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Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook
The coup is the most frequently attempted method of changing government & the most successful. Coup d'Etat outlines the mechanism of the coup & analyzes the conditions political, military & social, that gives rise to it. In doing so, the book sheds much light on societies where power does indeed grow out of the barrel of a gun & the role of law is a concept little understood.
List of Figures
List of Tables
Foreword
Preace to the 1st Edition
Preface to the 1979 Edition
What is the coup d'état? --
When is a coup d'état possible?
The strategy of the coup d'état
The planning of the coup d'état
The execution of the coup d'état
Appendices
Tables
Index
List of Figures
List of Tables
Foreword
Preace to the 1st Edition
Preface to the 1979 Edition
What is the coup d'état? --
When is a coup d'état possible?
The strategy of the coup d'état
The planning of the coup d'état
The execution of the coup d'état
Appendices
Tables
Index
215 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1968
About the author
Edward N. Luttwak
70 books190 followersEdward Nicolae Luttwak is a military strategist, political scientist and historian who has published works on military strategy, history, and international relations. Born in Arad, Romania, he studied in Palermo, Sicily, in England, LSE (BSc) & at Johns Hopkins (PhD). He speaks five languages. He serves or has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force; he is/has been an adviser to Treaty Allies of the United States. He is chairman of the board of Aircraft Purchase Fleet Limited (APFL), an aviation lessor, and he founded and directs a conservation cattle ranch in the Bolivian Amazon. He is the author of various
books and more articles including: The Rise of China vs the Logic of Strategy, Coup d'Etat: a practical handbook, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, The Endangered American Dream, and Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy. His books are also published in: Arabic, Chinese (both Beijing simplified and Taipei traditional), Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Indonesian (Bahasa), Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese (and Brazilian Portuguese) Romanian, Russian, Spanish (Castilian, Spain, in Argentina and in Venezuela), Swedish, and Turkish. Before ever writing of strategy and war, he was combat-trained (Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry) and fought as a volunteer or a contractor in several countries on two continents. He likes Hebrew songs and the Greek & Latin classics. His best article is "Homer Inc." in the London Review of Books.
books and more articles including: The Rise of China vs the Logic of Strategy, Coup d'Etat: a practical handbook, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire, The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, The Endangered American Dream, and Turbo-Capitalism: Winners and Losers in the Global Economy. His books are also published in: Arabic, Chinese (both Beijing simplified and Taipei traditional), Czech, Danish, Dutch, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hebrew, Indonesian (Bahasa), Italian, Japanese, Korean, Mongolian, Norwegian, Polish, Portuguese (and Brazilian Portuguese) Romanian, Russian, Spanish (Castilian, Spain, in Argentina and in Venezuela), Swedish, and Turkish. Before ever writing of strategy and war, he was combat-trained (Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry) and fought as a volunteer or a contractor in several countries on two continents. He likes Hebrew songs and the Greek & Latin classics. His best article is "Homer Inc." in the London Review of Books.
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September 17, 2020
Update 18-07-2016
After the events of the militairy coup against Erdogan in Turkey, I decided to pick up this book again and check how well the coupleaders read the book. It seems they made some classical mistakes, here they are:
1. They failed to neutralize the head of state (Erdogan himzelf): as long as he is free, he's able to mibilize the people. If he does not surrender, you should take him out
2. The part of the army that was performing the coup, never succeeded in isolating the power centre (Ankara, Istanbul) from the rest of the army. The part of the army that stayed loyal to Erdogan was able to land its forces unopposed to these cities. Even Erdogan was able to land safely.
3. They never took control of all the media channels - once Erdogan appeared on TV, the coup was deemed to failure
End of update
Imagine an ambitious general in some African country scouring the internet and stumbling on this book. Coup d'état (a practical handbook) by Luttwak shows you how to perform a coup, the techniques involved and how to succeed. I don't know if this book was actually used in the planning and execution of a coup, but I cannot imagine that this book doesn't feature on the shelves of a modern self respecting African dictator.
Luttwak first identifies the exact definition of a coup. It differs from a 'standard' revolution or guerilla warfare due to the fact that a coup d'état is not an assault from the outside and does not intend to change the political direction of a government. Instead a coup intends to discplace a small but critical segment of the current government from control and control the remainder.
According to Luttwak, there are three pre-conditions for a coup to be possible. First, the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population. Second, the target state must be substantially independent and the influence of foreign powers in its internal political life must be relatively limited. And last, the target state must have a political center for the coup to take place and take effect.
Planning and execution a coup is not easy. The defense of the state (armed forces, police and paramilitary forces) must be infiltrated, key positions must be approached and become active participants of the coup. Different elements (key persons in the government, ministers, presidents and top civil servants) must be neutralized, media must be put under control, roadblocks must be put up and airports must be closed in order to prevent intervention from hostile forces.
Luttwak goes into great detail on how to perform a coup, from recommendations for communication styles to the first communiques (romantic/lyrical, rational, messianic), where to put up the roadblocks and how to make sure that the coup does not turn against the initiators.
Because this is a book written in the 1970's, it does not take into account the modern inventions such as internet, mobile phones which - as we saw in the Arab spring - created a situation that was very difficult to control.
It is an enjoyable read however, and its writing style makes you (as the reader of this book) basically the focus of the coup. While reading this book, you are addressed by familiar terms ("we need to make sure that" , "we will be doing this by") and it actually put me in the position of an armchair general, fantasising plotting a coup against the evil government of my country. 3 stars.
After the events of the militairy coup against Erdogan in Turkey, I decided to pick up this book again and check how well the coupleaders read the book. It seems they made some classical mistakes, here they are:
1. They failed to neutralize the head of state (Erdogan himzelf): as long as he is free, he's able to mibilize the people. If he does not surrender, you should take him out
2. The part of the army that was performing the coup, never succeeded in isolating the power centre (Ankara, Istanbul) from the rest of the army. The part of the army that stayed loyal to Erdogan was able to land its forces unopposed to these cities. Even Erdogan was able to land safely.
