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انتقام الجغرافيا: ما الذي تخبرنا به الخرائط عن الصراعات المقبلة وعن الحرب ضد المصير
في هذا الكتاب يطرح المؤلف منظورا جديدا لعرض الإضطرابات العالمية, وفهم ما ينتظر القارات والبلدان في جميع أنحاء العالم في المستقبل. يبني المؤلف طرحه على أفكار واكتشافات ونظريات كبار الجغرافيين والمفكرين الجيوسياسيين في الماضي القريب والبعيد, وذلك بالنظر إلى الوراء حيث المحاور الحاسمة للتاريخ, ومن ثم يستشرف مستقبل الساحة العالمية المتطورة دوما
448 pages, Paperback
First published September 11, 2012
About the author
Robert D. Kaplan
54 books1,110 followersRobert David Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, and his more controversial essays about the nature of U.S. power have spurred debate in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. A frequent theme in his work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 632 reviews
December 23, 2013
The Revanche of the Geographers
There are books one turn to sometimes, not for improving knowledge but to be reminded of the extent of one’s ignorance. This has turned out to be one more of such books even though I had gone in thinking I was ready.
Many times in my overzealous nature, I have jumped into books which I was unable to appreciate fully because of a lack of background. In such cases, usually I end up grasping the full implications of many of the ideas only later - when some other author educates me on the foundations from which the ideas I had rejected earlier emerge and make sense. I have quite some experience in this humbling exercise, if I may say so myself. And now I have been developing an instinct for noticing when I am being skeptical about a book and examining if it comes from my own reasoned arguments or just from ignorance of the author’s arguments. With this developing knack, I cant shake the feeling that Kaplan’s book is going to turn out to be one more of those books. What right now sticks me as thinly-veiled war-mongering and a very unhealthy revanchist framework might well turn out to be an uncomfortable truth that my berlinesque education is finding hard to accept. But I have been telling myself to keep open to even contradictory ideas - my aim is not ideology, that is what comes easily if one doesn’t put efforts towards developing a steady aversion to easy rejections.
I do commend Kaplan for shocking me so thoroughly with this book and for the strategic insights into the genesis of much of today's geopolitics - at least his version of them. While I am sure Kaplan cherry-picked extensively by only selecting those geographers who can claim vengeance in the present context of world geopolitics, which strikes me as a possibly manipulative exercise, I am still going to grant the possibility that he might be right. Especially on Iran and Mexico and their interplay with the USA where Kaplan projects a purpose onto history and a possibly bright future, but not so much with the strategic views/recommendations on containing China which unfortunately reflect the “Yellow Peril” mindset of the patron geographers that Kaplan builds upon. But, of course, that is not to say that they are wrong.
The geographers might indeed be getting their revenge. But, in 40 years I wish I would get to read another, more positively enthymemetic book about the revenge of the humanists.
April 9, 2013
A disappointing read, almost painful at times, and a missed opportunity. There is useful content here but it is poorly organized. The book reads like a series of rambling lectures. The text is verbose and repetitive; brace yourself for frequent appearances of the phrases, ‘as noted’, ‘as we have seen’, and ‘as I have explained’. Was there no editor for ‘Revenge’? And forget about using this book as a reference text for there is no index.
Much space is given over to describing national and geographic features since fewer than 10 maps are included, one of which is a map of the Persian empire in 500 BCE. And the book is mis-titled: it should have been called ‘The Revenge of Geography and History: What History and the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate’ since lengthy portions are given over to historical precedents dating back millennia. I was looking for a useful text on contemporary geopolitical trends but I am still looking. Kaplan's is not the one.
Much space is given over to describing national and geographic features since fewer than 10 maps are included, one of which is a map of the Persian empire in 500 BCE. And the book is mis-titled: it should have been called ‘The Revenge of Geography and History: What History and the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate’ since lengthy portions are given over to historical precedents dating back millennia. I was looking for a useful text on contemporary geopolitical trends but I am still looking. Kaplan's is not the one.
April 19, 2024
"من ينسى الجغرافيا في حسابات القوة العالمية لا يمكنه أبدا أن يهزمها"
انطلاقا من هذه الفرضية يبنى كابلان وهو أحد منظري الجغرافيا السياسية في العالم تصوراته التي يتضمنها هذا الكتاب، يرى كابلان أن أقدار الأمم وتطورها كان
دوماً مرتبطا بالجغرافيا. وكلما نظرنا إلى الماضي، ندرك الدور الذي لعبته الجغرافيا في صنع التاريخ ويحاول كابلان الرد على القائلين بأنه لم تعد هناك أهمية للجغرافيا في عصر العولمة وتكنولوجيا الاتصالات، من خلال عرضه لأحداث التاريخ وما سيحصل في أوراسيا، بما في ذلك الشرق الأوسط الكبير وشبه القارة الهندية
ویعتقد كابلان أن هنالك أھمیة أخرى للجغرافيا الآن، إذ أن بإمكانها تفسير العلاقات والنزاعات الدولية
الكتاب هو محاولة من المؤلف لرد الاعتبار للجغرافيا كعامل (حتمي) في الصراع الدولي
لا يخلو الكتاب من نظرة الاستعلاء الغربية التي ترى أنه كان مقدرا للحضارة الغربية أن تتفوق على الحضارات الشرقية
انطلاقا من هذه الفرضية يبنى كابلان وهو أحد منظري الجغرافيا السياسية في العالم تصوراته التي يتضمنها هذا الكتاب، يرى كابلان أن أقدار الأمم وتطورها كان
دوماً مرتبطا بالجغرافيا. وكلما نظرنا إلى الماضي، ندرك الدور الذي لعبته الجغرافيا في صنع التاريخ ويحاول كابلان الرد على القائلين بأنه لم تعد هناك أهمية للجغرافيا في عصر العولمة وتكنولوجيا الاتصالات، من خلال عرضه لأحداث التاريخ وما سيحصل في أوراسيا، بما في ذلك الشرق الأوسط الكبير وشبه القارة الهندية
ویعتقد كابلان أن هنالك أھمیة أخرى للجغرافيا الآن، إذ أن بإمكانها تفسير العلاقات والنزاعات الدولية
الكتاب هو محاولة من المؤلف لرد الاعتبار للجغرافيا كعامل (حتمي) في الصراع الدولي
لا يخلو الكتاب من نظرة الاستعلاء الغربية التي ترى أنه كان مقدرا للحضارة الغربية أن تتفوق على الحضارات الشرقية
July 12, 2013
I read all kinds of books and seldom really dislike one. But Kaplan's simplistic geographic determinism, vast generalizations, and location-dropping in this one really drove me crazy. India's monsoonal cycle makes people meditative and religious? Seriously!?
He seems to be trying to win an argument about whether geography's still important. But who's he arguing against? Who seriously thinks geography is no longer relevant? It seems like this book is part of some silly intramural argument with people who claim geography's passe because we have the internet and airplanes, which is a point of view so absurd I wouldn't bother to seriously engage with it -- much less write a book to refute it.
I read George Friedman's "The Next 100 Years," which relies heavily on geography to predict the future of international affairs, and I found it at times interesting and always amusing. I'd recommend reading that instead of this.
"The Revenge of Geography," seemed to be an not-particularly-well-informed catalog of places Kaplan's visited and his impressions of how the landscapes there shaped the racial characteristics of the exotic peoples he encountered there.
He seems to be trying to win an argument about whether geography's still important. But who's he arguing against? Who seriously thinks geography is no longer relevant? It seems like this book is part of some silly intramural argument with people who claim geography's passe because we have the internet and airplanes, which is a point of view so absurd I wouldn't bother to seriously engage with it -- much less write a book to refute it.
I read George Friedman's "The Next 100 Years," which relies heavily on geography to predict the future of international affairs, and I found it at times interesting and always amusing. I'd recommend reading that instead of this.
"The Revenge of Geography," seemed to be an not-particularly-well-informed catalog of places Kaplan's visited and his impressions of how the landscapes there shaped the racial characteristics of the exotic peoples he encountered there.
December 5, 2012
"Revelatory prism?" No. Frankly, I read a lot of geopolitics and there aren't any new revelations here. I was fairly disappointed in this book, written by someone with tremendous expertise in the field. Although it contains some interesting and even exciting ideas, the text is not well-conceptualized and I am left with the belief that an awful lot was left on the table. The first concern is that it is not clear what audience Kaplan is writing for. On the one hand, the style assumes a significant amount of familiarity with geography and geopolitics. He throws around ideas and people without adequate introduction or explanation for a reader new to the field. This is a particular problem in the first few quagmiresque chapters in which he outlines some of the field's major thinkers and their place in history. Someone with expertise might find this an interesting analysis and be able to parse some finer points in his argument, but the section is a barrier to anyone without a base familiarity. I myself only held on because of the prospect of something better. After a brief period in the middle which seems promising but lacking in the presentation of evidence, the book becomes a fairly superficial exercise - so much so that anyone with knowledge in the field would likely find it a pointless restatement of fairly common information. Thus, some portions assume too much knowledge for most readers, and the remainder would be a waste for those with the knowledge to tackle the beginning.
In general, the book feels under-researched. It is lean on citations and evidence, so that while his descriptions of phenomena may be accurate, he does not provide a basis to conclude that his causal inferences are sound, nor does he take any real risks in predicting the future. If this is the best that geography can offer then the title is poorly chosen, for if that is true then geography does not offer a great deal. My view is that this is a fialure of the author, not the field. Oddly, it suffers from a pronounced lack of adequate maps, which seems like a careless oversight in a book that discusses them on virtually every page.
In general, the book feels under-researched. It is lean on citations and evidence, so that while his descriptions of phenomena may be accurate, he does not provide a basis to conclude that his causal inferences are sound, nor does he take any real risks in predicting the future. If this is the best that geography can offer then the title is poorly chosen, for if that is true then geography does not offer a great deal. My view is that this is a fialure of the author, not the field. Oddly, it suffers from a pronounced lack of adequate maps, which seems like a careless oversight in a book that discusses them on virtually every page.
February 26, 2013
Kaplan argues that geography still matters for the way societies and nations organize themselves and project power in their neighborhoods and beyond. This is a necessary corrective to post-modern, 'the world is flat,' vision of globalization that seems to hold sway at the moment. As usual, Kaplan delivers an insightful, thought-provoking work marked by a deep knowledge of the peoples and states he talks about.
Kaplan first reviews in part 1, a number of theories of geopolitics, including Mackinder's heartland hypothesis, Spyker's rimland thesis, Hodgson's 'oikoumene,' and Mahan's arguments in favor of sea power. All agree essentially that the main 'action' is on the Eurasian continents (the "world island") because historically and even now, they accounted for the majority of the world's population and natural resources. The power that dominates the world island naturally dominates the world, but theorists differ on what factors lend a power control of the world island.
For Mackinder, this was the heartland, the vast unpopulated but resource rich interior of Asia; any power that controlled it, will control Eurasia and thus the world. For Spyker the focus was on the rimland, the four densely populated peripheries of the heartland -- Europe, West Asia, India and China. Rimland powers are threatened from both land and sea, but have the potential to break out in either direction. Incidentally, Spyker claims it is no coincidence that each of the four rimlands produced unique civilizational/religious cultures. Hodgson focuses on the 'oikoumene, the 'inhabited zone' for the Greeks, the vast quadrilateral bounded by the Nile and the Oxus, the Arabian Sea and the Caucasus. It is from this region, always prone to conflict because it is at the cross-roads of three continents and with no defensible natural borders, that all world changing phenomena originate, be they city states, empires or world religions.
Mahan in contrast prioritizes sea power. Nations able to project power through control of the sea gain the advantage of mobility and access, denied to their land-bound counterparts. In a telling example, Kaplan says that the Roman victory in the Punic wars was due primarily to naval power that made the Mediterranean a Roman pond, forcing Hannibal to take the long route and overextend his supply lines.
Kaplan's part 2 is devoted to the analysis of the geopolitics of specific regions -- Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran, Turkey and the former Ottoman regions, and finally the United States.
It is interesting how borders, even when they seem totally arbitrary, often have a deep geographic/historic logic behind them. For example, during the cold war, the border dividing Germany was considered a totally accidental construct where two armies came to a standstill. But Kaplan, always the master of the telling detail, says that the border coincided almost exactly with the historical dividing line in central Europe, between the western maritime half, and the eastern, Prussian land powers. Similarly, Russia's national temperament is attributed to the vast indefensible borders to the south and east from where the invasions of the nomadic steppe peoples came. In China's case, Kaplan explains why the imperatives of trade and resource extraction have made the nation's strategic thinkers increasingly Mahanian -- aiming to extend naval control over the inner island chain, and then into the blue waters beyond. The image of Taiwan as an unsinkable battleship positioned at the center of the island chain is evocative.
Iran's historical coherence as a nation and a civilization is traced to the well-defined, defensible borders of the Iranian plateau, which constituted the heartland of successive Iranian empires -- from the Achaemenid, Parthian, Sassanian, and on to modern times. Turkey similarly has well-defined borders that make it almost an island -- seas on three sides and mountains on the fourth. In contrast, Iraq's borders are artificial and conflict goes back to ancient history, between the Sumerian south, the Akkadian center and the Assyrian north (different time periods though). Syria is cleft between a Mediterranean Aleppo and an east-facing Damascus, with Homs and Hama in between.
Kaplan's fine book has only a few flaws. One is a certain incoherence in part 1, where possibly in an attempt to enliven the presentation, Kaplan moves back and forth between various theories when devoting full attention to each might have been better. Also, Kaplan for a scholar with an ecumenical vision, sometimes lapses into the tired language of the orientalist thinkers of the nineteenth century -- at one point comparing Westernized Greece and Asiatic Persia. The Greeks were Westernized? At a time when the West was a vast barbarian wasteland? And does Kaplan suggest that there is something common to all Asia that might be labeled Asiatic? Perhaps the choice of words was unintended and acquired by osmosis from the old geopolitical treatises in which he was immersed while writing the book.
Kaplan first reviews in part 1, a number of theories of geopolitics, including Mackinder's heartland hypothesis, Spyker's rimland thesis, Hodgson's 'oikoumene,' and Mahan's arguments in favor of sea power. All agree essentially that the main 'action' is on the Eurasian continents (the "world island") because historically and even now, they accounted for the majority of the world's population and natural resources. The power that dominates the world island naturally dominates the world, but theorists differ on what factors lend a power control of the world island.
For Mackinder, this was the heartland, the vast unpopulated but resource rich interior of Asia; any power that controlled it, will control Eurasia and thus the world. For Spyker the focus was on the rimland, the four densely populated peripheries of the heartland -- Europe, West Asia, India and China. Rimland powers are threatened from both land and sea, but have the potential to break out in either direction. Incidentally, Spyker claims it is no coincidence that each of the four rimlands produced unique civilizational/religious cultures. Hodgson focuses on the 'oikoumene, the 'inhabited zone' for the Greeks, the vast quadrilateral bounded by the Nile and the Oxus, the Arabian Sea and the Caucasus. It is from this region, always prone to conflict because it is at the cross-roads of three continents and with no defensible natural borders, that all world changing phenomena originate, be they city states, empires or world religions.
Mahan in contrast prioritizes sea power. Nations able to project power through control of the sea gain the advantage of mobility and access, denied to their land-bound counterparts. In a telling example, Kaplan says that the Roman victory in the Punic wars was due primarily to naval power that made the Mediterranean a Roman pond, forcing Hannibal to take the long route and overextend his supply lines.
Kaplan's part 2 is devoted to the analysis of the geopolitics of specific regions -- Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran, Turkey and the former Ottoman regions, and finally the United States.
