes that undergird many current events from an iconic historian.
March 1, 2024
This is an ok overview of a lot of US foreign policy since WWII, but I think that books like Shock Doctrine and How to Hide an Empire have covered the same history in more depth and in a way that I found more engaging. I’d recommend this if you want a very low commitment intro to the topic, but I didn’t find it to be the best source.
December 23, 2019
Opens with questioning Steven Pinker's notion of a "Long Peace" and his methods of quantification used to justify such an idea... followed by a brief overview of mutually assured destruction, CIA torture manuals, revolution in military affairs, special operations, etc.
April 19, 2017
Surgically precise and rich with verifiable facts and statistics -- presented only as an accomplished historian could. An alarming, yet necessary read.
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November 18, 2017fear as tool
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