3. They never took control of all the media channels - once Erdogan appeared on TV, the coup was deemed to failure
End of update
Imagine an ambitious general in some African country scouring the internet and stumbling on this book. Coup d'état (a practical handbook) by Luttwak shows you how to perform a coup, the techniques involved and how to succeed. I don't know if this book was actually used in the planning and execution of a coup, but I cannot imagine that this book doesn't feature on the shelves of a modern self respecting African dictator.
Luttwak first identifies the exact definition of a coup. It differs from a 'standard' revolution or guerilla warfare due to the fact that a coup d'état is not an assault from the outside and does not intend to change the political direction of a government. Instead a coup intends to discplace a small but critical segment of the current government from control and control the remainder.
According to Luttwak, there are three pre-conditions for a coup to be possible. First, the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to a small fraction of the population. Second, the target state must be substantially independent and the influence of foreign powers in its internal political life must be relatively limited. And last, the target state must have a political center for the coup to take place and take effect.
Planning and execution a coup is not easy. The defense of the state (armed forces, police and paramilitary forces) must be infiltrated, key positions must be approached and become active participants of the coup. Different elements (key persons in the government, ministers, presidents and top civil servants) must be neutralized, media must be put under control, roadblocks must be put up and airports must be closed in order to prevent intervention from hostile forces.
Luttwak goes into great detail on how to perform a coup, from recommendations for communication styles to the first communiques (romantic/lyrical, rational, messianic), where to put up the roadblocks and how to make sure that the coup does not turn against the initiators.
Because this is a book written in the 1970's, it does not take into account the modern inventions such as internet, mobile phones which - as we saw in the Arab spring - created a situation that was very difficult to control.
It is an enjoyable read however, and its writing style makes you (as the reader of this book) basically the focus of the coup. While reading this book, you are addressed by familiar terms ("we need to make sure that" , "we will be doing this by") and it actually put me in the position of an armchair general, fantasising plotting a coup against the evil government of my country. 3 stars.
Read
March 13, 2015This indispensible guide to launching a coup in 1960s and 70s Africa lopes along at a good pace. Told from the perspective of someone intent on organising and winning a coup it is full of useful advice on how to use the structures and resources of the government against itself in order to change the regime, or at least change the identities of the men wearing the gold braid.
The author's injunction for the reader to look on coups as being a little closer to democracy because the views of a gang of junior military officers at least represents a wider spectrum of opinion than the one man-one vote government of a dictator is typical of the tone of the whole work, which is to say at times very close to self-parody.
Fortunately this now seems to be a work of historical interest only.
The author's injunction for the reader to look on coups as being a little closer to democracy because the views of a gang of junior military officers at least represents a wider spectrum of opinion than the one man-one vote government of a dictator is typical of the tone of the whole work, which is to say at times very close to self-parody.
Fortunately this now seems to be a work of historical interest only.
January 10, 2022
Coup d'Etat: A Practical Handbook, revised edition 2016, Edward N. Luttwak, 264 pp., ISBN 9780674737266, Library-of-Congress JC.494.L88.2016. Author's wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edward_...
worldcat https://www.worldcat.org/title/coup-d...
https://search.library.wisc.edu/catal...
Although written in a "here's what we're gonna do" tone, the book is an attempt to understand the political life of the less-developed countries. p. xxix.
As of 1978, "the coup d'etat is now the normal mode of political change in most member states of the United Nations." p. xxxiii. 1963-1978, there have been some 120 military coups. p. xxxv. Since 1776, governments have been overthrown at an increasing pace. p. 5. 1946-2010, there were 616 coup attempts: 299 succeeded, 317 failed. p. 253. There were 60+ coup attempts per year from about 1967-1982; 30+ coup attempts per year 1960-2006; 24+ coup attempts per year, 1950-2010. p. 256.
Use at your own risk: "a heavily annotated and blood-spattered copy of the French edition of this book was found" near the body of one unsuccessful plotter. p. xxii.
Two generations after independence, African countries are indeed democratizing; genuine political communities are emerging. But: Post-colonial new African leaders were given control over the army, police, tax collectors and administrators who had worked for the colonial government. p. xxiv. Lack of political community left the populace passive, and the new leaders unconstrained by any rule of law. Idi Amin's brutalities briefly attracted Western attention; other autocrats quietly plundered and repressed. p. xxvi-xxvii.
The cultural hegemony of Islam seems to be an insurmountable obstacle to democratic governance. God Himself has already given the law in its entirety in the Qur'an, which none may debate nor dispute: legislators can do only harm, as by permitting choice of religion, women's equality, or wine. pp. xxii, xxvii-xxviii, 151-153.
A successful coup uses the /threat/ of violence to oust one set of rulers and install another set. But actually /using/ much violence makes success unlikely, rather plunges the country into civil war. pp. xv-xvi, 168.
For there to be sufficient incentive to justify the risks of a coup, large-scale corruption opportunities must exist, for the would-be new rulers to milk the country and become billionaires. p. xvi.
A coup requires that the armed forces, bureaucracy, and police not be personally loyal to the current dictator. p. 2. The generals who tried in April 1961 to overthrow Charles de Gaulle failed to appreciate de Gaulle's popularity with the French people, labor unions, and political parties. pp. 116-119.
For your coup to succeed, you need resources enough to neutralize every effective center of power. The young officers who staged the January 1966 coup in Nigeria succeeded in killing the prime minister in the federal capital, and the boss of the Northern Region who dominated most of the country. But they were overextended, so the senior army officer, acting with the police and bureaucracy, staged a counter-coup and seized power on his own account. pp. 48-49.
Strong regional forces may make a coup impossible. There's never been a coup in Lebanon: Shi'a, Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Druze blocs are all mutually hostile, but no one group can dominate--not even Hezbollah, now strongest by far (sustained by Iran. p. 84). Any coup would likely capture only Beirut, the other groups seizing power in their own areas. pp. 49-51.