It is interesting how borders, even when they seem totally arbitrary, often have a deep geographic/historic logic behind them. For example, during the cold war, the border dividing Germany was considered a totally accidental construct where two armies came to a standstill. But Kaplan, always the master of the telling detail, says that the border coincided almost exactly with the historical dividing line in central Europe, between the western maritime half, and the eastern, Prussian land powers. Similarly, Russia's national temperament is attributed to the vast indefensible borders to the south and east from where the invasions of the nomadic steppe peoples came. In China's case, Kaplan explains why the imperatives of trade and resource extraction have made the nation's strategic thinkers increasingly Mahanian -- aiming to extend naval control over the inner island chain, and then into the blue waters beyond. The image of Taiwan as an unsinkable battleship positioned at the center of the island chain is evocative.
Iran's historical coherence as a nation and a civilization is traced to the well-defined, defensible borders of the Iranian plateau, which constituted the heartland of successive Iranian empires -- from the Achaemenid, Parthian, Sassanian, and on to modern times. Turkey similarly has well-defined borders that make it almost an island -- seas on three sides and mountains on the fourth. In contrast, Iraq's borders are artificial and conflict goes back to ancient history, between the Sumerian south, the Akkadian center and the Assyrian north (different time periods though). Syria is cleft between a Mediterranean Aleppo and an east-facing Damascus, with Homs and Hama in between.
Kaplan's fine book has only a few flaws. One is a certain incoherence in part 1, where possibly in an attempt to enliven the presentation, Kaplan moves back and forth between various theories when devoting full attention to each might have been better. Also, Kaplan for a scholar with an ecumenical vision, sometimes lapses into the tired language of the orientalist thinkers of the nineteenth century -- at one point comparing Westernized Greece and Asiatic Persia. The Greeks were Westernized? At a time when the West was a vast barbarian wasteland? And does Kaplan suggest that there is something common to all Asia that might be labeled Asiatic? Perhaps the choice of words was unintended and acquired by osmosis from the old geopolitical treatises in which he was immersed while writing the book.
July 22, 2021
Geopolitical analysis—the subject of this fascinating book—has been on my mind almost throughout my life.
I had recently turned three when the Allies invaded Normandy, beginning the long, last phase of World War II in Europe. I have no active memory of the invasion, but I learned to read by studying the news about the event and its aftermath. My father read the newspaper at dinner, and I sat opposite him, leaning over the table so I could see the headlines—upside down—and ask him to tell me what the words meant. I loved the maps, too, those sketches of Europe and the Pacific with broad arrows pointing this way and that to indicate the movements of troops and ships at sea. Geography was long my favorite subject in school, and it’s not a stretch to think that my life-long fascination with the world outside the USA began with that experience.
A strange new perspective on the Earth
Through the lens of geopolitical analysis, Planet Earth and the machinations and foibles of earthly leaders look a lot different than they do in most history books. Stand a few feet away from a globe and squint: if the globe is properly positioned, what you’ll see is one huge, three-tentacled landmass (Asia-Africa-Europe); a second, much smaller one that consists of two parts joined by a narrow connector (North and South America); and several even smaller bits of land scattered about on the periphery (Australia, Greenland, Japan, Indonesia). That’s the world as the Joint Chiefs of Staff views it. Has to view it.
Viewing the globe through geopolitical analysis
Understanding the globe from that perspective, current events become a lot easier to understand. Take, for example, the object of American preoccupation today: the Middle East.
The true geopolitical center of the Earth lies in the Middle East, a region consisting essentially of three sections:
the Iranian Plateau, running from present-day Iraq to Afghanistan and dominated by a resurgent Iran, the latest incarnation of the Persian Empire;
the Anatolian landbridge (Turkey) that connects Asia and Europe, successor to the Eastern Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman Empires; and
the oil- and natural-gas-rich Arabian Peninsula, unsteadily governed by the extended Saud family and a congeries of coastal emirates.
Nestled between them and extending westward along the North African Maghreb is a long line of generally flat, low-lying states that are experiencing various degrees of instability, only a handful of which have a solid historical and demographic basis for nationhood (Tunisia, Egypt, Israel). Given the geography of this region, its perennial volatility is no surprise. Constant turmoil is practically guaranteed. The dominating Iranian and Turkish highlands lie above. Below, virtually flat, featureless plains are divided among mostly weak states with arbitrary borders inherited from British and French colonial masters. As Kaplan notes, “the supreme fact of twenty-first -century world politics is that the most geographically central area of the dry-land earth is also the most unstable.”
The central importance of Iran
Of all the states in the Greater Middle East, the strongest of all, and most likely to dominate at some point in the decades ahead, is Iran, with its proud history. “Iran was the ancient world’s first superpower,” Kaplan asserts. It houses a population of 83 million, sports a literacy rate of 85%, an industrial base, and an extensive network of universities. Iran is situated in an enviable position, straddling the region’s two principal oil-production areas (the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf), not to mention its own abundant hydrocarbon reserves. Is it any wonder, then, why Iran captures headlines with such frequency? Under geopolitical analysis, the question answers itself.
Comparing the potential of China and Brazil
In this fashion, geopolitical analysis yields important insight about how the world works. To cite another example, Kaplan asks “Why is China ultimately more important than Brazil?” The question is relevant because Brazil is so often spoken of as “the country of the future.” Kaplan explains that the key lies in “geographical location: even supposing the same level of economic growth as China and a population of equal size, Brazil does not command the main sea lines of communication connecting oceans and continents as China does; nor does it mainly lie in the temperate zone like China, with a more disease-free and invigorating climate. China fronts the Western Pacific and has depth on land reaching to oil- and natural-gas-rich Central Asia. Brazil offers less of a comparative advantage. It lies isolated in South America, geographically removed from other landmasses.”
Thought-provoking analysis in abundance
The Revenge of Geography is crammed with thought-provoking analysis. About the influence of geography on European history. The role of megacities in our future. And about changing demographic patterns and the impact of latitude on the fate of nations. Oh, and do you remember Sacha Baron Cohen‘s satirical treatment of Kazakhstan? Kaplan informs us that “Kazakhstan is truly becoming an independent power in its own right” (and proves it). Who knew?
A word of warning, though: unless you’re familiar with both world history and ancient history, you may find The Revenge of Geography to be tough sledding. You’ll need to wend your way through the innumerable mentions of long-lost empires and forgotten kings. Kaplan grounds his analysis not just in geography but also in history, and his knowledge of both clearly runs deep. Geopolitical analysis is not for the faint of heart.
“Why not fix Mexico instead” of meddling in the Middle East?
Kaplan begins wrapping up his book with a troubling discussion about recent U.S. foreign and military policy. “While the United States was deeply focused on Afghanistan and other parts of the Greater Middle East,” he writes, “a massive state failure was developing right on America’s southern border, with far more profound implications for the near and distant future of America, its society, and American power than anything occurring half a world away. What have we achieved in the Middle East with all of our interventions since the 1980s? . . . Why not fix Mexico instead?”
“America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas,” Kaplan concludes. “[A] chaotic Eurasian heartland in the Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower, and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. And the challenges we face with China and Mexico are most efficiently dealt with by wariness of further military involvement in the Middle East. This is the only way that American power can sustain itself for the decades to come.” Note, too, that Kaplan wrote this book nearly a decade ago. Since then, conditions in Mexico have only worsened, and many of the nations of Central America have disintegrated as well. The challenge to our south is enormous.
About the author
Robert D. Kaplan (1952-) has been writing about politics, foreign affairs, and travel since 1980—scores of books all told. As his Wikipedia entry reveals, “In addition to his journalism, Kaplan has been a consultant to the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, the United States Marines, and the United States Air Force. He has lectured at military war colleges, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, major universities, the CIA, and business forums, and has appeared on PBS, NPR, C-SPAN, and Fox News.” Kaplan is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. Geopolitical analysis seems to come naturally to him.
I had recently turned three when the Allies invaded Normandy, beginning the long, last phase of World War II in Europe. I have no active memory of the invasion, but I learned to read by studying the news about the event and its aftermath. My father read the newspaper at dinner, and I sat opposite him, leaning over the table so I could see the headlines—upside down—and ask him to tell me what the words meant. I loved the maps, too, those sketches of Europe and the Pacific with broad arrows pointing this way and that to indicate the movements of troops and ships at sea. Geography was long my favorite subject in school, and it’s not a stretch to think that my life-long fascination with the world outside the USA began with that experience.
A strange new perspective on the Earth
Through the lens of geopolitical analysis, Planet Earth and the machinations and foibles of earthly leaders look a lot different than they do in most history books. Stand a few feet away from a globe and squint: if the globe is properly positioned, what you’ll see is one huge, three-tentacled landmass (Asia-Africa-Europe); a second, much smaller one that consists of two parts joined by a narrow connector (North and South America); and several even smaller bits of land scattered about on the periphery (Australia, Greenland, Japan, Indonesia). That’s the world as the Joint Chiefs of Staff views it. Has to view it.
Viewing the globe through geopolitical analysis
Understanding the globe from that perspective, current events become a lot easier to understand. Take, for example, the object of American preoccupation today: the Middle East.
The true geopolitical center of the Earth lies in the Middle East, a region consisting essentially of three sections:
the Iranian Plateau, running from present-day Iraq to Afghanistan and dominated by a resurgent Iran, the latest incarnation of the Persian Empire;
the Anatolian landbridge (Turkey) that connects Asia and Europe, successor to the Eastern Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman Empires; and
the oil- and natural-gas-rich Arabian Peninsula, unsteadily governed by the extended Saud family and a congeries of coastal emirates.
Nestled between them and extending westward along the North African Maghreb is a long line of generally flat, low-lying states that are experiencing various degrees of instability, only a handful of which have a solid historical and demographic basis for nationhood (Tunisia, Egypt, Israel). Given the geography of this region, its perennial volatility is no surprise. Constant turmoil is practically guaranteed. The dominating Iranian and Turkish highlands lie above. Below, virtually flat, featureless plains are divided among mostly weak states with arbitrary borders inherited from British and French colonial masters. As Kaplan notes, “the supreme fact of twenty-first -century world politics is that the most geographically central area of the dry-land earth is also the most unstable.”
The central importance of Iran
Of all the states in the Greater Middle East, the strongest of all, and most likely to dominate at some point in the decades ahead, is Iran, with its proud history. “Iran was the ancient world’s first superpower,” Kaplan asserts. It houses a population of 83 million, sports a literacy rate of 85%, an industrial base, and an extensive network of universities. Iran is situated in an enviable position, straddling the region’s two principal oil-production areas (the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf), not to mention its own abundant hydrocarbon reserves. Is it any wonder, then, why Iran captures headlines with such frequency? Under geopolitical analysis, the question answers itself.
Comparing the potential of China and Brazil
In this fashion, geopolitical analysis yields important insight about how the world works. To cite another example, Kaplan asks “Why is China ultimately more important than Brazil?” The question is relevant because Brazil is so often spoken of as “the country of the future.” Kaplan explains that the key lies in “geographical location: even supposing the same level of economic growth as China and a population of equal size, Brazil does not command the main sea lines of communication connecting oceans and continents as China does; nor does it mainly lie in the temperate zone like China, with a more disease-free and invigorating climate. China fronts the Western Pacific and has depth on land reaching to oil- and natural-gas-rich Central Asia. Brazil offers less of a comparative advantage. It lies isolated in South America, geographically removed from other landmasses.”
Thought-provoking analysis in abundance
The Revenge of Geography is crammed with thought-provoking analysis. About the influence of geography on European history. The role of megacities in our future. And about changing demographic patterns and the impact of latitude on the fate of nations. Oh, and do you remember Sacha Baron Cohen‘s satirical treatment of Kazakhstan? Kaplan informs us that “Kazakhstan is truly becoming an independent power in its own right” (and proves it). Who knew?
A word of warning, though: unless you’re familiar with both world history and ancient history, you may find The Revenge of Geography to be tough sledding. You’ll need to wend your way through the innumerable mentions of long-lost empires and forgotten kings. Kaplan grounds his analysis not just in geography but also in history, and his knowledge of both clearly runs deep. Geopolitical analysis is not for the faint of heart.
“Why not fix Mexico instead” of meddling in the Middle East?
Kaplan begins wrapping up his book with a troubling discussion about recent U.S. foreign and military policy. “While the United States was deeply focused on Afghanistan and other parts of the Greater Middle East,” he writes, “a massive state failure was developing right on America’s southern border, with far more profound implications for the near and distant future of America, its society, and American power than anything occurring half a world away. What have we achieved in the Middle East with all of our interventions since the 1980s? . . . Why not fix Mexico instead?”
“America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas,” Kaplan concludes. “[A] chaotic Eurasian heartland in the Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower, and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. And the challenges we face with China and Mexico are most efficiently dealt with by wariness of further military involvement in the Middle East. This is the only way that American power can sustain itself for the decades to come.” Note, too, that Kaplan wrote this book nearly a decade ago. Since then, conditions in Mexico have only worsened, and many of the nations of Central America have disintegrated as well. The challenge to our south is enormous.
About the author
Robert D. Kaplan (1952-) has been writing about politics, foreign affairs, and travel since 1980—scores of books all told. As his Wikipedia entry reveals, “In addition to his journalism, Kaplan has been a consultant to the U.S. Army’s Special Forces, the United States Marines, and the United States Air Force. He has lectured at military war colleges, the FBI, the National Security Agency, the Pentagon’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, major universities, the CIA, and business forums, and has appeared on PBS, NPR, C-SPAN, and Fox News.” Kaplan is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security in Washington, DC. Geopolitical analysis seems to come naturally to him.
January 27, 2016
I was resolved to read this book to get a better understanding of some of the long term structural issues underlying international politics and it took all my resolve to persist through the meandering first chapters.
It was worth it in the end. Despite the clunky style, statements of the obvious and sometimes circular arguments, I now have a much better idea of the pressure points for each of the major global pressure points (though Africa remains virtually unknown territory). That's why I've given it 4 stars.
I have marked many passages for contemplation and can imagine that I will revisit individual chapters from time to time. I will look out for future bosky him but don't think I'll read any of his region-specific works.
Most surprising for me is the theory that a major threat to the United States is a potentially failed-state Mexico, with all that flows from that.
I can understand why Kaplan is described as one of the leading 100 global thinkers.
It was worth it in the end. Despite the clunky style, statements of the obvious and sometimes circular arguments, I now have a much better idea of the pressure points for each of the major global pressure points (though Africa remains virtually unknown territory). That's why I've given it 4 stars.
I have marked many passages for contemplation and can imagine that I will revisit individual chapters from time to time. I will look out for future bosky him but don't think I'll read any of his region-specific works.
Most surprising for me is the theory that a major threat to the United States is a potentially failed-state Mexico, with all that flows from that.
I can understand why Kaplan is described as one of the leading 100 global thinkers.
September 30, 2012
I don't quit reading books often, but I had to throw in the towel on this one, which is disappointing considering I've read so many of Kaplan's books in the past. The key here, evidently, being "the past," meaning a different period in my life.
I found this book to be exhausting, as if Kaplan tries entirely too hard to come across as a scholar. I quickly grew tired of the endless citations and quotes with little actual insight from the author. A fascinating subject unfortunately presented in a dull, sleep-inducing manner. I gave up about 100 pages in.
February 5, 2013
Stupid name for a trite book redeemed by a few good lines and an occasional useful insight. As for the title, the "influence" or the "significance" of geography would have made sense, but "revenge"?