If Wall Street controlled the United States--the president and Congress acting as its stooges--then power could not be seized in Washington. p. 51.
Hitler rose to power politically, not by the power of the brownshirts. p. 55. Hitler is a popular figure with Arabs. p. 85.
As of 2015, India, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, and China are all experiencing violent conflicts with separatist elements. p. 48.
If a country wants to acquire jet fighters, it has to be reasonably friendly with one of six countries: Sweden, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, or Russia. p. 31. The initial purchase is followed by years of dependence.
As of 2015, the U.S. has 1.4 million personnel in military uniform. p. 58. And at least 21 intelligence agencies, enumerated pp. 60-62. "That more /is/ less when it comes to intelligence will no doubt be recognized some day."
It's important to control or disable radio and TV stations, phone relays and exchanges, to silence our enemies and cement our control. pp. xv, 131-136, 174, 195. We'll take over the principal broadcasting station, and co-opt technicians to sabotage the others. "We're in control. There is no longer any resistance. Law and order have been restored." pp. 196-198.
Few things grow as easily as state bureaucracies. p. xxiv.
The best investment of taxpayer money ever was Britain's government buying 50% of British Petroleum (Anglo-Persian, then Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). p. 43.
Answers questions like this:
https://www.goodreads.com/trivia/work...
worldcat https://www.worldcat.org/title/coup-d...
https://search.library.wisc.edu/catal...
Although written in a "here's what we're gonna do" tone, the book is an attempt to understand the political life of the less-developed countries. p. xxix.
As of 1978, "the coup d'etat is now the normal mode of political change in most member states of the United Nations." p. xxxiii. 1963-1978, there have been some 120 military coups. p. xxxv. Since 1776, governments have been overthrown at an increasing pace. p. 5. 1946-2010, there were 616 coup attempts: 299 succeeded, 317 failed. p. 253. There were 60+ coup attempts per year from about 1967-1982; 30+ coup attempts per year 1960-2006; 24+ coup attempts per year, 1950-2010. p. 256.
Use at your own risk: "a heavily annotated and blood-spattered copy of the French edition of this book was found" near the body of one unsuccessful plotter. p. xxii.
Two generations after independence, African countries are indeed democratizing; genuine political communities are emerging. But: Post-colonial new African leaders were given control over the army, police, tax collectors and administrators who had worked for the colonial government. p. xxiv. Lack of political community left the populace passive, and the new leaders unconstrained by any rule of law. Idi Amin's brutalities briefly attracted Western attention; other autocrats quietly plundered and repressed. p. xxvi-xxvii.
The cultural hegemony of Islam seems to be an insurmountable obstacle to democratic governance. God Himself has already given the law in its entirety in the Qur'an, which none may debate nor dispute: legislators can do only harm, as by permitting choice of religion, women's equality, or wine. pp. xxii, xxvii-xxviii, 151-153.
A successful coup uses the /threat/ of violence to oust one set of rulers and install another set. But actually /using/ much violence makes success unlikely, rather plunges the country into civil war. pp. xv-xvi, 168.
For there to be sufficient incentive to justify the risks of a coup, large-scale corruption opportunities must exist, for the would-be new rulers to milk the country and become billionaires. p. xvi.
A coup requires that the armed forces, bureaucracy, and police not be personally loyal to the current dictator. p. 2. The generals who tried in April 1961 to overthrow Charles de Gaulle failed to appreciate de Gaulle's popularity with the French people, labor unions, and political parties. pp. 116-119.
For your coup to succeed, you need resources enough to neutralize every effective center of power. The young officers who staged the January 1966 coup in Nigeria succeeded in killing the prime minister in the federal capital, and the boss of the Northern Region who dominated most of the country. But they were overextended, so the senior army officer, acting with the police and bureaucracy, staged a counter-coup and seized power on his own account. pp. 48-49.
Strong regional forces may make a coup impossible. There's never been a coup in Lebanon: Shi'a, Maronite Christian, Sunni Muslim, and Druze blocs are all mutually hostile, but no one group can dominate--not even Hezbollah, now strongest by far (sustained by Iran. p. 84). Any coup would likely capture only Beirut, the other groups seizing power in their own areas. pp. 49-51.
If Wall Street controlled the United States--the president and Congress acting as its stooges--then power could not be seized in Washington. p. 51.
Hitler rose to power politically, not by the power of the brownshirts. p. 55. Hitler is a popular figure with Arabs. p. 85.
As of 2015, India, Kenya, Mali, Myanmar, Pakistan, and China are all experiencing violent conflicts with separatist elements. p. 48.
If a country wants to acquire jet fighters, it has to be reasonably friendly with one of six countries: Sweden, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, China, or Russia. p. 31. The initial purchase is followed by years of dependence.
As of 2015, the U.S. has 1.4 million personnel in military uniform. p. 58. And at least 21 intelligence agencies, enumerated pp. 60-62. "That more /is/ less when it comes to intelligence will no doubt be recognized some day."
It's important to control or disable radio and TV stations, phone relays and exchanges, to silence our enemies and cement our control. pp. xv, 131-136, 174, 195. We'll take over the principal broadcasting station, and co-opt technicians to sabotage the others. "We're in control. There is no longer any resistance. Law and order have been restored." pp. 196-198.
Few things grow as easily as state bureaucracies. p. xxiv.
The best investment of taxpayer money ever was Britain's government buying 50% of British Petroleum (Anglo-Persian, then Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). p. 43.
Answers questions like this:
https://www.goodreads.com/trivia/work...
December 6, 2019
This is one of those books I’m uncomfortable admitting that I’ve read. Its the type of text that makes me feel like by simply stating I have it on my shelf - that I have committed some form of treason against the state. Ah well.