Kaplan, who served in the Israeli army but not in the American army (he is old enough to have served in Vietnam), seems to have lot more interest in and knowledge of the middle east than of America and its Latin neighbors, especially Mexico. V.D. Hanson's Mexifornia has a lot more interesting and useful to say about America and Mexico.
About Asia he seems to know very little. Oh, yes, he yaks on about China in a pop journalism sort of way, echoing the currently fashionable obsession, even dredging up Mahan, an irrelevant 19th century Boston imperialist, to make himself sound deep.
In that context, what he writes about the military build-up on Guam is overblown--for example, he talks about rows of F/A-18s, as well as Air Force bombers, lined up at AAFB, but when F/A-18s visit they fly down from Okinawa; none are permanently station on Guam. Ditto the handful of bombers that rotate in and out.
The thing is...I know first hand about what's going on in Guam--and he's just winging it, mixing together hyperbole, outdated news reports and questionable extrapolation. So I can't help but wonder if the rest of the book is full of the same stuff.
He scarcely mentions Japan, once as obsessed over by his sort as China is today. But Japan is like, you know, so 20th century. In any case, what he does say about the country seems off the mark, based on my personal experience.
Indonesia gets short shrift although it is racing towards becoming the 4th largest economy in the world.
And what about the Philippines? Why is that nation ignored while he raves on about some stupid 'stan? I could mention a half-dozen other countries that he never even mentions.
In any case, who cares? All he does is arm wave about this and that, his paragraphs filled with conditional phrases. "Could," "should" and "must" seem to be his operative words. You could find a bore at a faculty cocktail party at any university who would pontificate in the same sort of way.
Setting all that aside, the book reads like a cross between a padded-out op-ed page essay and filled-out notes from a lecture course in some aspects of geopolitics. And it's mostly based on really old secondary sources, some of them so old you can download them from Gutenberg or the Internet Archives. You should do that and read those sources, then decide for yourself how relevant they may be in today's world. Kaplan doesn't add much.
Funny thing is, I watched a video interview with him in YouTube (Uncommon Knowledge, maybe), and he seemed smart, knowledgeable, interesting. So I decided to read his book.
What a disappointment.
Kaplan, who served in the Israeli army but not in the American army (he is old enough to have served in Vietnam), seems to have lot more interest in and knowledge of the middle east than of America and its Latin neighbors, especially Mexico. V.D. Hanson's Mexifornia has a lot more interesting and useful to say about America and Mexico.
About Asia he seems to know very little. Oh, yes, he yaks on about China in a pop journalism sort of way, echoing the currently fashionable obsession, even dredging up Mahan, an irrelevant 19th century Boston imperialist, to make himself sound deep.
In that context, what he writes about the military build-up on Guam is overblown--for example, he talks about rows of F/A-18s, as well as Air Force bombers, lined up at AAFB, but when F/A-18s visit they fly down from Okinawa; none are permanently station on Guam. Ditto the handful of bombers that rotate in and out.
The thing is...I know first hand about what's going on in Guam--and he's just winging it, mixing together hyperbole, outdated news reports and questionable extrapolation. So I can't help but wonder if the rest of the book is full of the same stuff.
He scarcely mentions Japan, once as obsessed over by his sort as China is today. But Japan is like, you know, so 20th century. In any case, what he does say about the country seems off the mark, based on my personal experience.
Indonesia gets short shrift although it is racing towards becoming the 4th largest economy in the world.
And what about the Philippines? Why is that nation ignored while he raves on about some stupid 'stan? I could mention a half-dozen other countries that he never even mentions.
In any case, who cares? All he does is arm wave about this and that, his paragraphs filled with conditional phrases. "Could," "should" and "must" seem to be his operative words. You could find a bore at a faculty cocktail party at any university who would pontificate in the same sort of way.
Setting all that aside, the book reads like a cross between a padded-out op-ed page essay and filled-out notes from a lecture course in some aspects of geopolitics. And it's mostly based on really old secondary sources, some of them so old you can download them from Gutenberg or the Internet Archives. You should do that and read those sources, then decide for yourself how relevant they may be in today's world. Kaplan doesn't add much.
Funny thing is, I watched a video interview with him in YouTube (Uncommon Knowledge, maybe), and he seemed smart, knowledgeable, interesting. So I decided to read his book.
What a disappointment.
May 25, 2022
“As Napoleon said, to know a nation’s geography is to know its foreign policy.”
Geopolitics is not for the timid. No matter how sincere the protestations of charity and good will, at the end of the day a nation’s decision making will be in the hands of hard-eyed, pragmatic men and women. This is the essence of realpolitick. As Robert Kaplan himself said in his 2018 book The Return of Marco-Polo’s World, “Because the realist knows that he must work with elemental forces rather than against them, he also knows, for example, that order comes before freedom and interests come before values. After all, without order there is no freedom for anybody, and without interests a state has no incentive to project its values.”
Kaplan’s books are insightful and thought-provoking, charged with the key facts, the telling insights, the apposite historical incidents that shed light on the modern world. His 1993 book Balkan Ghosts is still consulted today to help make sense of that complex region, simmering with barely contained violence. Above all, he has a remarkable ability to distill complicated situations into their essential facts. For example, consider this comment, and then reflect on what it says about the West’s current relationship with Russia: “Remember that the Munich conference occurred only twenty years after the mass death of World War I, making realist politicians like Neville Chamberlain understandably hell-bent on avoiding another conflict. Such situations are perfectly suited for the machinations of a tyrannical state that knows no such fears: Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.”
This book looks at how geography constrains and directs international relations, and it offers some practical advice to decision makers, lessons to be learned from the folly and shortsightedness of earlier leaders, such as “Vietnam counsels that tragedy is avoided by thinking tragically. It decries incessant fervor, for it suggests how wrong things can go,” and “Don’t ever say things cannot get much worse than they are, because they can.”
Geography is often cited as a contributing factor in history, but it is given much less weight than economic conditions or the personalities of nations’ leaders. In this book Kaplan brings it back front and center as a key explanatory factor in national history and foreign policy. For example:
After examining the historic forces which led to the current state of world affairs, Kaplan looks at what he considers key challenges for the United States going into the 21st century, “the realist camp of foreign policy [arrives at] the conclusion that America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas: a chaotic Eurasian heartland in the Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower, and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. And the challenges we face with China and Mexico are most efficiently dealt with by wariness of further military involvement in the Middle East.”
China is actively seeking to become the dominant power in the Pacific. Key to this ambition is Taiwan, which it intends to reclaim diplomatically if possible, but by military force if necessary. Once this is achieved all the other nations of the western Pacific Rim would come within the Chinese sphere of influence, Japan and the Philippians in particular, but southeast Asia as well, presenting Australia with an uncomfortable decision to resist or accommodate.
Political theorist Nicholas Spykman recognized this as early as 1942, writing
At least the threat from China is generally recognized, but Kaplan sees as great a problem coming from Mexico, “Mexico registers far less in the elite imagination than does Israel or China, or India even. Yet Mexico could affect America’s destiny more than any of those countries.” Stanford historian David Kennedy has pointed out that the income differential between the United States and Mexico is the largest of any two contiguous countries in the world, with the American GDP nine times that of Mexico’s.
In 1998 Kaplan published An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America's Future, which included a close analysis of the situation in Mexico, conditions which have only been exacerbated in the intervening years.
He also observes that “Unlike the former Soviet Union, Mexico’s party despotism has never been guided by an ideology or the pretense of one. It exists for crime, whether in the form of patronage and nepotism at the top or armed robbery at the lower reaches.” And now, in Revenge of Geography he cites Robert C. Bonner, former head of the U. S. Drug Enforcement Agency, who wrote that if the gangs complete their takeover of the Mexican government, “the United States will share a 2,000-mile border with a nacrostate controlled by powerful transnational drug cartels that threaten the stability of Central and South America.”
Kaplan’s recommendation is that the United States should focus on the threats from China and Mexico and try to avoid entanglements elsewhere. This book was written in 2012, before the extent of the debacle of America’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were clear (Kaplan originally supported the Iraq war, but now regrets that decision). Looking back, we can see that for all the expense in lives and treasure, all we accomplished was to further destabilize already incompetent governments.
The United States still has an important role to play fostering in democracy around the world, but the days when it could be the world’s policeman are coming to an end. If we fail to realize that then the future will be one of endless wars and declining relevance. In Barbara Tuchman’s book The March of Folly, she reviews the hubris and short-sighted policy decisions that led to decades of war in Vietnam and incalculable damage to the the nation’s prestige and ability to project its values, and sums up the results by saying “What America lost in Vietnam was, to put it in one word, virtue.”
Another reason to avoid foreign entanglements is that much of the world is rapidly becoming more fragmented, and more dangerous, with regional power blocs and the spread of toxic populism fueled by irresponsible social media giants.
Kaplan also makes some interesting comments regarding home-grown destabilizing factors in Europe and the United States, religion in particular, “Christianity, too, becomes, as a consequence of the stresses of suburban living in the American South and West, more ideological, even as a loose form of environmental paganism takes root in the cities of Europe, replacing traditional nationalism, given that the super-state of the European Union has only abstract meaning to all but the elite.”
The world is becoming a more dangerous place just as the United States becomes less and less able to control events, but we must adapt or perish. “How does America prepare itself for a prolonged and graceful exit from history as a dominant power? Like Byzantium, it can avoid costly interventions, use diplomacy to sabotage enemies, employ intelligence assets for strategic uses, and so on.” Kaplan is a realist who knows that we cannot save the world, but we could destroy ourselves by trying, and in any case we have more pressing threats to deal with.
Geopolitics is not for the timid. No matter how sincere the protestations of charity and good will, at the end of the day a nation’s decision making will be in the hands of hard-eyed, pragmatic men and women. This is the essence of realpolitick. As Robert Kaplan himself said in his 2018 book The Return of Marco-Polo’s World, “Because the realist knows that he must work with elemental forces rather than against them, he also knows, for example, that order comes before freedom and interests come before values. After all, without order there is no freedom for anybody, and without interests a state has no incentive to project its values.”
Kaplan’s books are insightful and thought-provoking, charged with the key facts, the telling insights, the apposite historical incidents that shed light on the modern world. His 1993 book Balkan Ghosts is still consulted today to help make sense of that complex region, simmering with barely contained violence. Above all, he has a remarkable ability to distill complicated situations into their essential facts. For example, consider this comment, and then reflect on what it says about the West’s current relationship with Russia: “Remember that the Munich conference occurred only twenty years after the mass death of World War I, making realist politicians like Neville Chamberlain understandably hell-bent on avoiding another conflict. Such situations are perfectly suited for the machinations of a tyrannical state that knows no such fears: Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.”
This book looks at how geography constrains and directs international relations, and it offers some practical advice to decision makers, lessons to be learned from the folly and shortsightedness of earlier leaders, such as “Vietnam counsels that tragedy is avoided by thinking tragically. It decries incessant fervor, for it suggests how wrong things can go,” and “Don’t ever say things cannot get much worse than they are, because they can.”
Geography is often cited as a contributing factor in history, but it is given much less weight than economic conditions or the personalities of nations’ leaders. In this book Kaplan brings it back front and center as a key explanatory factor in national history and foreign policy. For example:
What could be a more central fact of European history than that Germany is a continental power and Great Britain an island? Germany faces both east and west with no mountain ranges to protect it, providing it with pathologies from militarism to nascent pacifism, so as to cope with its dangerous location. Britain, on the other hand, secure in its borders, with an oceanic orientation, could develop a democratic system ahead of its neighbors, and forge a special transatlantic relationship with the United States, with which it shares a common language.
After examining the historic forces which led to the current state of world affairs, Kaplan looks at what he considers key challenges for the United States going into the 21st century, “the realist camp of foreign policy [arrives at] the conclusion that America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas: a chaotic Eurasian heartland in the Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower, and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. And the challenges we face with China and Mexico are most efficiently dealt with by wariness of further military involvement in the Middle East.”
China is actively seeking to become the dominant power in the Pacific. Key to this ambition is Taiwan, which it intends to reclaim diplomatically if possible, but by military force if necessary. Once this is achieved all the other nations of the western Pacific Rim would come within the Chinese sphere of influence, Japan and the Philippians in particular, but southeast Asia as well, presenting Australia with an uncomfortable decision to resist or accommodate.
Political theorist Nicholas Spykman recognized this as early as 1942, writing
A modern, vitalized, and militarized China … is going to be a threat not only to Japan, but also to the position of the Western Powers in the Asiatic Mediterranean. China will be a continental power of huge dimensions in control of a large section of the littoral of that middle sea. Her geographic position will be similar to that of the United States in regard to the American Mediterranean. When China becomes strong, her present economic penetration in that region will undoubtedly take on political overtones. It is quite possible to envisage the day when this body of water will be controlled not by British, American, or Japanese sea power but by Chinese air power.
At least the threat from China is generally recognized, but Kaplan sees as great a problem coming from Mexico, “Mexico registers far less in the elite imagination than does Israel or China, or India even. Yet Mexico could affect America’s destiny more than any of those countries.” Stanford historian David Kennedy has pointed out that the income differential between the United States and Mexico is the largest of any two contiguous countries in the world, with the American GDP nine times that of Mexico’s.
In 1998 Kaplan published An Empire Wilderness: Travels into America's Future, which included a close analysis of the situation in Mexico, conditions which have only been exacerbated in the intervening years.
Tijuana ... illustrates the jarring divide between the United States, a society governed through flexible and interlocking jurisdictions, and Mexico, an oligarchal tyranny that does not really govern at all. The multibillion-dollar narcotics trade in Mexico is simply too vast to be dismissed as ‘illegal.’ It is the heart of the Mexican economy and constitutes the principal economic fact of life for the southern part of North America at the turn of the twenty-first century.
He also observes that “Unlike the former Soviet Union, Mexico’s party despotism has never been guided by an ideology or the pretense of one. It exists for crime, whether in the form of patronage and nepotism at the top or armed robbery at the lower reaches.” And now, in Revenge of Geography he cites Robert C. Bonner, former head of the U. S. Drug Enforcement Agency, who wrote that if the gangs complete their takeover of the Mexican government, “the United States will share a 2,000-mile border with a nacrostate controlled by powerful transnational drug cartels that threaten the stability of Central and South America.”
Kaplan’s recommendation is that the United States should focus on the threats from China and Mexico and try to avoid entanglements elsewhere. This book was written in 2012, before the extent of the debacle of America’s involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq were clear (Kaplan originally supported the Iraq war, but now regrets that decision). Looking back, we can see that for all the expense in lives and treasure, all we accomplished was to further destabilize already incompetent governments.
The United States still has an important role to play fostering in democracy around the world, but the days when it could be the world’s policeman are coming to an end. If we fail to realize that then the future will be one of endless wars and declining relevance. In Barbara Tuchman’s book The March of Folly, she reviews the hubris and short-sighted policy decisions that led to decades of war in Vietnam and incalculable damage to the the nation’s prestige and ability to project its values, and sums up the results by saying “What America lost in Vietnam was, to put it in one word, virtue.”
Another reason to avoid foreign entanglements is that much of the world is rapidly becoming more fragmented, and more dangerous, with regional power blocs and the spread of toxic populism fueled by irresponsible social media giants.
A Eurasia and North Africa of vast, urban concentrations, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational global media will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors and half-truths transported at the speed of light by satellite channels across the rimlands and heartland expanse, from on Third World city to another. Conversely, the crowd, empowered by social media like Twitter and Facebook, will also be fed by the very truth that autocratic rulers have denied it.
Kaplan also makes some interesting comments regarding home-grown destabilizing factors in Europe and the United States, religion in particular, “Christianity, too, becomes, as a consequence of the stresses of suburban living in the American South and West, more ideological, even as a loose form of environmental paganism takes root in the cities of Europe, replacing traditional nationalism, given that the super-state of the European Union has only abstract meaning to all but the elite.”
The world is becoming a more dangerous place just as the United States becomes less and less able to control events, but we must adapt or perish. “How does America prepare itself for a prolonged and graceful exit from history as a dominant power? Like Byzantium, it can avoid costly interventions, use diplomacy to sabotage enemies, employ intelligence assets for strategic uses, and so on.” Kaplan is a realist who knows that we cannot save the world, but we could destroy ourselves by trying, and in any case we have more pressing threats to deal with.
October 8, 2016
كتاب : انتقام الجغرافيا
المؤلف : روبرت د. كابلان
المترجم : د. إيهاب عبدالرحيم
الناشر : المجلس الوطني للثقافة والفنون والادب - الكويت
الطبعة : يناير 2015
التقييم : 5/4
الجغرافيا السياسية ( جيوبوليتك ) فن السيطرة على العالم من خلال تطبيق الاستراتيجيات الجغرافيه للتحكم بالعالم ..
فأذا ذكر مصطلح الجيوبوليتك يبادر الى ذهنك نظرية المفكر الاستراتيجي هالفورد ماكندر المعروفه بأسم " المنطقة المركزية " فما هي تلك النظرية ..؟
بإيجاز تقول النظرية " من يتحكم بمنطقة القلب يتحكم بالجزيرة العالمية ( أوراسيا أي اوروبا واسيا وافريقيا ) ، ومن يتحكم بالجزيرة العالمية يتحكم بالعالم " انتهى ..
طيب كيف ذلك لم أفهم ..؟
سنشرح ذلك بإيجاز لتتضح النظرية قسم ما كيندر العالم الى ثلاث اقسام وهي ( منطقة القلب ، منطقة الهلال الداخلي ، منطقة الهلال الخارجي ) ..
- منطقة القلب أي " المنطقه المركزيه " وهي المنطقة الأكثر أهمية لسيادة العالم ويقصد بها "شرق أوروبا "أي حدودها من الشرق الصين ومن الغرب نهر الفولغا (ويقع غرب روسيا ) ومن الشمال المحيط المتجمد ومن الجنوب هضاب اسيا وجبال الهيمالايا .
- منطقة الهلال الداخلي وهي منطقة الأرتكاز الثانية أي ما يحيط منطقة القلب على شكل قوس ويقصد بها أوروبا الغربية وأفريقيا والشرق الأوسط والمناطق المتبقية من أسيا ، ويقول بأن هذه المنطقة منطقة الصدام بين القوات البرية والبحرية ..
- منطقة الهلال الخارجي ويقصد بها القوس الذي يحيط الهلال الداخلي أي الجزر التي تحيط بالقارات الثلاث اوروبا واسيا وافريقيا وتشمل أمريكا الشمالية والجنوبية واستراليا وانجلترا واليابان ، ويملك هذا النطاق قوه بحرية عظيمة ..
وبناء على ذلك فالفرضية تقول من يسيطر على قلب العالم ( المنطقة المركزية ) يتحكم بالجزيرة العالمية ( اي الهلال الداخلي ) ومن يتحكم بالجزيرة العالمية فهو يتحكم بالعالم ( أي الهلال الخارجي ) ..
فأتمنى أن أكون وفقت في شرح هذه النظرية التي تأثرت بها الحركة النازية الالمانية وخاضت الحرب العالمية الثانية لتسيطر على قلب العالم ..
ولكن لا تخلو النظريه من النقد فقد بنيت هذه النظرية على معطيات وتراكمات جغرافيه و تاريخيه في ذلك الوقت وتبناها مخططون استراتيجيون ، وأما في وقتنا الحاضر ينقصها كثير حيث توجد عوامل اخرى من يملكها يتحكم بالعالم كالتكنولوجيا المتطوره والغطاء الجوي والموارد الطبيعيه والعوامل الاقتصاديه والتوزيع الديموغرافي وغيرها ..
كتاب مليء بالمفاجأت و شيق ترى كيف تؤثر الجغرافيا السياسية وتغيراتها على الأنقسامات البشرية ..
08/10/2016
June 2, 2017
Whilst I am just at the beginning of my forray in and journey through the field of geopolitics, I get the distinct feeling that this book is not what it was supposed to be. The title has no tangible connection to the actual work (unless I am mistaken on the meaning of the word 'revenge'), there are some gross generalizations made in order to get points through and sometimes, what I consider to be blatant mistakes. What do you mean, the Chinese had 'no interest in exploring until the XIII Century'? As far as I know, exploring is not only defined so if you manage to make it to another continent and 'discover' it. Anyways. Kaplan constantly assumes the reader is a well of knowledge with regards to the subject. In my opinion, no matter the calibre of the author and the subject in mind - no writer in the history of ever should write as if only intended for the experts or medium-to-high knowledgeable in the field. You want to educate people? Don't belittle them by constantly saying stuff like: 'as the reader knows", "as it is obvious", etc. You know what? Maybe it's not so obvious, and even though I am the type of reader predisposed to stop reading and open Wikipedia up to fact-check, many are not, and amongst them valuable minds are lost in the process.
That being said, this book IS a very valuable source on the geography of the world, focusing on an area at a time, giving the reader the ability to visualize and understand certain political processes as they happend, with geographical specifications providing the backdrop. That part of the book I enjoyed very much and consider very well written. All in all, it's a good read if you are interested in the field, but I'll hold my horses for my future forrays in the subject.
That being said, this book IS a very valuable source on the geography of the world, focusing on an area at a time, giving the reader the ability to visualize and understand certain political processes as they happend, with geographical specifications providing the backdrop. That part of the book I enjoyed very much and consider very well written. All in all, it's a good read if you are interested in the field, but I'll hold my horses for my future forrays in the subject.
November 25, 2012
Well, I won’t lie. That was more than a bit like eating my peas (with apologies to peas; I really like them). I knew it was good for me, but it wasn’t necessarily enjoyable.
I had to approach this book in periodic bursts over a month's time. Many readers claim to have no problem with abandoning a book they don’t enjoy. I’m not one of them. I’m hell bound to finish my peas, even if they’ve gone cold because I keep walking away from the table for periods of time. Stubborn, I guess.
It’s hard to identify what made this book such a chore to digest. It’s jam-packed with interesting and useful ideas that will serve me well, but it was perhaps too dense, too jam-packed. And a tad rambling, jumbly. Editing is a lost art.
And it suffers from an absolutely unforgivable dearth of maps. How can a book about political geography be so lacking in maps? The first doesn’t appear until a good 130-odd pages in, despite densely packed descriptions of geopolitical regions. Maps, maps, my kingdom for a map. This puppy needed more maps.
Kvetching aside, lots of good concepts are present for stubborn people determined to eat their peas. I’ve gained a lot of new ideas and perspectives to keep in mind while considering the longer-term implications of the daily news. I don’t quite buy all of Kaplan’s analysis; it sometimes felt like mumbo jumbo – as if one could apply geopolitical principles to argue for any possible outcome.
The book is divided into three parts. The first part explores major geopolitical theories. The second part analyzes the major regions of the world in terms of those theories. The brief third part (far too brief, just one hurried chapter) looks to America’s future in broad, rushed strokes. I would have liked to have seen a few more chapters focusing on the different parts of the Western Hemisphere. I’ve been to South America several times in the past few years and can sense the beginnings of a future powerhouse.
Like the nerd I am, I took notes. If you want the Cliff note version, I’m happy to supply them.
I had to approach this book in periodic bursts over a month's time. Many readers claim to have no problem with abandoning a book they don’t enjoy. I’m not one of them. I’m hell bound to finish my peas, even if they’ve gone cold because I keep walking away from the table for periods of time. Stubborn, I guess.
It’s hard to identify what made this book such a chore to digest. It’s jam-packed with interesting and useful ideas that will serve me well, but it was perhaps too dense, too jam-packed. And a tad rambling, jumbly. Editing is a lost art.
And it suffers from an absolutely unforgivable dearth of maps. How can a book about political geography be so lacking in maps? The first doesn’t appear until a good 130-odd pages in, despite densely packed descriptions of geopolitical regions. Maps, maps, my kingdom for a map. This puppy needed more maps.
Kvetching aside, lots of good concepts are present for stubborn people determined to eat their peas. I’ve gained a lot of new ideas and perspectives to keep in mind while considering the longer-term implications of the daily news. I don’t quite buy all of Kaplan’s analysis; it sometimes felt like mumbo jumbo – as if one could apply geopolitical principles to argue for any possible outcome.
The book is divided into three parts. The first part explores major geopolitical theories. The second part analyzes the major regions of the world in terms of those theories. The brief third part (far too brief, just one hurried chapter) looks to America’s future in broad, rushed strokes. I would have liked to have seen a few more chapters focusing on the different parts of the Western Hemisphere. I’ve been to South America several times in the past few years and can sense the beginnings of a future powerhouse.
Like the nerd I am, I took notes. If you want the Cliff note version, I’m happy to supply them.
April 15, 2016
مؤلف الكتاب أمريكي-يهودي، عاش فترة من حياته في فلسطين المحتلة وخدم في جيش الاحتلال الاسرائيلي. لعل ذلك ما يفسر موقفه السلبي نسبياً تجاه العرب حيث قفز قفزة واسعة فوق الادوار التي لعبها الع��ب تاريخياً ولم يولي أهمية كبيرة للموقع الجغرافي للمنطقة العربية. ولكنني وللإنصاف، لا بد أن أشير الى أن الكاتب لم يحاول الدفاع عن إسرائيل بل وصفها بالشذوذ والوقاحة في أكثر من موقع.
الكتاب في مجمله عميق وثري، ويعد مدخلاً مهماً لكل مهتم بالجغرافيا السياسية ودورها في الصراعات الاستراتيجية الدائرة اليوم ولكنه يتطلب قراءة بحثية وناقدة. يعيب الكتاب بعض الاسقاطات "الامريكية جداً" والتي لا تخلو من التبرير لمواقف القوى الامبريالية عبر محطات التاريخ المختلفة.
ابتداءاً من ماكيندر ونظريته حول أهمية "المنطقة المركزية" في أوراسيا، مروراً بفرضية سبايكمان حول "الأرض المحيطة" المهيمنة على أوراسيا بديموغرافيتها الضخمة، وصولاً الى "جاذبية الممرات البحرية" حسب نظرية ألفريد ماهان (وهو بالمناسبة أول من ابتدع مصطلح الشرق الأوسط) ، وانتهاء عند تحذيرات براكن من "أزمة المتسع" الخانقة التي تعصر الجغرافيا ولا تترك أي مجال للخطأ وسوء التقدير في رقعة الشطرنج العالمية المتقلصة، يستعرض الكتاب جملة من النظريات الرئيسية في الجغرافيا السياسية ويقوم باسقاطها على مجريات التاريخ الحديث مبيناً أثر الجغرافيا في رسم أقدار الشعوب.
وفي باقي فصوله، يطوف الكتاب بخارطة العالم الحديث مستعرضاً أبرز اللاعبين فيها ابتداءاً بأوروبا وروسيا فالصين والهند ثم إيران وتركيا. وأخيراً يتوقف الكاتب عند أمريكا، حيث يشاطر هيننغتون قلقه حول مصيرها في ظل اختلال التوازن الديموغرافي فيها الناتج عن الهجرات الكبيرة من المكسيك والتي ستؤثر في المدى القريب في الطبيعية القومية الانجلو-بروتستانتية في أمريكا.
الكتاب في مجمله عميق وثري، ويعد مدخلاً مهماً لكل مهتم بالجغرافيا السياسية ودورها في الصراعات الاستراتيجية الدائرة اليوم ولكنه يتطلب قراءة بحثية وناقدة. يعيب الكتاب بعض الاسقاطات "الامريكية جداً" والتي لا تخلو من التبرير لمواقف القوى الامبريالية عبر محطات التاريخ المختلفة.
ابتداءاً من ماكيندر ونظريته حول أهمية "المنطقة المركزية" في أوراسيا، مروراً بفرضية سبايكمان حول "الأرض المحيطة" المهيمنة على أوراسيا بديموغرافيتها الضخمة، وصولاً الى "جاذبية الممرات البحرية" حسب نظرية ألفريد ماهان (وهو بالمناسبة أول من ابتدع مصطلح الشرق الأوسط) ، وانتهاء عند تحذيرات براكن من "أزمة المتسع" الخانقة التي تعصر الجغرافيا ولا تترك أي مجال للخطأ وسوء التقدير في رقعة الشطرنج العالمية المتقلصة، يستعرض الكتاب جملة من النظريات الرئيسية في الجغرافيا السياسية ويقوم باسقاطها على مجريات التاريخ الحديث مبيناً أثر الجغرافيا في رسم أقدار الشعوب.
وفي باقي فصوله، يطوف الكتاب بخارطة العالم الحديث مستعرضاً أبرز اللاعبين فيها ابتداءاً بأوروبا وروسيا فالصين والهند ثم إيران وتركيا. وأخيراً يتوقف الكاتب عند أمريكا، حيث يشاطر هيننغتون قلقه حول مصيرها في ظل اختلال التوازن الديموغرافي فيها الناتج عن الهجرات الكبيرة من المكسيك والتي ستؤثر في المدى القريب في الطبيعية القومية الانجلو-بروتستانتية في أمريكا.
November 24, 2021
An excellent read, one of the best book on geopolitics, indeed a must read for understanding the contemporary polity of the world.
The author has done a great job, he has discussed this book in three parts, the first part of the book is basically an introductory one, where the important concepts, ideas, thesis, and analysis of various Thinkers, analyst, Writers, from ancient time to present are discussed.
In the first part titled as Visionary, one will learn about the ideas of Herodotus, Thucydides, and more importantly 19th and 20th century influential figures in the polity and foreign affairs such as Rimlands Thesis of Nicholas J Spykman, according to spykman one who controls the Rimlands control the heart of the world, and one who controls the heart of the world controls the world itself, and the Rimlands is literally thr area conspiring the Eurasia particularly their littorls(oceans/coast). Another influential figures is Sir Halford J Mackinder, Mackinder has written many books but he is well know for his one article that he wrote in 1904, "The geographic pivot of history", this is the most influential article ever, here Mackinder has discussed his thesis of Heartland, his thesis was that one who controls the heartland controls the world, and in 1904 in this very article he prophesied how the future is going to unfold, he wrote that because Germany is in the very heart and centre of Europe, therefore it will have a significant role in the coming decades, and the future conflicts/war will decide whether Germany is going to control the heartland or not, so those two world wars were about the dominance of German.
Geography is key in not just understanding the current world but also the future conflicts, as Napoleon said one who knows the Geography of a country, he knows the foreign policy of that country, the decisions of rulers, Generals are always constrained because of the Geography, the world may have became short with globalization but the role of Geography today is as important as it was in the ancient times, and according to Huntington this globalization is the very reason not of unity but of division, as globalization allows more and more civilizational to interact with each other it brings dissent, intolerance.
In the first part Kaplan also discuses the competing philosophies of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Julian Robert, Mahan was key to U.S in the early 20th century, he was also the captain in U.S navy, but was also one of the intellectual, U.S followed Mahan's ideas of controlling Seas, and becoming the powerful naval force which intimidates other countries, Mahan's ideas are aggressive there is little cooperation or respect for others sovereignty, whereas U.S is now following the ideas of Julian Robert whose ideas are based more on cooperation and on equal terms with others, but now China is following Mahan, every seminar or in strategic meetings in China, everyone seems to quote Mahan, so as china soon become a naval power, he Will be the one strongly threatening U.S interests in Eurasia.