Its pretty much what it sounds like. The book, written by one of America’s foremost military strategy historians, introduces the reader how to overthrow a government via a mix of historical examples, and abstract ideas. It speaks in a voice as if you are not just thinking about it, or planning about such an attempt at a power grab, but rather that your coup is already underway. We are taken through a small exercise of the various institutions that can cause issues from the media, the police, the military and loyalists of the government, and what side they will take in the upcoming days. we are also to think about the team we intend to bring together, the communication networks of the state and well Luttawak is fairly meticulous..
Its kinda crazy. The book also presents the reader with a very useful appendix on a variety of coups in history.(well, in the 20th cent)
The topic is, of course, a very fascinating one and it brings to question not only when it is truly needed for such a thing to occur, but as to how important hostile takeovers of a governing body, have pushed the tides of history.
Recommended for:
-Strategy historians
-Those thinking about poly sci
-those researching power and how it shifts
Its pretty much what it sounds like. The book, written by one of America’s foremost military strategy historians, introduces the reader how to overthrow a government via a mix of historical examples, and abstract ideas. It speaks in a voice as if you are not just thinking about it, or planning about such an attempt at a power grab, but rather that your coup is already underway. We are taken through a small exercise of the various institutions that can cause issues from the media, the police, the military and loyalists of the government, and what side they will take in the upcoming days. we are also to think about the team we intend to bring together, the communication networks of the state and well Luttawak is fairly meticulous..
Its kinda crazy. The book also presents the reader with a very useful appendix on a variety of coups in history.(well, in the 20th cent)
The topic is, of course, a very fascinating one and it brings to question not only when it is truly needed for such a thing to occur, but as to how important hostile takeovers of a governing body, have pushed the tides of history.
Recommended for:
-Strategy historians
-Those thinking about poly sci
-those researching power and how it shifts
March 15, 2015
First off--- I have no idea what Edward Luttwak must've thought, but there was in fact a film made from this book: a c. 1980 piece called "Power Play", with Peter O'Toole as an ambitious general in some unnamed Central European state.
Beyond that--- "Coup d'Etat" is an rather nice introduction to the idea of seizure of power and how it's historically been done. Luttwak structures the book as a mock-handbook to how to mount a coup (always seize the radio and TV stations first), whether you're an ambitious group of young colonels or a political party with a militia and a general or two on its side. That's an amusing conceit, though some of the technology has changed (this was all very much before mobile phones and social media and the web). Still--- Luttwak is a serious scholar, and "Coup d'Etat" is a good introduction to a phenomenon that became in the 1950-80s the most common way worldwide of changing governments. Worth reading...and perhaps worth carrying in a knapsack if you're a young officer with...hopes for the future.
Beyond that--- "Coup d'Etat" is an rather nice introduction to the idea of seizure of power and how it's historically been done. Luttwak structures the book as a mock-handbook to how to mount a coup (always seize the radio and TV stations first), whether you're an ambitious group of young colonels or a political party with a militia and a general or two on its side. That's an amusing conceit, though some of the technology has changed (this was all very much before mobile phones and social media and the web). Still--- Luttwak is a serious scholar, and "Coup d'Etat" is a good introduction to a phenomenon that became in the 1950-80s the most common way worldwide of changing governments. Worth reading...and perhaps worth carrying in a knapsack if you're a young officer with...hopes for the future.
April 2, 2023
I had not intended to ship Coup d'Etat with the 2 or 3 hundred books to Saudi Arabia where I had been hired to work for Aramco. I had started reading the book back in Park Ridge, Illinois, and laid it aside as we got ready to ship out; but it did slip through and while unpacking 2 or 3 months later I realized how lucky that it had been missed by the Saudi censors at the port of entry. Other books had made it through with covers that I had removed that portrayed sex or religion in any way (possibly more threatening than revolution or seizing of power). So, my library was filled with mostly paperbacks with one whose spine faced inward and that I would eventually read, which I did in the next year.
It is a well written text on how to take over a government by force. It is frightening to read. My interest in reading it was that I had had a quasi-military background as a reservist after having attended two military academies and witnessing a coup and its result in Greece and having been close to several in the Middle East and Africa.
Luttwak is still relevant, even more so today. I would like to read the revised and updated version to understand how Putin is going to get his just desserts and let Russia resume its path of becoming European again after more than a century.
(My young son at the time got ahold of Luttwak's book and began reading it, which sort of concerned me and might have influenced his decision to major in foreign affairs. I just hoped that he wouldn't mention it in school to his classmates in Dhahran. And he didn't, without being told not to.)
It is a well written text on how to take over a government by force. It is frightening to read. My interest in reading it was that I had had a quasi-military background as a reservist after having attended two military academies and witnessing a coup and its result in Greece and having been close to several in the Middle East and Africa.
Luttwak is still relevant, even more so today. I would like to read the revised and updated version to understand how Putin is going to get his just desserts and let Russia resume its path of becoming European again after more than a century.
(My young son at the time got ahold of Luttwak's book and began reading it, which sort of concerned me and might have influenced his decision to major in foreign affairs. I just hoped that he wouldn't mention it in school to his classmates in Dhahran. And he didn't, without being told not to.)
August 27, 2018
Given that zombie survival manuals and similar how-to books are today all the rage, on sale at every Costco, Edward Luttwak’s "Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook" seems like a selection from the same genre. Namely, of somewhat jokey books that purport to tell you what to do in a strange, disastrous situation, while effectively acknowledging that if you do end up being chased by zombies, hurriedly turning to the index, finding the entry “When Being Pursued,” then scrambling to locate page 102, isn’t probably the best tactic for survival. But instead, this book is the real thing, I think—an actual practical handbook on how to overthrow the state. More precisely, how to overthrow a weak state, a banana republic, though I will give some thought to relevance in the modern American context.