Well coming on to second part of the book, which is titled as "Maps of early 21st century", here Robert Kaplan the maps of contemporary key countries, he discusses through map the Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran, and former ottoman empire. Through maps he unravels the world unto us, the world of competing interests, the world of coming conflicts, the world of power, economies, trade.
Beginning with Europe he discusses how the Europe unlike China, India, is a divided continent, how the geography has played a key role here in facilitating the different languages, customs, and the more or less a free life in the European continent.
In the second map he eloquently discuss the Russia, beginning with the first ever Russian empire in the 9th century, whose emperor was Kievan Rus, here author unfolds how Russia has been a great power throughout, but unlike others powers such as Ottoman, Roman, Persian who dominate for a particular time then collapsed and it is end of them, we never here again from them, but Russia is a power who has dominated, decayed, then after sometime always came back again, just as Kievan Rus collapsed in the 14th century after the onslaught of Mongols, then in 16th century is returned with Ivan the terrible, his empire also collapsed in early 17th century, then under new czar, Michael Romanov it rose again in 1613, and then almost lasted for 3 centuries before collapsing again in the middle of Bolshevik revolution, but soviet union which came into power in 1920s collapsed again in 1991, so this is Russia, Geography dictates that it will rise again, it will rise again because for Russia to survive they need to conquer others, Russia is a land power, the land powers are always vulnerable, for a sea power country it is very easy to defend.
Further author has discussed China, India, Iran, And ottoman empire. Indian's Monsoonal climate is the very reason for the indian subcontinent mainly being relying on prayers, rituals. India, china, Iran are the very countries/ regions which inhibits the core of both the heartland and the Rimlands. And lastly ottoman empire is discussed to shade lights on the contemporary turkey through its history, and its role in the contemporary world,
Final part is titled, "Braudel, Mexico and the grand strategy", here author has discussed the ideas of Fernand Braudel, a French writer, whose influential work is Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world under Phillip 2. Braudel wrote most of his book under German detention during the world war 2. Here Robert D Kaplan has discussed the American continent, particularly the Mexico as the United States, Mexico because as Huntington said between two countries in which one is dominant, and the other is being dominated then the latter is the one who will be the better off in the long term, now as U.S borders Mexico, and this is the only borders on the south of U.S which is little fragile, and unstable, U.S is secure on either is its east and west, on the east because of the Atlantic ocean, and the west because of the Pacific ocean, it is safe on the north because of arctic Canada. U.S and the Mexico are the only two countries in the world alongside each others whose GDP differs so significant, U.S GPD is nine times that of Mexico.. but as Huntington has pointed out U.S in long term id worse off, and the figures don't lie, U.S has a ageing population, where as Mexico has a young population. Here author has also discussed the U.S foreign policy and the critic on it, such as U.S spending million of dollars on countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and jn doing so not just loosing on the resources but also suffering human casualties, so author has discussed various critic here who highlighted that instead of wasting all these sums for a country who is not going to affect U.S directly, why not save the Mexico through all these dollars as it is next door yo U.S and it is going to affect U.S directly in a negative way if it fails, and in a positive way if it prospers.
Author has further discussed the failure of Roman empire, and how U.s can learn from the failure, and more importantly shades lights on the Venice of 15th century who was a dominating power as long as it focused on its seas, but as soon as it turns inwards and involved itself in conflicts and wars with its next neighbor then it collapsed, so there is an analogy for U.S, focus on being a sea power, do not enforce an unnecessary conflicts on the border with Mexico..
The author has done a great job, he has discussed this book in three parts, the first part of the book is basically an introductory one, where the important concepts, ideas, thesis, and analysis of various Thinkers, analyst, Writers, from ancient time to present are discussed.
In the first part titled as Visionary, one will learn about the ideas of Herodotus, Thucydides, and more importantly 19th and 20th century influential figures in the polity and foreign affairs such as Rimlands Thesis of Nicholas J Spykman, according to spykman one who controls the Rimlands control the heart of the world, and one who controls the heart of the world controls the world itself, and the Rimlands is literally thr area conspiring the Eurasia particularly their littorls(oceans/coast). Another influential figures is Sir Halford J Mackinder, Mackinder has written many books but he is well know for his one article that he wrote in 1904, "The geographic pivot of history", this is the most influential article ever, here Mackinder has discussed his thesis of Heartland, his thesis was that one who controls the heartland controls the world, and in 1904 in this very article he prophesied how the future is going to unfold, he wrote that because Germany is in the very heart and centre of Europe, therefore it will have a significant role in the coming decades, and the future conflicts/war will decide whether Germany is going to control the heartland or not, so those two world wars were about the dominance of German.
Geography is key in not just understanding the current world but also the future conflicts, as Napoleon said one who knows the Geography of a country, he knows the foreign policy of that country, the decisions of rulers, Generals are always constrained because of the Geography, the world may have became short with globalization but the role of Geography today is as important as it was in the ancient times, and according to Huntington this globalization is the very reason not of unity but of division, as globalization allows more and more civilizational to interact with each other it brings dissent, intolerance.
In the first part Kaplan also discuses the competing philosophies of Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Julian Robert, Mahan was key to U.S in the early 20th century, he was also the captain in U.S navy, but was also one of the intellectual, U.S followed Mahan's ideas of controlling Seas, and becoming the powerful naval force which intimidates other countries, Mahan's ideas are aggressive there is little cooperation or respect for others sovereignty, whereas U.S is now following the ideas of Julian Robert whose ideas are based more on cooperation and on equal terms with others, but now China is following Mahan, every seminar or in strategic meetings in China, everyone seems to quote Mahan, so as china soon become a naval power, he Will be the one strongly threatening U.S interests in Eurasia.
Well coming on to second part of the book, which is titled as "Maps of early 21st century", here Robert Kaplan the maps of contemporary key countries, he discusses through map the Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran, and former ottoman empire. Through maps he unravels the world unto us, the world of competing interests, the world of coming conflicts, the world of power, economies, trade.
Beginning with Europe he discusses how the Europe unlike China, India, is a divided continent, how the geography has played a key role here in facilitating the different languages, customs, and the more or less a free life in the European continent.
In the second map he eloquently discuss the Russia, beginning with the first ever Russian empire in the 9th century, whose emperor was Kievan Rus, here author unfolds how Russia has been a great power throughout, but unlike others powers such as Ottoman, Roman, Persian who dominate for a particular time then collapsed and it is end of them, we never here again from them, but Russia is a power who has dominated, decayed, then after sometime always came back again, just as Kievan Rus collapsed in the 14th century after the onslaught of Mongols, then in 16th century is returned with Ivan the terrible, his empire also collapsed in early 17th century, then under new czar, Michael Romanov it rose again in 1613, and then almost lasted for 3 centuries before collapsing again in the middle of Bolshevik revolution, but soviet union which came into power in 1920s collapsed again in 1991, so this is Russia, Geography dictates that it will rise again, it will rise again because for Russia to survive they need to conquer others, Russia is a land power, the land powers are always vulnerable, for a sea power country it is very easy to defend.
Further author has discussed China, India, Iran, And ottoman empire. Indian's Monsoonal climate is the very reason for the indian subcontinent mainly being relying on prayers, rituals. India, china, Iran are the very countries/ regions which inhibits the core of both the heartland and the Rimlands. And lastly ottoman empire is discussed to shade lights on the contemporary turkey through its history, and its role in the contemporary world,
Final part is titled, "Braudel, Mexico and the grand strategy", here author has discussed the ideas of Fernand Braudel, a French writer, whose influential work is Mediterranean and the Mediterranean world under Phillip 2. Braudel wrote most of his book under German detention during the world war 2. Here Robert D Kaplan has discussed the American continent, particularly the Mexico as the United States, Mexico because as Huntington said between two countries in which one is dominant, and the other is being dominated then the latter is the one who will be the better off in the long term, now as U.S borders Mexico, and this is the only borders on the south of U.S which is little fragile, and unstable, U.S is secure on either is its east and west, on the east because of the Atlantic ocean, and the west because of the Pacific ocean, it is safe on the north because of arctic Canada. U.S and the Mexico are the only two countries in the world alongside each others whose GDP differs so significant, U.S GPD is nine times that of Mexico.. but as Huntington has pointed out U.S in long term id worse off, and the figures don't lie, U.S has a ageing population, where as Mexico has a young population. Here author has also discussed the U.S foreign policy and the critic on it, such as U.S spending million of dollars on countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan and jn doing so not just loosing on the resources but also suffering human casualties, so author has discussed various critic here who highlighted that instead of wasting all these sums for a country who is not going to affect U.S directly, why not save the Mexico through all these dollars as it is next door yo U.S and it is going to affect U.S directly in a negative way if it fails, and in a positive way if it prospers.
Author has further discussed the failure of Roman empire, and how U.s can learn from the failure, and more importantly shades lights on the Venice of 15th century who was a dominating power as long as it focused on its seas, but as soon as it turns inwards and involved itself in conflicts and wars with its next neighbor then it collapsed, so there is an analogy for U.S, focus on being a sea power, do not enforce an unnecessary conflicts on the border with Mexico..
September 3, 2022
تعد منطقة الشرق الأوسط من أكثر المناطق التي تعاني من ندرة المياه، لا سيما وأن عددا من دولها ومناطقها الحضرية ترزح تحت وطأة أزمات ونزاعات عسكرية طويلة الأمد. في اليوم العالمي للمياه [22 آذار/مارس]، نلقي نظرة على واقع الحال في منطقتنا والتحديات الحالية والمتوقعة لتأمين المياه فيها وسبل تخطيها.
تمثل الأزمات والنزاعات المسلحة التي طال أمدها في السياقات الحضرية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا تحديًا متزايدًا للسكان للحصول على المياه العذبة. ويقول خبراء إن المنطقة العربية ستعاني أكثر من غيرها من ندرة المياه بسبب النمو السكاني السريع، والافتقار إلى اتفاقيات المياه العابرة للحدود، والإدارة غير المستدامة للمياه، والتدهور البيئي الواسع النطاق خاصة بسبب النزاع المسلح.
وتحظى المياه بحماية خاصة بموجب القانون الدولي الإنساني، فالمادة 54 من البروتوكول الأول الإضافي لاتفاقيات جنيف لعام 1949 تنص على أنه “يحظر مهاجمة أو تدمير أو نقل أو تعطيل الأعيان والمواد التي لا غنى عنها لبقاء السكان المدنيين ومثالها المواد الغذائية والمناطق الزراعية التي تنتجها والمحاصيل والماشية ومرافق مياه الشرب وشبكاتها وأشغال الري.”
أضرار مباشرة للنزاعات
يعتمد سكان الحضر بشكل كبير على الخدمات الأساسية لتلبية احتياجاتهم، وبالتالي فهم عرضة لأي تقلبات قد تحدث للخدمات الأساسية جراء النزاعات.
وتشمل الخدمات الأساسية تلك الخدمات الحيوية لضمان معيشة السكان المدنيين، بما في ذلك الكهرباء والصحة والمياه ومعالجة مياه الصرف الصحي والتخلص من النفايات الصلبة. وهذه الخدمات وإدارتها مرتبطة ببعضها البعض ما يجعل أي أذى يصيب أحد القطاعات ينعكس على القطاعات الأخرى.
وتعتمد هذه القطاعات على ثلاثة عناصر: العنصر البشري، والبنية التحتية، ومواد الطاقة لتشغيلها. وغالبا ما يؤدي القتال إلى التسبب بأضرار في هذه البنى التحتية بالإضافة إلى خسارة العنصر البشري الذي يديرها بفعل الإصابة أو النزوح كما أن المواد الأساسية لتشغيلها يمكن أن تصبح غير متوفرة.
في البلدان التي تعاني من نزاعات طويلة الأمد، يكون الأطفال دون سن الخامسة أكثر عرضة للوفاة من أمراض الإسهال المرتبطة بالمياه والصرف الصحي غير المأمونة بأكثر من 20 مرة من العنف في النزاع.
ففي اليمن مثلا أسفر الدمار الذي طال شبكات الصرف الصحي ومحطات معالجة المياه في ربوع البلاد عن سرعة انتشار وباء الكوليرا. وفي غزة فإن أكثر من ربع إجمالي الأمراض المسجلة في القطاع سببها رداءة المياه وصعوبة الوصول إليها وفقاً لدراسة أجرتها مؤسسة “راند” الأميركية.
أما في سورية فما يزال نقص المياه أحد الشواغل الرئيسية للسكان المدنيين في مناطق عدة.
ففي دير الزور، امتد الدمار إلى شبكة إمداد المياه، وتعطلت معظم محطات وشبكات المعالجة. وفي الرقة، يحصل السكان على المياه مرة واحدة في الأسبوع من محطة المياه الرئيسية. وتلجأ الأسر غالبًا في المناطق الريفية إلى ملء شاحناتهم الشخصية مباشرة من نهر الفرات لتعويض نقص المياه من المحطة الرئيسية.
يحكي حامد، 34 عامًا، وهو عامل في إحدى محطات المياه في حلب، عن أجواء القتال في العام 2012. في تلك الفترة حاول حامد وزملاؤه جاهدين أن يبقوا المحطة عاملة برغم ظروف القتال.
يقول ” في إحدى فترات القتال العنيف، كنا محاصرين لأيام متتالية. حافظت أنا وزملائي في العمل على وجود مستمر في المحطة. وعملنا في نوبات عمل لمدة أسبوع في محطتين للمياه فكنا نعبر الخطوط الأمامية بشكل أسبوعي بالتنسيق مع الشركاء والجهات الإنسانية على الأرض. لم تكن عملية العبور تسير بشكل سلس دائمًا وقد أصبت في إحدى المرات. واجهنا لحظات مروعة شعرنا فيها أننا جزء من فيلم رعب!”
أسباب متعددة للأزمة
هناك عدة عوامل تفاقم من أزمة المياه في المنطقة العربية، كالاستخدام غير المستدام للموارد الطبيعية والتدهور البيئي الواسع الانتشار، والتعرض الكبير لتغير المناخ في ظل وعي بيئي منخفض، مع ت��ادم البنية التحتية للمياه والصرف الصحي.
علاوة على ذلك، يبدو الأمر الأكثر وضوحًا اليوم هو توفير خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي يتدهور نتيجة الصراع والعنف.
يقول إيغور ملغراتي، المستشار الاقليمي لقضايا المياه والسكن في اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، “يمكن لهذه الخدمات أن تتدهور بسبب التأثيرات المباشرة للنزاع (كتدمير البنية التحتية) أو التأثيرات غير المباشرة (التآكل المستمر للقدرة على تشغيل وصيانة الخدمات) على مزود خدمة المياه والصرف الصحي والبنية التحتية التي تعمل بها. ويصبح الأمر أكثر تأثيرا في المدن، حيث تعتمد المجتمعات على مجموعة معقدة ومترابطة من الخدمات.”
كما يمكن أن تشكل العقوبات والحظر وأشكال القيود الأخرى عائقًا كبيرًا أمام استيراد المواد التي يمكن اعتبارها “مواد ذات استخدام مزدوج” ولكنها ضرورية للتوصيل ا��آمن لخدمات المياه والصرف الصحي مثل البترول والكلور.
الشراكة كحل
من المهم أن يعتمد المجتمع الحضري في مواجهة الأزمات على بنية تحتية مرنة مع إدارة موارد المياه، النادرة أصلا، على نحو مستدام. إذ يؤثر الفراغ في إدارة المياه والبيئة خلال الأزمات الممتدة على كمية ونوعية المياه لمقدمي خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي وغالبًا ما ينعكس ذلك مباشرة على شكل تدهور سريع في جودة المياه.
كما تتعرض المياه الجوفية للتهديد بشكل خاص بسبب الاستغلال المفرط الناجم عن غياب تطبيق القوانين التنظيمية أو بسبب الزيادة السريعة في حفر الآبار كجزء من الاستجابة للطوارئ. ويؤدي ذلك إلى انخفاض سريع في مستويات المياه، وزيادة في تركيزات الملح. وفي المناطق الساحلية، يمكن أن يؤدي إلى تسرب المياه المالحة باتجاه المياه الجوفية.
وفي غياب التنظيم أو المراقبة أو البيانات المناسبة، يواجه مقدمو الخدمات شكوكًا حول تخزين المياه الجوفية، مما يجعل من الصعب التنبؤ بمستويات المياه الجوفية وقياس مدى الخطر الذي يهددها.
وتحدد منظمات دولية قائمة بسياسات ينبغي اتباعها لمواجهة انخفاض الموارد المائية وقت الأزمات. ومن ضمن هذه السياسات العمل مع مقدمي الخدمات لإعادة تأهيل الآبار القائمة بدلاً من حفر آبار طوارئ جديدة، وتحسين إدارة مياه الأمطار، والعمل على تقليل مستويات التلوث من خلال معالجة مياه الصرف الصحي.
يقول مالغراتي “فهم الخدمات الأساسية الحضرية والترابط في ما بينها بعناية ومقدماً مهم لتجنب الانقطاع المطول للخدمات الأساسية ما يعني أن يكون النهج المتبع للخدمات الحضرية مزيجًا من تدابير الوقاية والاستجابة والحماية.”
تمثل الأزمات والنزاعات المسلحة التي طال أمدها في السياقات الحضرية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا تحديًا متزايدًا للسكان للحصول على المياه العذبة. ويقول خبراء إن المنطقة العربية ستعاني أكثر من غيرها من ندرة المياه بسبب النمو السكاني السريع، والافتقار إلى اتفاقيات المياه العابرة للحدود، والإدارة غير المستدامة للمياه، والتدهور البيئي الواسع النطاق خاصة بسبب النزاع المسلح.
وتحظى المياه بحماية خاصة بموجب القانون الدولي الإنساني، فالمادة 54 من البروتوكول الأول الإضافي لاتفاقيات جنيف لعام 1949 تنص على أنه “يحظر مهاجمة أو تدمير أو نقل أو تعطيل الأعيان والمواد التي لا غنى عنها لبقاء السكان المدنيين ومثالها المواد الغذائية والمناطق الزراعية التي تنتجها والمحاصيل والماشية ومرافق مياه الشرب وشبكاتها وأشغال الري.”
أضرار مباشرة للنزاعات
يعتمد سكان الحضر بشكل كبير على الخدمات الأساسية لتلبية احتياجاتهم، وبالتالي فهم عرضة لأي تقلبات قد تحدث للخدمات الأساسية جراء النزاعات.
وتشمل الخدمات الأساسية تلك الخدمات الحيوية لضمان معيشة السكان المدنيين، بما في ذلك الكهرباء والصحة والمياه ومعالجة مياه الصرف الصحي والتخلص من النفايات الصلبة. وهذه الخدمات وإدارتها مرتبطة ببعضها البعض ما يجعل أي أذى يصيب أحد القطاعات ينعكس على القطاعات الأخرى.
وتعتمد هذه القطاعات على ثلاثة عناصر: العنصر البشري، والبنية التحتية، ومواد الطاقة لتشغيلها. وغالبا ما يؤدي القتال إلى التسبب بأضرار في هذه البنى التحتية بالإضافة إلى خسارة العنصر البشري الذي يديرها بفعل الإصابة أو النزوح كما أن المواد الأساسية لتشغيلها يمكن أن تصبح غير متوفرة.
في البلدان التي تعاني من نزاعات طويلة الأمد، يكون الأطفال دون سن الخامسة أكثر عرضة للوفاة من أمراض الإسهال المرتبطة بالمياه والصرف الصحي غير المأمونة بأكثر من 20 مرة من العنف في النزاع.
ففي اليمن مثلا أسفر الدمار الذي طال شبكات الصرف الصحي ومحطات معالجة المياه في ربوع البلاد عن سرعة انتشار وباء الكوليرا. وفي غزة فإن أكثر من ربع إجمالي الأمراض المسجلة في القطاع سببها رداءة المياه وصعوبة الوصول إليها وفقاً لدراسة أجرتها مؤسسة “راند” الأميركية.
أما في سورية فما يزال نقص المياه أحد الشواغل الرئيسية للسكان المدنيين في مناطق عدة.
ففي دير الزور، امتد الدمار إلى شبكة إمداد المياه، وتعطلت معظم محطات وشبكات المعالجة. وفي الرقة، يحصل السكان على المياه مرة واحدة في الأسبوع من محطة المياه الرئيسية. وتلجأ الأسر غالبًا في المناطق الريفية إلى ملء شاحناتهم الشخصية مباشرة من نهر الفرات لتعويض نقص المياه من المحطة الرئيسية.
يحكي حامد، 34 عامًا، وهو عامل في إحدى محطات المياه في حلب، عن أجواء القتال في العام 2012. في تلك الفترة حاول حامد وزملاؤه جاهدين أن يبقوا المحطة عاملة برغم ظروف القتال.
يقول ” في إحدى فترات القتال العنيف، كنا محاصرين لأيام متتالية. حافظت أنا وزملائي في العمل على وجود مستمر في المحطة. وعملنا في نوبات عمل لمدة أسبوع في محطتين للمياه فكنا نعبر الخطوط الأمامية بشكل أسبوعي بالتنسيق مع الشركاء والجهات الإنسانية على الأرض. لم تكن عملية العبور تسير بشكل سلس دائمًا وقد أصبت في إحدى المرات. واجهنا لحظات مروعة شعرنا فيها أننا جزء من فيلم رعب!”
أسباب متعددة للأزمة
هناك عدة عوامل تفاقم من أزمة المياه في المنطقة العربية، كالاستخدام غير المستدام للموارد الطبيعية والتدهور البيئي الواسع الانتشار، والتعرض الكبير لتغير المناخ في ظل وعي بيئي منخفض، مع ت��ادم البنية التحتية للمياه والصرف الصحي.
علاوة على ذلك، يبدو الأمر الأكثر وضوحًا اليوم هو توفير خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي يتدهور نتيجة الصراع والعنف.
يقول إيغور ملغراتي، المستشار الاقليمي لقضايا المياه والسكن في اللجنة الدولية للصليب الأحمر، “يمكن لهذه الخدمات أن تتدهور بسبب التأثيرات المباشرة للنزاع (كتدمير البنية التحتية) أو التأثيرات غير المباشرة (التآكل المستمر للقدرة على تشغيل وصيانة الخدمات) على مزود خدمة المياه والصرف الصحي والبنية التحتية التي تعمل بها. ويصبح الأمر أكثر تأثيرا في المدن، حيث تعتمد المجتمعات على مجموعة معقدة ومترابطة من الخدمات.”
كما يمكن أن تشكل العقوبات والحظر وأشكال القيود الأخرى عائقًا كبيرًا أمام استيراد المواد التي يمكن اعتبارها “مواد ذات استخدام مزدوج” ولكنها ضرورية للتوصيل ا��آمن لخدمات المياه والصرف الصحي مثل البترول والكلور.
الشراكة كحل
من المهم أن يعتمد المجتمع الحضري في مواجهة الأزمات على بنية تحتية مرنة مع إدارة موارد المياه، النادرة أصلا، على نحو مستدام. إذ يؤثر الفراغ في إدارة المياه والبيئة خلال الأزمات الممتدة على كمية ونوعية المياه لمقدمي خدمات المياه والصرف الصحي وغالبًا ما ينعكس ذلك مباشرة على شكل تدهور سريع في جودة المياه.
كما تتعرض المياه الجوفية للتهديد بشكل خاص بسبب الاستغلال المفرط الناجم عن غياب تطبيق القوانين التنظيمية أو بسبب الزيادة السريعة في حفر الآبار كجزء من الاستجابة للطوارئ. ويؤدي ذلك إلى انخفاض سريع في مستويات المياه، وزيادة في تركيزات الملح. وفي المناطق الساحلية، يمكن أن يؤدي إلى تسرب المياه المالحة باتجاه المياه الجوفية.
وفي غياب التنظيم أو المراقبة أو البيانات المناسبة، يواجه مقدمو الخدمات شكوكًا حول تخزين المياه الجوفية، مما يجعل من الصعب التنبؤ بمستويات المياه الجوفية وقياس مدى الخطر الذي يهددها.
وتحدد منظمات دولية قائمة بسياسات ينبغي اتباعها لمواجهة انخفاض الموارد المائية وقت الأزمات. ومن ضمن هذه السياسات العمل مع مقدمي الخدمات لإعادة تأهيل الآبار القائمة بدلاً من حفر آبار طوارئ جديدة، وتحسين إدارة مياه الأمطار، والعمل على تقليل مستويات التلوث من خلال معالجة مياه الصرف الصحي.
يقول مالغراتي “فهم الخدمات الأساسية الحضرية والترابط في ما بينها بعناية ومقدماً مهم لتجنب الانقطاع المطول للخدمات الأساسية ما يعني أن يكون النهج المتبع للخدمات الحضرية مزيجًا من تدابير الوقاية والاستجابة والحماية.”
January 4, 2017
يقوم الكتاب على بضعة أفكار مهمة، وتثبت مصداقيتها باستقراء التاريخ وماجريات السياسة. إلا أنه مملٌ جدًا في أسلوبه، وفي كثرة التكرار الملحوظة في فصوله وفقراته.
نعم! مهما نسينا الجغرافيا الطبيعية، فإنها ستظلّ حاضرة ومؤثرة فاعلة. ومهما حلمنا بعالمٍ مثالي فإن "الواقع" يفرض نفسه ويصنع الأحداث التي نعيش، و الحال الجيوسياسي هو أحد أهم أركان هذا الواقع العالمي .
إلا أني وبسبب أسلوب الكتاب لم أستطع إتمامه كاملًا، ولا أنوي.
نعم! مهما نسينا الجغرافيا الطبيعية، فإنها ستظلّ حاضرة ومؤثرة فاعلة. ومهما حلمنا بعالمٍ مثالي فإن "الواقع" يفرض نفسه ويصنع الأحداث التي نعيش، و الحال الجيوسياسي هو أحد أهم أركان هذا الواقع العالمي .
إلا أني وبسبب أسلوب الكتاب لم أستطع إتمامه كاملًا، ولا أنوي.
May 11, 2021
Berlin Wall was just another stage in the continuing process of territorial transformation. The demilitarized zone (DM2) between the two Koreas is an arbitrary border of no geographical logic that divides an ethnic nation at the spot where two opposing armies happened to come to rest. A man made border that does not match a natural frontier zone is particularly vulnerable. The collapse of the Berlin Wall should have enhance our respect for geography and the relief map - and what that map might have foreshadowed in the adjacent Barkans and the Middle East - the dismantling of a man made boundary in Germany had led to the assumption that all human divisions are surmountable; that democracy could conquer Africa and the Middle East as easily as it had Eastern Europe; that globalization was nothing less than a moral direction of history and a system of international security, rather than what it actually was merely as an economic and cultural stage of development.
The 1990s was less a decade of military power than it was specifically a decade of air power. The 1999 war in Kosovo as much as 9/11 allowed for the expansion of NATO to the Black Sea. The Post Cold War brought us to the recognition that the very totalitarianism that we fought against in the decades following WWII might in quite a few circumstances such as Iraq invasion and Vietnam War, be preferable to a situation where nobody is incharge. Simply because a nation is a democracy does not mean that its foreign policy will necessarily turn out to be better or more enlightened that than of a dictatorship. A state's position on the map is the first thing that defines it more than that its governing philosophy even. It is no accident that the world's poorest regions tend to be where geography by way of soil suitability supports high population densities but not economic growth because of distance from ports and rail heads. Central India and inland Africa are prime examples of this.
America and Britain could campaign freedom only because the sea protected them from the landbound enemies of liberty. As heirs to land power Germans and Russians have over the centuries thought more in terms of geography than Americans and Britons - heirs of sea power. A world of subtle power arrangements where trade and economies will erode sheer military might will still be one of geopolitics governed by geography especially in the world's oceans which will be more crowded than ever - predictions for the future. The Chinese are building underground submarines penson Hainan Island and developing anti-ship missiles. The Americans are providing Taiwan with 114 patriot air defense missiles and dozens of advanced military communication systems.
The Japanese and South Koreans are engaged in across-the-board modernization of their fleets with a particular emphasis on submarines. India is building a great navy. These are all crude forms of seeking to adjust the balance of power in one's favor. There is an arms race going on and it is occuring in Asia. This is the world that awaits the US when it completes its withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Empty spaces on the map are becoming crowded with more people, strategic roads and pipelines and ships in the water to say nothing of overlapping concentric circles of missiles.
Geography dictates that Iran will be pivotal to the trend lines in the Greater Middle East and Eurasia and it may dictate how it will be pivotal but it cannot dictate for what purpose it will be pivotal. This is up the decisions of men. Turkey and Iran contain the Middle East's richest agricultural economies as well as the highest levels of industrialization and technological know-how which the other Arab countries lack. America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas: a chaotic Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. A border between a highly developed society and a less developed society will not attain an equilibrium but will advance in more backward society's favor.
The Americans are not importance because of who they are but because of where they live. Borders indicate passport controls and fixed divisions of sovereignty whereas frontiers indicate a pre-modern world of vague, more informal overlapping divisions. The smaller the world becomes because of technology, the more that every place in it becomes strategic. The world of 21st Century in which an intimate knowledge of geography will make this increasingly smaller yet intensely variegated world more manageable and understandable.
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The 1990s was less a decade of military power than it was specifically a decade of air power. The 1999 war in Kosovo as much as 9/11 allowed for the expansion of NATO to the Black Sea. The Post Cold War brought us to the recognition that the very totalitarianism that we fought against in the decades following WWII might in quite a few circumstances such as Iraq invasion and Vietnam War, be preferable to a situation where nobody is incharge. Simply because a nation is a democracy does not mean that its foreign policy will necessarily turn out to be better or more enlightened that than of a dictatorship. A state's position on the map is the first thing that defines it more than that its governing philosophy even. It is no accident that the world's poorest regions tend to be where geography by way of soil suitability supports high population densities but not economic growth because of distance from ports and rail heads. Central India and inland Africa are prime examples of this.
America and Britain could campaign freedom only because the sea protected them from the landbound enemies of liberty. As heirs to land power Germans and Russians have over the centuries thought more in terms of geography than Americans and Britons - heirs of sea power. A world of subtle power arrangements where trade and economies will erode sheer military might will still be one of geopolitics governed by geography especially in the world's oceans which will be more crowded than ever - predictions for the future. The Chinese are building underground submarines penson Hainan Island and developing anti-ship missiles. The Americans are providing Taiwan with 114 patriot air defense missiles and dozens of advanced military communication systems.
The Japanese and South Koreans are engaged in across-the-board modernization of their fleets with a particular emphasis on submarines. India is building a great navy. These are all crude forms of seeking to adjust the balance of power in one's favor. There is an arms race going on and it is occuring in Asia. This is the world that awaits the US when it completes its withdrawal from both Iraq and Afghanistan. Empty spaces on the map are becoming crowded with more people, strategic roads and pipelines and ships in the water to say nothing of overlapping concentric circles of missiles.