You could look at this book through the other end of the kaleidoscope, too, as an analysis of how all this has happened before and will happen again—or, as Luttwak claims, in his typical cynical and ironic way, as a way “to explore the meaning of politics in many backward countries politely described as ‘emerging.’ ” As a “practical handbook,” a lot of details are missing—it doesn’t tell you, for example, whether you need artillery or can instead get by with just man portable weapons, or give you the exact words to use to convince Captain Jones to join your coup. I think that’s intentional, though, since one of the key takeaways from the book, obvious but still worth repeating, is that every situation is different, flexibility is key, and therefore general principles are what should be focused on. This is what I used to call, in my younger days advising (poorly) my friends on tactics with the fairer sex, “broad strokes”—not getting bogged down in obsessive plus/minus analysis of narrow decisions or happenings, but to view the overall picture and goals while hewing closely to a few basic principles (what I codified as “Charles’s Seven Or So Rules”—no, you may not have a copy).
Before we get to how to actually seize power, I should note the original book was written fifty years ago, and substantially revised and updated in 2016. It doesn’t seem that Luttwak changed much, though I don’t know for sure, and one or two errors slip through (Reza Shah has not been “the father of the present shah of Persia” for quite some time). In 1968, the glow was still partially on the post-colonial world, and nearly everyone assumed it was just a matter of time before post-colonial countries joined the First World. Fifty years ago, therefore, coups seemed like a transitory phase in the march toward stability and wealth, but now we know they are permanent, since there is basically no indication of any post-colonial country joining the First World, other than a few smaller Asian countries—which are themselves not necessarily as stable as they appear, which isn’t very stable anyway. Luttwak notes this, in his typical mocking way, saying that he predicted it, not because of instability due to the “revolution of rising expectations” (“yet another slogan made up by Western intellectuals to justify forthcoming depredations”), but because stable political community is a rare and fragile thing, not found in any post-colonial country (or in their pre-colonial versions, either). By this he means, though he uses other words, adherence to the rule of law. His conclusion is that, if very slowly, sub-Saharan Africa may be rising, or rather, “it is no longer feckless optimism to expect cumulative progress in more places than not.” In North Africa and the Middle East, conversely, Islam has proven an insuperable barrier to the creation of stable regimes recognizing the rule of law (Luttwak is very anti-Islam). The result is continued coups, and more in the latter area than the former. Luttwak wrote before the 2016 coup attempt that effectively cemented Erdogan’s Islamist hold on power, but he was doubtless not surprised by that turn of events.
So how does Luttwak advise seizing power? The basic pedagogic method of this book is to divide the topic into core categories (definition; feasibility; planning; execution), and within those, provide rules that flow from logic and from a range of historical examples Luttwak provides. As far as definitions, Luttwak defines a coup as “a special form of politics that requires guns as an aid to persuasion, although coups rarely succeed if guns are much used and fail totally if the situation degenerates into civil war.” A coup is a swift and complete seizure of the mechanism of state power. Luttwak notes that what makes a coup possible is the modern separation of much of the mechanism of governance from the political rulers themselves, allowing control of the former to be peeled away from the latter (which also means that a state such as Saudi Arabia, cross-linked throughout by “traditional bonds,” is hard to execute a coup against). In short, a successful coup “uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers over the rest.” Notably, a coup is not a revolution (it seeks to control the current system, not destroy it), the masses are not directly involved, and it has no necessary bias toward being executed more by either Left or Right; this is all about power, although it may have an ideological overlay.
Luttwak claims that coups are usually only feasible where the country is “backward.” By this he does not mean poor (and, in fact, if the country is poor enough not to have a bureaucracy, a coup is not feasible at all). Rather, he means there is no diffusion of power, that “the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to as small fraction of the population.” In a more advanced country, such as a modern Western state, power is too diffuse to be easily and quickly seized, and the bureaucracy is widespread and sophisticated, unlikely to simply take orders from those it regards as breaking the rules of political community—and therefore a coup there is much harder. Other preconditions to coup feasibility include actual political independence (not being a client state of a great power) and having “organic unity,” not being merely a collection of regional power centers under a diaphanous central government.
As far as strategy, Luttwak focuses on “maximum speed in the transitional phase, and the need to fully neutralize the opposition both before and immediately after the coup.” Lack of speed exposes weakness, which there is certain to be, and makes it harder for the large “wait and see” contingent of uninvolved government workers to maintain neutrality. They will come over to the side of the coup if it succeeds, though—so it needs to succeed fast, to prevent them from instead choosing to back the existing rulers. Furthermore, achieving speed permits easier neutralization of both the armed defenses of the state and possible sources of major political (or religious) opposition. (Although Luttwak doesn’t mention it, lack of speed, because of lack of planning, along with “too many chiefs and not enough Indians,” was the problem with the Stauffenberg coup against Hitler.) To achieve speed, you must recruit adequate numbers of people, who can then be used, at the right moment, “to displace the government from its control of [the state].” Usually, that means you have to recruit from within the armed forces of the state you are trying to subvert (unless there is a party militia or similar group—but that requires money). Luttwak spends quite a bit of time analyzing at what level and with what tools to subvert the military, using real-life examples such as the Portuguese army in 1967 (when there was not a coup—it’s just a structural example). He distinguishes how to approach leaders, who can bring along fighting men, and technicians, such as air traffic controllers, who can help by preventing effective response by the opposition (and by running TV and radio stations, etc.). He recommends how to frame the initial discussions with those one is trying to subvert (this part is especially good). Luttwak also discusses quasi-military potentially oppositional forces, such as the Paris police force, concluding that in most cases they should be ignored and dealt with after the coup. Finally, he offers rules for compartmentalization and maintaining as much secrecy as possible, while recognizing that the existing regime will certainly get wind that “something is up.” Thus, minimizing actual information that gets to the state security services (and limiting the damage if someone turns), while maximizing “noise,” is necessary.