Geography dictates that Iran will be pivotal to the trend lines in the Greater Middle East and Eurasia and it may dictate how it will be pivotal but it cannot dictate for what purpose it will be pivotal. This is up the decisions of men. Turkey and Iran contain the Middle East's richest agricultural economies as well as the highest levels of industrialization and technological know-how which the other Arab countries lack. America faces three primary geopolitical dilemmas: a chaotic Middle East, a rising and assertive Chinese superpower and a state in deep trouble in Mexico. A border between a highly developed society and a less developed society will not attain an equilibrium but will advance in more backward society's favor.
The Americans are not importance because of who they are but because of where they live. Borders indicate passport controls and fixed divisions of sovereignty whereas frontiers indicate a pre-modern world of vague, more informal overlapping divisions. The smaller the world becomes because of technology, the more that every place in it becomes strategic. The world of 21st Century in which an intimate knowledge of geography will make this increasingly smaller yet intensely variegated world more manageable and understandable.
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January 4, 2020
Miért a földrajz bosszúja? Mit bosszul meg a földrajz? Először is ezek a kérdések fogantak meg a fejemben. A földrajz (domborzat, távolság, magasság stb.) befolyása az emberiség életébe alapvetően a determinista felfogáshoz igazodik, azonban manapság sem lehet figyelmen kívül hagyni, amikor a technológia révén már számos aspektusát le lehet küzdeni. A könyv szerzője ezen vonalon mozog.
Robert D. Kaplan a neorealistának nevezett irányzat képviselője. Ez nagyjából abból áll, hogy a részeket az egészből levezetve vizsgálja. Ennek kapcsán van a könyvnek néhány meredek következtetése erkölcsi szempontból. Igaz, a politika és az erkölcs a legritkább esetben konvergál egymáshoz. A világpolitikai folyamatokat tekintve egy emberi élet pláne semmiség, porszemek vagyunk mind, de ha egy nemzetközi hírű gondolkodó ezt könyvben leírva nyomatékosítja, az kicsit szíven ütő.
Amerika iraki kalandjának nem volt semmi ehhez hasonló végzetes következménye – katonai és gazdasági pozíciónk a világban, különösen Kelet-Ázsiában szilárd, és nem mutatja a gyengülés jeleit. Kevesebb mint ötezer katonát vesztettünk, harminckétezren súlyosan megsebesültek, ami iszonyatos ár, de nem az inváziós erők félmilliós nagyságrendjéhez képest. (399. oldal) Ma csak az udvar felét nyírtam le, de az egész udvarhoz viszonyítva jól állok. Főleg, hogy télen nem kell füvet nyírni. Amikor pedig fajokról beszél emberek esetében, néztem egy nagyot. Betudom annak, hogy elkalandozott.
Mackinder magterület- és Spykman peremvidék-elmélete fontos tételei a könyvnek. Két geopolitikai nagyágyú, akik már a nagy egészben gondolkodtak. Mackinder szerint aki uralja a magterületet – amely nagyjából egy ázsiai gócpont – az uralja a világot. Ez Oroszország területén található. Egyébként akkoriban a britek Oroszországot tekintették a legveszélyesebb ellenfélnek. Spykman szerint ezt a gócpontot körülvevő gyűrű a fontos geopolitikai szempontból, mondván, hogy ezt uralja, az uralja a magterületet is. A könyv első része ezeknek az elméleteknek az alapos bemutatása, és a múltban való szerepük és gyakorlati kiterjesztésük (pl. Lebensraum).
A második részben 21. századi valójában vizsgálja a területet, tehát az Európától Kínáig terjedő irdatlan szárazföldet, azon markánsan jelenlévő hatalmakat, népeket.
A harmadik rész az USA és a mexikói bevándorlás viszonyát vizsgálja.
Az ehhez nagyon hasonló A földrajz fogságában című könyv olvasmányosabb, ez viszont mélyenszántóbb. Illetve – bár ez nem negatívum – előbbi aktuálisabb, hiszen ez már 2012-ben íródott.
Robert D. Kaplan a neorealistának nevezett irányzat képviselője. Ez nagyjából abból áll, hogy a részeket az egészből levezetve vizsgálja. Ennek kapcsán van a könyvnek néhány meredek következtetése erkölcsi szempontból. Igaz, a politika és az erkölcs a legritkább esetben konvergál egymáshoz. A világpolitikai folyamatokat tekintve egy emberi élet pláne semmiség, porszemek vagyunk mind, de ha egy nemzetközi hírű gondolkodó ezt könyvben leírva nyomatékosítja, az kicsit szíven ütő.
Amerika iraki kalandjának nem volt semmi ehhez hasonló végzetes következménye – katonai és gazdasági pozíciónk a világban, különösen Kelet-Ázsiában szilárd, és nem mutatja a gyengülés jeleit. Kevesebb mint ötezer katonát vesztettünk, harminckétezren súlyosan megsebesültek, ami iszonyatos ár, de nem az inváziós erők félmilliós nagyságrendjéhez képest. (399. oldal) Ma csak az udvar felét nyírtam le, de az egész udvarhoz viszonyítva jól állok. Főleg, hogy télen nem kell füvet nyírni. Amikor pedig fajokról beszél emberek esetében, néztem egy nagyot. Betudom annak, hogy elkalandozott.
Mackinder magterület- és Spykman peremvidék-elmélete fontos tételei a könyvnek. Két geopolitikai nagyágyú, akik már a nagy egészben gondolkodtak. Mackinder szerint aki uralja a magterületet – amely nagyjából egy ázsiai gócpont – az uralja a világot. Ez Oroszország területén található. Egyébként akkoriban a britek Oroszországot tekintették a legveszélyesebb ellenfélnek. Spykman szerint ezt a gócpontot körülvevő gyűrű a fontos geopolitikai szempontból, mondván, hogy ezt uralja, az uralja a magterületet is. A könyv első része ezeknek az elméleteknek az alapos bemutatása, és a múltban való szerepük és gyakorlati kiterjesztésük (pl. Lebensraum).
A második részben 21. századi valójában vizsgálja a területet, tehát az Európától Kínáig terjedő irdatlan szárazföldet, azon markánsan jelenlévő hatalmakat, népeket.
A harmadik rész az USA és a mexikói bevándorlás viszonyát vizsgálja.
Az ehhez nagyon hasonló A földrajz fogságában című könyv olvasmányosabb, ez viszont mélyenszántóbb. Illetve – bár ez nem negatívum – előbbi aktuálisabb, hiszen ez már 2012-ben íródott.
May 19, 2018
I enjoyed The Revenge of Geography by Robert D. Kaplan, even as I am mindful of some of the more critical of its reviews. Mr. Kaplan lays out a series of intelligent discussions built around the interrelationship between geography and history. It is part of my job to look at events and ask why here (not there) and will it be here again? As such geological determinism is an implied concept in my profession. Beyond my professional predilection to accept some degree of determinism, Kaplan uses geography as persisting frame of reference in making his geographically based analysis of world history, politics and possible futures. He also admits to the need to be flexible in the application of determinism in the face of conflicting histories and alternate futures. His politics are apparent, but there is no need to agree with either his politics or his conclusions. The reader is free to ignore his specifics, but is making a mistake by preemptively shrugging them aside.
Part I, Chapters 1-6 are the weakest part of the book. Here he presents his arguments in favor of geography as fate and gives himself the cover of saying this only mostly true. A more general statement of his thesis is that across history, where regional maps do not place political borders around obvious barrier features, mountains, oceans or desserts and the like, human history will be about the wars fought over who is to hold that land. Further these chapter identify the several geographic thinkers who help to organize and direct the shape of his argument.
Next he posits, in broad terms, that within areas defined by natural barriers the culture and government of the people within are heavily influenced by the nature of the environment that encloses the inhabitants. Temperate climates help to promote a more temperate, less central, dictatorial government and less hospitable climates promote more disciplined centralized governments. Here Kaplan quotes Napoleon directly as having said: “Tell me about a nation’s climate and I will tell you about its culture.”
Having defined, and defended this thesis, he cites geographically minded academics to define terms that divide the planet into areas like the “Rimlands” and to document his belief that the relief map rules.
Given this view of the relief map of the world as a primary determinant of how local history and culture will be constrained or fated Part 2 cover the major division of the planet within this system. These six chapters look at, in sequence: Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran (Iraq) and Turkey ( the Ottoman Empire). The nations are not just the boundaries that we now recognize but centers of historic regions, including smaller, lessor border-states. For each nation/region we are given its history and something of a geographic strengths, weaknesses and opportunity analysis. This is the best of the Revenge of Geography. Again it is not a question of our agreeing with this history or analysis or even any absolute ‘rightness’ of his recitation and conclusions. It is about the value to be gained by thinking about people and places from this kind of geo-politics meets realpolitik meats manifest destiny point of view.
Kaplan will give himself the right to be inconsistent. Is Korea or Taiwan the pivot region in Asia? Is the existence of Afghanistan illogical or the center of future oil distribution? Should America seek to make friends or even frienemies of Iran and thereby promote the relative liberality of Persian Sunni’s? Or is the Middle East a place where America, by dint of consistent failure to understand the place and its peoples accept the contradiction of our inability to force western values or withdraw? Also as his analysis moves closer to America and modern times he walks back on the primacy of geography in favor of the ability to apply technology in overcoming space in communications and logistics and therefore military power and diplomatic influence.
Part 3 addresses the Americas and what he believes is the real problem facing the United States. He is highly concerned that the US is willing to commit vast resources in other part of the world, while being blind to the danger of Mexico as a failing state. He take on the threat of a Hispanic Reconquista of the American South west. It may happen but in itself it is not so much a tragedy as it is recognition that much of this area may naturally belong to a Catholic, Spanish speaking peoples. His concern is that a failed Mexico and especially one in aligned with other Central/South American narco-states could so destabilize the New World as to cost America the ability to deal with an obviously emerging China and a slowly reconstituting Imperialistic Russia.
In recommending The Revenge of Geography, the point is not to accept Robert Kaplan as the final word on any region, aspect of his hypotheses or the particulars of his analyses. I do not have the depth of bibliography to begin to challenge him. What is more important to me is that the reader appreciate the value of his methodology and the importance of seeking out the detailed knowledge that would allow you to accept or reject particulars. Kaplan is addressing the kinds of high level, informed strategic thinking that should be part of being a knowledgeable member of twenty first century America.
Part I, Chapters 1-6 are the weakest part of the book. Here he presents his arguments in favor of geography as fate and gives himself the cover of saying this only mostly true. A more general statement of his thesis is that across history, where regional maps do not place political borders around obvious barrier features, mountains, oceans or desserts and the like, human history will be about the wars fought over who is to hold that land. Further these chapter identify the several geographic thinkers who help to organize and direct the shape of his argument.
Next he posits, in broad terms, that within areas defined by natural barriers the culture and government of the people within are heavily influenced by the nature of the environment that encloses the inhabitants. Temperate climates help to promote a more temperate, less central, dictatorial government and less hospitable climates promote more disciplined centralized governments. Here Kaplan quotes Napoleon directly as having said: “Tell me about a nation’s climate and I will tell you about its culture.”
Having defined, and defended this thesis, he cites geographically minded academics to define terms that divide the planet into areas like the “Rimlands” and to document his belief that the relief map rules.
Given this view of the relief map of the world as a primary determinant of how local history and culture will be constrained or fated Part 2 cover the major division of the planet within this system. These six chapters look at, in sequence: Europe, Russia, China, India, Iran (Iraq) and Turkey ( the Ottoman Empire). The nations are not just the boundaries that we now recognize but centers of historic regions, including smaller, lessor border-states. For each nation/region we are given its history and something of a geographic strengths, weaknesses and opportunity analysis. This is the best of the Revenge of Geography. Again it is not a question of our agreeing with this history or analysis or even any absolute ‘rightness’ of his recitation and conclusions. It is about the value to be gained by thinking about people and places from this kind of geo-politics meets realpolitik meats manifest destiny point of view.
Kaplan will give himself the right to be inconsistent. Is Korea or Taiwan the pivot region in Asia? Is the existence of Afghanistan illogical or the center of future oil distribution? Should America seek to make friends or even frienemies of Iran and thereby promote the relative liberality of Persian Sunni’s? Or is the Middle East a place where America, by dint of consistent failure to understand the place and its peoples accept the contradiction of our inability to force western values or withdraw? Also as his analysis moves closer to America and modern times he walks back on the primacy of geography in favor of the ability to apply technology in overcoming space in communications and logistics and therefore military power and diplomatic influence.
Part 3 addresses the Americas and what he believes is the real problem facing the United States. He is highly concerned that the US is willing to commit vast resources in other part of the world, while being blind to the danger of Mexico as a failing state. He take on the threat of a Hispanic Reconquista of the American South west. It may happen but in itself it is not so much a tragedy as it is recognition that much of this area may naturally belong to a Catholic, Spanish speaking peoples. His concern is that a failed Mexico and especially one in aligned with other Central/South American narco-states could so destabilize the New World as to cost America the ability to deal with an obviously emerging China and a slowly reconstituting Imperialistic Russia.
In recommending The Revenge of Geography, the point is not to accept Robert Kaplan as the final word on any region, aspect of his hypotheses or the particulars of his analyses. I do not have the depth of bibliography to begin to challenge him. What is more important to me is that the reader appreciate the value of his methodology and the importance of seeking out the detailed knowledge that would allow you to accept or reject particulars. Kaplan is addressing the kinds of high level, informed strategic thinking that should be part of being a knowledgeable member of twenty first century America.
October 28, 2013
Kaplan here displays his usual depth and erudition, giving us a new view of geopolitics with the focus on geography, which he regards as far more important than we usually consider it. He starts in Section I with a summary of the thoughts of great minds on the topic, from Herodotus to Kissinger and beyond. In Section II he focuses on a number of significant states, civilizations, and empires past and present, including China, India, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Afghanistan. He refers to Eurasia as the "world island" and points out how each country's nearness and accessibility to its neighbors contributes to or detracts from its power and influence. Geology, he says, can be surmounted by the actions of strong leaders, but because geology doesn't change, it remains highly relevant even in today's world of instant communication and reach of fast travel.
Section III is called "America's Destiny" and discusses the U.S. role in world geopolitics. It is quite unfortunate, Kaplan says, that Americans have spent trillions of dollars on wars half a world away, when our most pressing and sensitive issue is our relationship with Mexico. Borders are inherently unstable when they separate rich countries from poor, and the U.S. has five times the per capita GDP of Mexico, putting increasing stress on the border. Since much of the U.S. Southwest belonged to Mexico not so long ago, many Mexicans on both sides of the border see reclaiming those areas as legitimate.
Unfortunately the valuable ideas in this book are marred by poor editing throughout. Most sentences are too long and complex, forcing the reader to go back in search of the subject or the antecedent. Here's an example:
Mexican Americans, who account for 12.5 percent of the U.S.
population, not counting other Hispanics, and are, more or
less, concentrated in the Southwest, contiguous to Mexico,
are for the first time in America's history amending our
historical memory.
Colons and semicolons are tossed into the middle of sentences to break things up, but they are overused and often used incorrectly. It's a shame Kaplan's valuable insights are buried in such a stylistic bog.
Section III is called "America's Destiny" and discusses the U.S. role in world geopolitics. It is quite unfortunate, Kaplan says, that Americans have spent trillions of dollars on wars half a world away, when our most pressing and sensitive issue is our relationship with Mexico. Borders are inherently unstable when they separate rich countries from poor, and the U.S. has five times the per capita GDP of Mexico, putting increasing stress on the border. Since much of the U.S. Southwest belonged to Mexico not so long ago, many Mexicans on both sides of the border see reclaiming those areas as legitimate.