Next Luttwak covers planning, here focusing on the 1961 Algerian/French coup attempt, which de Gaulle successfully defeated, and also on a successful attempt (one of many) in Syria in 1961. Luttwak’s main point is that mere control of the military is inadequate; some thought must be given to planning to control, neutralize, or defeat political opposition during and immediately after the coup, especially with the role that social media plays today. (Again, Luttwak wrote before the 2016 Turkish coup attempt, but social media played a critical role in defeating that attempt.) Here, Luttwak focuses heavily on “personalities,” by which he means charismatic leaders who must be “neutralized”—i.e., kidnapped or killed at the very beginning of the coup, although he only refers obliquely to that second option. He also discusses geography of control, the blocking of roads, and so forth. Finally, he focuses on group neutralization, from trade unions to religious bodies to political parties, where a powerful enough political group (he uses as an example the National Rifle Association) can slow down the consolidation of an initially successful coup such that it “provokes conflicts that re-open the whole issue.”
And, finally, we get execution of the coup. What is necessary is total commitment, immediately as soon as adequate infiltration of the armed forces is achieved, along with simultaneous execution of the plan such that the warning functions of the state are simultaneously triggered at all areas of action (rather than sequentially), and avoiding actual fighting if at all possible, strongly preferring immobilization of opposing forces, while the actual levers of government are seized. Creating ambiguity and confusion on the part of the forces of the state is critical; when presented with what looks like a fait accompli, it will be a fait accompli. The coup plotters also must not allow a single “headquarters” target on their side to exist such that it can be decapitated. Each team executing the coup must know enough about their own mission (with the details only provided at the last minute), but only about their own mission. And once opposing forces are immobilized and the coup plotters have the levers of power, and control media outlets, they broadcast messages intended to both reassure and intimidate. QED.
This is all incisively and well written. I suspect it is not quite updated enough from 1968; for example, I think that while it mentions social media, it does not emphasize its role enough, nor how best to neutralize its effect, whether you’re the state trying to prevent a coup or plotters trying after the coup begins to neutralize political opposition that may slow down your coup or prevent coordination of civilians against your actions. How does one kill Twitter or Facebook in a country, other than by wholly shutting the Internet down (because it is quite easy to evade filters and blocks, if you are motivated enough)? This question is a bit more complex than it seems, though, because it assumes that Facebook, Twitter, and the other “GAFA companies” are opposed to tyranny and will allow themselves to be used to combat tyranny, or at a minimum remain neutral in a conflict. This is false; their decision dynamic is totally different. It boils down to (a) in large markets, actively cooperate with tyranny, and (b) in small markets, assist leftists in power and harm any Right activity, whether in power or not. Thus, in large markets like China and India, the GAFA companies already actively cooperate to suppress opposition (or would in India if the Indian government wanted it), and would certainly eagerly subject themselves to total clampdown at the demand of the state, as during a coup attempt. For example, Google in recent weeks has been openly coordinating with the Chinese government to allow the suppression of any information searches frowned on by the government. We can be certain if there were active opposition to the Chinese government, the GAFA companies would fall all over themselves to obey the Party and do their very best to keep the Party on top, although I should note that as of now, this is of limited importance to the Party, because none of the GAFA companies are as dominant as local Chinese options for the same activities, such as Baidu and Weibo, all of which are also under the iron control of the government. (Whether the GAFA companies would cooperate with a large Right tyranny is uncertain, though; the desire to harm the Right might override the desire for profits. If, for example, the Russian government faced a coup, Putin, unlike Xi Jinping, could not count on Google’s and Jack Dorsey’s help.)
As to smaller markets, the GAFA companies were happy to allow Erdogan to use social media to combat the 2016 coup, not because Erdogan was democratically elected, but because he is Islamist, and Islamists are a “victim group” in the eyes of the Left, in essence honorary leftists. (Sure, his opponents were Muslims, too, but not real Muslims for leftist victim-card purposes, since they were secularist military men in the Ataturk mold. Whether the GAFA companies also actively suppressed use of the social media by them, I don’t know, but it seems unlikely social media was part of their plan.) But we can be certain that if the Left launched a coup against, say, the Hungarian or Polish governments, the GAFA companies would do all in their power to assist the coup to overthrow the legitimate government, and to harm the government’s ability to use social media to coordinate a response. Democracy is irrelevant; what is relevant is that those who rule the GAFA companies, and who therefore increasingly rule us, would desperately want the coup, and any Left coup, to succeed in seizing power. (The same principle can be seen in the current massive censorship of conservative thought across all social media, while overt calls for violence from the Left are always totally ignored.) Thus, from the perspective of any Right coup, social media is a significant problem, and from the perspective of any Left coup, a way to start the race ahead of the starting line. The only possible answer is for us to totally break the power of the GAFA companies, since it’s not like Viktor Orbán can do it from his perch in Budapest, so we must do it for him, but that is a topic for another day.
It is tempting to try to map Luttwak’s analysis onto the present day. On the Left, we hear that Trump is leading a coup against America, though what that means is pretty unclear. On the Right, we hear that the Deep State is attempting to overthrow Trump. Leaving aside the truth of either claim, neither of these is much like the types of coups that Luttwak analyzes. I think it is true that the Deep State, basically consisting of pushers of global neoliberal hegemony combined with pushers of vicious left-wing social politics, wants Trump gone. But just because Trump let his opponents create, in the Mephistophalean person of Robert Mueller, a witch-hunting task force of unlimited power devoted to the single goal of destroying him, doesn’t mean that, even if they succeed, there has been a coup. After all, Trump doesn’t even control most of the levers of government now—his opponents do. They are just trying to keep it that way.
I suppose there could be a coup in America someday. Certainly power is not as diffused as it used to be, which makes America increasingly “backward” in Luttwak’s definition. We have the possibility of well-armed militias. We have a politicized and hollowed-out military, where the best men are passed over for advancement in favor of women and homosexuals, doubtless causing the type of resentment Luttwak portrays as fertile ground for coup recruiting (as when recently the Marine Corps ended the career of the prominent and popular Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Mainz, for the sin of referring to administrative make-work as “faggot stuff”). And Luttwak himself identifies circumstances in which highly developed countries may become vulnerable to a coup, like France in 1961: “severe and prolonged economic crisis . . . a long and unsuccessful war or a major defeat . . . or chronic instability under a multiparty system.” But Luttwak is generally right—the principles of his book aren’t really relevant to America or modern Western Europe, whatever problems we may have. That doesn’t make his book any less interesting, and who knows, maybe it will rise in relevance to our situation. That’s certainly more likely than a zombie invasion!
You could look at this book through the other end of the kaleidoscope, too, as an analysis of how all this has happened before and will happen again—or, as Luttwak claims, in his typical cynical and ironic way, as a way “to explore the meaning of politics in many backward countries politely described as ‘emerging.’ ” As a “practical handbook,” a lot of details are missing—it doesn’t tell you, for example, whether you need artillery or can instead get by with just man portable weapons, or give you the exact words to use to convince Captain Jones to join your coup. I think that’s intentional, though, since one of the key takeaways from the book, obvious but still worth repeating, is that every situation is different, flexibility is key, and therefore general principles are what should be focused on. This is what I used to call, in my younger days advising (poorly) my friends on tactics with the fairer sex, “broad strokes”—not getting bogged down in obsessive plus/minus analysis of narrow decisions or happenings, but to view the overall picture and goals while hewing closely to a few basic principles (what I codified as “Charles’s Seven Or So Rules”—no, you may not have a copy).
Before we get to how to actually seize power, I should note the original book was written fifty years ago, and substantially revised and updated in 2016. It doesn’t seem that Luttwak changed much, though I don’t know for sure, and one or two errors slip through (Reza Shah has not been “the father of the present shah of Persia” for quite some time). In 1968, the glow was still partially on the post-colonial world, and nearly everyone assumed it was just a matter of time before post-colonial countries joined the First World. Fifty years ago, therefore, coups seemed like a transitory phase in the march toward stability and wealth, but now we know they are permanent, since there is basically no indication of any post-colonial country joining the First World, other than a few smaller Asian countries—which are themselves not necessarily as stable as they appear, which isn’t very stable anyway. Luttwak notes this, in his typical mocking way, saying that he predicted it, not because of instability due to the “revolution of rising expectations” (“yet another slogan made up by Western intellectuals to justify forthcoming depredations”), but because stable political community is a rare and fragile thing, not found in any post-colonial country (or in their pre-colonial versions, either). By this he means, though he uses other words, adherence to the rule of law. His conclusion is that, if very slowly, sub-Saharan Africa may be rising, or rather, “it is no longer feckless optimism to expect cumulative progress in more places than not.” In North Africa and the Middle East, conversely, Islam has proven an insuperable barrier to the creation of stable regimes recognizing the rule of law (Luttwak is very anti-Islam). The result is continued coups, and more in the latter area than the former. Luttwak wrote before the 2016 coup attempt that effectively cemented Erdogan’s Islamist hold on power, but he was doubtless not surprised by that turn of events.
So how does Luttwak advise seizing power? The basic pedagogic method of this book is to divide the topic into core categories (definition; feasibility; planning; execution), and within those, provide rules that flow from logic and from a range of historical examples Luttwak provides. As far as definitions, Luttwak defines a coup as “a special form of politics that requires guns as an aid to persuasion, although coups rarely succeed if guns are much used and fail totally if the situation degenerates into civil war.” A coup is a swift and complete seizure of the mechanism of state power. Luttwak notes that what makes a coup possible is the modern separation of much of the mechanism of governance from the political rulers themselves, allowing control of the former to be peeled away from the latter (which also means that a state such as Saudi Arabia, cross-linked throughout by “traditional bonds,” is hard to execute a coup against). In short, a successful coup “uses parts of the state apparatus to seize the controlling levers over the rest.” Notably, a coup is not a revolution (it seeks to control the current system, not destroy it), the masses are not directly involved, and it has no necessary bias toward being executed more by either Left or Right; this is all about power, although it may have an ideological overlay.
Luttwak claims that coups are usually only feasible where the country is “backward.” By this he does not mean poor (and, in fact, if the country is poor enough not to have a bureaucracy, a coup is not feasible at all). Rather, he means there is no diffusion of power, that “the social and economic conditions of the target country must be such as to confine political participation to as small fraction of the population.” In a more advanced country, such as a modern Western state, power is too diffuse to be easily and quickly seized, and the bureaucracy is widespread and sophisticated, unlikely to simply take orders from those it regards as breaking the rules of political community—and therefore a coup there is much harder. Other preconditions to coup feasibility include actual political independence (not being a client state of a great power) and having “organic unity,” not being merely a collection of regional power centers under a diaphanous central government.
As far as strategy, Luttwak focuses on “maximum speed in the transitional phase, and the need to fully neutralize the opposition both before and immediately after the coup.” Lack of speed exposes weakness, which there is certain to be, and makes it harder for the large “wait and see” contingent of uninvolved government workers to maintain neutrality. They will come over to the side of the coup if it succeeds, though—so it needs to succeed fast, to prevent them from instead choosing to back the existing rulers. Furthermore, achieving speed permits easier neutralization of both the armed defenses of the state and possible sources of major political (or religious) opposition. (Although Luttwak doesn’t mention it, lack of speed, because of lack of planning, along with “too many chiefs and not enough Indians,” was the problem with the Stauffenberg coup against Hitler.) To achieve speed, you must recruit adequate numbers of people, who can then be used, at the right moment, “to displace the government from its control of [the state].” Usually, that means you have to recruit from within the armed forces of the state you are trying to subvert (unless there is a party militia or similar group—but that requires money). Luttwak spends quite a bit of time analyzing at what level and with what tools to subvert the military, using real-life examples such as the Portuguese army in 1967 (when there was not a coup—it’s just a structural example). He distinguishes how to approach leaders, who can bring along fighting men, and technicians, such as air traffic controllers, who can help by preventing effective response by the opposition (and by running TV and radio stations, etc.). He recommends how to frame the initial discussions with those one is trying to subvert (this part is especially good). Luttwak also discusses quasi-military potentially oppositional forces, such as the Paris police force, concluding that in most cases they should be ignored and dealt with after the coup. Finally, he offers rules for compartmentalization and maintaining as much secrecy as possible, while recognizing that the existing regime will certainly get wind that “something is up.” Thus, minimizing actual information that gets to the state security services (and limiting the damage if someone turns), while maximizing “noise,” is necessary.