Unfortunately the valuable ideas in this book are marred by poor editing throughout. Most sentences are too long and complex, forcing the reader to go back in search of the subject or the antecedent. Here's an example:
Mexican Americans, who account for 12.5 percent of the U.S.
population, not counting other Hispanics, and are, more or
less, concentrated in the Southwest, contiguous to Mexico,
are for the first time in America's history amending our
historical memory.
Colons and semicolons are tossed into the middle of sentences to break things up, but they are overused and often used incorrectly. It's a shame Kaplan's valuable insights are buried in such a stylistic bog.
February 22, 2013
What a thorough disappointment! An important topic that needs to be discussed, particularly after two decades (or more, according to Kaplan) of liberal institutionalism/responsibility to protect adventurism (or the often ignored call for it, followed by neoconservative adventurism (unfortunately less ignored). Bringing back into discussion the realist worldview is necessary, and the importance of geography as a major factor in determining why the world works (or doesn't work) as it does (or doesn't) needs a re-airing, particularly because the rise of technology has convinced so many - maybe TOO many - that it is easy to get over mountains and oceans. Mackinder and his heartland theory, and Spykman and his rimland (makes me giggle) theory need to be reconsidered.
Kaplan attempts to do that. But, man, he does it in about as uninteresting a way as I could imagine. What a slow and unorganized read! A year ago I read Kaplan's Monsoon book, about the rising important of the Indian Ocean area, and it was fantastic. So I figured this would be likewise. But it's as if he wrote this book by speaking his random thoughts into a tape recorder. Ah well. Still worth two stars because at a few intervals, his analysis is quite informative.
Kaplan attempts to do that. But, man, he does it in about as uninteresting a way as I could imagine. What a slow and unorganized read! A year ago I read Kaplan's Monsoon book, about the rising important of the Indian Ocean area, and it was fantastic. So I figured this would be likewise. But it's as if he wrote this book by speaking his random thoughts into a tape recorder. Ah well. Still worth two stars because at a few intervals, his analysis is quite informative.
March 3, 2017
In the current climate of politics around the world, this book is a must read piece. The book provides a wide ranging and entertaining coverage of world affairs; and it links geographical and historical facts and events with contemporary politics and power struggles. I did not agree with all the judgments and analyses, but appreciated Kaplan's way of thinking, his deep insights, and his use of personal experiences and in depth knowledge of different countries in the book.
The author's predications, or anticipations, are likely to come true in many instances; as some have already materialized since 2012. One main reason for this seemingly high level of success in predicting political events is due to the nature of the analyses. Kaplan avoids recommending solutions or actions; and insists on a deep analysis that covers most potential courses of events. He should be congratulated for such an approach.
The book should also be very interesting for academics of geopolitics - or perhaps for postgraduate students - because of the generous referencing of the scholars and scholarly works. While I found this educational and insightful, I found it boring on several occasions!
The author's predications, or anticipations, are likely to come true in many instances; as some have already materialized since 2012. One main reason for this seemingly high level of success in predicting political events is due to the nature of the analyses. Kaplan avoids recommending solutions or actions; and insists on a deep analysis that covers most potential courses of events. He should be congratulated for such an approach.
The book should also be very interesting for academics of geopolitics - or perhaps for postgraduate students - because of the generous referencing of the scholars and scholarly works. While I found this educational and insightful, I found it boring on several occasions!
August 29, 2017
Reading this book was more like reading a poetic take on how geography affects geopolitics than a coherent and robust theory on why geopolitics are as they are. If you find the work of Jared Diamond compelling, then you will probably enjoy this too; but if you are like me, you will find the cherry picking and lack of counterfactuals quite jarring. To his credit, Kaplan isn't as bold as Diamond, in that he more strongly acknowledges the role of many factors, of which geography is just one. But at the same time that he says geography is not determinative, he kind of still argues that, and that's where the poetry comes in. It's so beautiful and simple to think that Europe, for example, is divided into such small countries way that it is because of its terrain, and then to contrast it with its flatter, more expansive neighbour Russia. But it is nearly impossible to tease out the role of the terrain from other social and biophysical factors, especially when you are just picking illustrative cases to prove your thesis. So while I found this a compelling read that made me think about the world in a different way, I have to admit that I didn't really buy into many of its arguments.
April 7, 2014
Don't let the title fool you. Kaplan is not going to berate you for failing to learn the state capitals in the 4th grade. Kaplan picks up the narrative of geopolitics which was largely abandoned after WWI as nations plotted their foreign policies based on their positions on fascism or communism. With the discrediting of the history-explaining ideological narratives, Kaplan argues that nations once again are faced with dealing with the geography they live with in deciding how to make their way in the world. He picks up the Mahan vs Mackinder debate that was a matter of great concern 100 years ago, but largely forgotten by 1989. He updates Mackinder to keep him abreast of the changing political map and finds his arguments prescient. Kaplan keeps alive Mackinder's belief that gazing at relief maps is a better way to tell the future than gazing into a crystal ball. At the very least, familiarizing oneself with the arguments presented by Kaplan will make the actions of the nations of the world seem less random.
March 30, 2018
Điểm thực của mình cho có lẽ chỉ 3.5 nhưng mình cho 4 sao vì những thông tin khá hay của cuốn sách này. Nó cung cấp cho mình một khái niệm rất mới, đó là địa chính trị. Những học thuyết xoay quanh khái niệm này cũng như nhưng thực tế đang diễn ra tại các khu vực nóng bỏng trên thế giới dựa trên các phân tích có tính khoa học chính là điều làm nên giá trị cuốn sách.
Tuy nhiên, điều mình không thích về cuốn sách cũng kha khá, trong đó có 2 điểm cốt yếu nhất. Một là, cách viết của tác giả quá lan man, lòng vòng, không tập trung, đặc biệt ở các chương đầu về học thuyết. Mình có thể hiểu là tác giả muốn đặt 1 nền tảng về lý thuyết trước để chuẩn bị kiến thức cho các chương phân tích sau nhưng mình vẫn nghĩ là có thể có nhiều cách diễn đạt khác tốt hơn. Hai là, có lẽ tác giả là người Mỹ nên đứng trên phương diện của Mỹ để phát biểu về cục diện thế giới nên nâng Mỹ hơi lố (ví dụ, nói Mỹ đóng vai trò gìn giữ hòa bình thế giới, :D).
Dù sao, khi nhìn nhận với một tâm lý khách quan thì cuốn sách này vẫn đáng đọc.
Tuy nhiên, điều mình không thích về cuốn sách cũng kha khá, trong đó có 2 điểm cốt yếu nhất. Một là, cách viết của tác giả quá lan man, lòng vòng, không tập trung, đặc biệt ở các chương đầu về học thuyết. Mình có thể hiểu là tác giả muốn đặt 1 nền tảng về lý thuyết trước để chuẩn bị kiến thức cho các chương phân tích sau nhưng mình vẫn nghĩ là có thể có nhiều cách diễn đạt khác tốt hơn. Hai là, có lẽ tác giả là người Mỹ nên đứng trên phương diện của Mỹ để phát biểu về cục diện thế giới nên nâng Mỹ hơi lố (ví dụ, nói Mỹ đóng vai trò gìn giữ hòa bình thế giới, :D).
Dù sao, khi nhìn nhận với một tâm lý khách quan thì cuốn sách này vẫn đáng đọc.
January 4, 2019
Fantastic! This is one of those books that requires one to read a few paragraphs here and there a second time, just to make sure you got it, of course. I’ll never look at a map the same way!
August 24, 2019
ماذا عسانا أن نتعلمه من الخرائط؟ وماذا تحمله لنا السنوات القادمة ؟
من خلال ما عرضه المؤلف لنا وتقديمه لأهم نظريات المفكرين الجيوسياسيين يخرج لنا هذا الكتاب بمنظور جديد.
إن الجغرافيا تمثل مقدمة لمسار الأحداث الإنسانية، وهي العامل الأهم للسياسات الخارجية للدول. وكما ذكر المؤلف " الخرائط أدوات خطرة ولكنها بالغة الأهمية من أجل التوصل لأي فهم للسياسة العالمية " .
قسم المؤلف كتابه لثلاثة فصول. في الفصل الأول طرح العديد من النظريات المتعلقة بالجغرافيا السياسية التي كتبت في الماضي البعيد والقريب. منها ( الأرض المركزية، وفرضية الأرض المحيطة ) .اللتان تتمركزان حول آسيا وأوروبا، وبالأخص آسيا الوسطى. كونها الجسر القاري بين القارتين، قامت حول هذه المنطقة العديد من الإمبراطوريات واندثرت، سعى كل منها للتمدد والاتساع لكسب الأراضي وثوراتها.
في نظرية ( جاذبية القوة البحرية ) والتي تعد البحار بأهميتها أهمية اليابسة نرى العملاق الصيني وهو يتوسع في عمق البحار. أما روسيا التي تسعى للوصول للمياه الدافئة فأمامها الكثير من العقبات السياسية. والوجود الأمريكي والبريطاني في البحار.
في الفصل الثاني قام الكاتب بعرض مفصل وواسع لأهم الدول في القارتين من الماضي والحاضر. حسب أهمية الدول في النظريات المطروحة. وتاريخها الحافل بالحروب والسيطرة. منها العملاق الصيني الجديد، الذي يتوسع حتى في القارة السمراء. وروسيا التي تسعى جاهدة للوصول إلى المياه الدافئة جنوباً. في ظل سيطرة غربية على البحار. وتركيا مجدها الإمبراطوري السابق. والمحور الإيراني المعبر الأهم بين آسيا وأوروبا. وهضبته الغنية بالنفط والغاز. وأخيراً الشرق الأوسط الذي مازال يغرق في سياسات متخبطة وثورات عقيمة.
وفي الفصل الثالث. سؤال مهم يطرح " ماذا جنت الولايات المتحدة بغزوها لكل من العراق وأفغانستان ؟ ولماذا أهملت جارتها المكسيك ؟ التي على وشك انفجار سكاني وهجرة كبرى . أليس من الأفضل أن تصرف الأموال التي ضخت في الحربين على إصلاح المكسيك؟
أمريكا وسياستها الخارجية في البحار واليابسة.
من خلال ما عرضه المؤلف لنا وتقديمه لأهم نظريات المفكرين الجيوسياسيين يخرج لنا هذا الكتاب بمنظور جديد.
إن الجغرافيا تمثل مقدمة لمسار الأحداث الإنسانية، وهي العامل الأهم للسياسات الخارجية للدول. وكما ذكر المؤلف " الخرائط أدوات خطرة ولكنها بالغة الأهمية من أجل التوصل لأي فهم للسياسة العالمية " .
قسم المؤلف كتابه لثلاثة فصول. في الفصل الأول طرح العديد من النظريات المتعلقة بالجغرافيا السياسية التي كتبت في الماضي البعيد والقريب. منها ( الأرض المركزية، وفرضية الأرض المحيطة ) .اللتان تتمركزان حول آسيا وأوروبا، وبالأخص آسيا الوسطى. كونها الجسر القاري بين القارتين، قامت حول هذه المنطقة العديد من الإمبراطوريات واندثرت، سعى كل منها للتمدد والاتساع لكسب الأراضي وثوراتها.
في نظرية ( جاذبية القوة البحرية ) والتي تعد البحار بأهميتها أهمية اليابسة نرى العملاق الصيني وهو يتوسع في عمق البحار. أما روسيا التي تسعى للوصول للمياه الدافئة فأمامها الكثير من العقبات السياسية. والوجود الأمريكي والبريطاني في البحار.
في الفصل الثاني قام الكاتب بعرض مفصل وواسع لأهم الدول في القارتين من الماضي والحاضر. حسب أهمية الدول في النظريات المطروحة. وتاريخها الحافل بالحروب والسيطرة. منها العملاق الصيني الجديد، الذي يتوسع حتى في القارة السمراء. وروسيا التي تسعى جاهدة للوصول إلى المياه الدافئة جنوباً. في ظل سيطرة غربية على البحار. وتركيا مجدها الإمبراطوري السابق. والمحور الإيراني المعبر الأهم بين آسيا وأوروبا. وهضبته الغنية بالنفط والغاز. وأخيراً الشرق الأوسط الذي مازال يغرق في سياسات متخبطة وثورات عقيمة.
وفي الفصل الثالث. سؤال مهم يطرح " ماذا جنت الولايات المتحدة بغزوها لكل من العراق وأفغانستان ؟ ولماذا أهملت جارتها المكسيك ؟ التي على وشك انفجار سكاني وهجرة كبرى . أليس من الأفضل أن تصرف الأموال التي ضخت في الحربين على إصلاح المكسيك؟
أمريكا وسياستها الخارجية في البحار واليابسة.
October 29, 2013
I've been holding off on writing a review of this book for a bit now because I'm not sure that I can express my frustration properly.
This book is an apologia for Western, even Victorian mindset in seeing the world. While Kaplan goes to great lengths to talk about how geography is not destiny and geostrategists have to avoid falling into the trap of determinism, his analysis of the world is still based on the philosphies of the mid-20th century and before, complete with disturbing discussions of control of the Heartland, a philosophy most often associated with Nazi Germany's invasion of Russia.
I tried very hard to Kaplan the benefit of the doubt, figuring that discussions of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder would give way eventually to more nuanced geographical thinkers like Jared Diamond. It was not to be.
And it wasn't just a dependence on the philosophy of colonialist Europeans that colored the book. The language was very value-laden with discussions of mountains breeding "turbaned guerrilla forces" (so the Scots or the Basques don't count here?) or referencing areas of high population density and poverty as "demographic cockpits". The worries of the British Raj are reflected in the absolute certainty that the 1980 Russian invasion of Afghanistan was a play for the warm-water ports of Pakistan (has any Russian author ever obsessed over warm-water ports for Russia as the Brits did?).
At it's most fundamental, I suppose Kaplan is tying to argue that the world is more than just Hot, Flat, and Crowded in the words of Thomas L. Friedman, but instead mountainous and with a coastline as well. However, I felt that the lines of race and religion were always lurking just below the text of the page.
This volume is one of reaction, a worried white male of privilege looking at a world in the future with much more equality for all and being afraid for his own special position.
This book is an apologia for Western, even Victorian mindset in seeing the world. While Kaplan goes to great lengths to talk about how geography is not destiny and geostrategists have to avoid falling into the trap of determinism, his analysis of the world is still based on the philosphies of the mid-20th century and before, complete with disturbing discussions of control of the Heartland, a philosophy most often associated with Nazi Germany's invasion of Russia.
I tried very hard to Kaplan the benefit of the doubt, figuring that discussions of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford Mackinder would give way eventually to more nuanced geographical thinkers like Jared Diamond. It was not to be.
And it wasn't just a dependence on the philosophy of colonialist Europeans that colored the book. The language was very value-laden with discussions of mountains breeding "turbaned guerrilla forces" (so the Scots or the Basques don't count here?) or referencing areas of high population density and poverty as "demographic cockpits". The worries of the British Raj are reflected in the absolute certainty that the 1980 Russian invasion of Afghanistan was a play for the warm-water ports of Pakistan (has any Russian author ever obsessed over warm-water ports for Russia as the Brits did?).
At it's most fundamental, I suppose Kaplan is tying to argue that the world is more than just Hot, Flat, and Crowded in the words of Thomas L. Friedman, but instead mountainous and with a coastline as well. However, I felt that the lines of race and religion were always lurking just below the text of the page.
This volume is one of reaction, a worried white male of privilege looking at a world in the future with much more equality for all and being afraid for his own special position.
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