Next Luttwak covers planning, here focusing on the 1961 Algerian/French coup attempt, which de Gaulle successfully defeated, and also on a successful attempt (one of many) in Syria in 1961. Luttwak’s main point is that mere control of the military is inadequate; some thought must be given to planning to control, neutralize, or defeat political opposition during and immediately after the coup, especially with the role that social media plays today. (Again, Luttwak wrote before the 2016 Turkish coup attempt, but social media played a critical role in defeating that attempt.) Here, Luttwak focuses heavily on “personalities,” by which he means charismatic leaders who must be “neutralized”—i.e., kidnapped or killed at the very beginning of the coup, although he only refers obliquely to that second option. He also discusses geography of control, the blocking of roads, and so forth. Finally, he focuses on group neutralization, from trade unions to religious bodies to political parties, where a powerful enough political group (he uses as an example the National Rifle Association) can slow down the consolidation of an initially successful coup such that it “provokes conflicts that re-open the whole issue.”
And, finally, we get execution of the coup. What is necessary is total commitment, immediately as soon as adequate infiltration of the armed forces is achieved, along with simultaneous execution of the plan such that the warning functions of the state are simultaneously triggered at all areas of action (rather than sequentially), and avoiding actual fighting if at all possible, strongly preferring immobilization of opposing forces, while the actual levers of government are seized. Creating ambiguity and confusion on the part of the forces of the state is critical; when presented with what looks like a fait accompli, it will be a fait accompli. The coup plotters also must not allow a single “headquarters” target on their side to exist such that it can be decapitated. Each team executing the coup must know enough about their own mission (with the details only provided at the last minute), but only about their own mission. And once opposing forces are immobilized and the coup plotters have the levers of power, and control media outlets, they broadcast messages intended to both reassure and intimidate. QED.
This is all incisively and well written. I suspect it is not quite updated enough from 1968; for example, I think that while it mentions social media, it does not emphasize its role enough, nor how best to neutralize its effect, whether you’re the state trying to prevent a coup or plotters trying after the coup begins to neutralize political opposition that may slow down your coup or prevent coordination of civilians against your actions. How does one kill Twitter or Facebook in a country, other than by wholly shutting the Internet down (because it is quite easy to evade filters and blocks, if you are motivated enough)? This question is a bit more complex than it seems, though, because it assumes that Facebook, Twitter, and the other “GAFA companies” are opposed to tyranny and will allow themselves to be used to combat tyranny, or at a minimum remain neutral in a conflict. This is false; their decision dynamic is totally different. It boils down to (a) in large markets, actively cooperate with tyranny, and (b) in small markets, assist leftists in power and harm any Right activity, whether in power or not. Thus, in large markets like China and India, the GAFA companies already actively cooperate to suppress opposition (or would in India if the Indian government wanted it), and would certainly eagerly subject themselves to total clampdown at the demand of the state, as during a coup attempt. For example, Google in recent weeks has been openly coordinating with the Chinese government to allow the suppression of any information searches frowned on by the government. We can be certain if there were active opposition to the Chinese government, the GAFA companies would fall all over themselves to obey the Party and do their very best to keep the Party on top, although I should note that as of now, this is of limited importance to the Party, because none of the GAFA companies are as dominant as local Chinese options for the same activities, such as Baidu and Weibo, all of which are also under the iron control of the government. (Whether the GAFA companies would cooperate with a large Right tyranny is uncertain, though; the desire to harm the Right might override the desire for profits. If, for example, the Russian government faced a coup, Putin, unlike Xi Jinping, could not count on Google’s and Jack Dorsey’s help.)
As to smaller markets, the GAFA companies were happy to allow Erdogan to use social media to combat the 2016 coup, not because Erdogan was democratically elected, but because he is Islamist, and Islamists are a “victim group” in the eyes of the Left, in essence honorary leftists. (Sure, his opponents were Muslims, too, but not real Muslims for leftist victim-card purposes, since they were secularist military men in the Ataturk mold. Whether the GAFA companies also actively suppressed use of the social media by them, I don’t know, but it seems unlikely social media was part of their plan.) But we can be certain that if the Left launched a coup against, say, the Hungarian or Polish governments, the GAFA companies would do all in their power to assist the coup to overthrow the legitimate government, and to harm the government’s ability to use social media to coordinate a response. Democracy is irrelevant; what is relevant is that those who rule the GAFA companies, and who therefore increasingly rule us, would desperately want the coup, and any Left coup, to succeed in seizing power. (The same principle can be seen in the current massive censorship of conservative thought across all social media, while overt calls for violence from the Left are always totally ignored.) Thus, from the perspective of any Right coup, social media is a significant problem, and from the perspective of any Left coup, a way to start the race ahead of the starting line. The only possible answer is for us to totally break the power of the GAFA companies, since it’s not like Viktor Orbán can do it from his perch in Budapest, so we must do it for him, but that is a topic for another day.
It is tempting to try to map Luttwak’s analysis onto the present day. On the Left, we hear that Trump is leading a coup against America, though what that means is pretty unclear. On the Right, we hear that the Deep State is attempting to overthrow Trump. Leaving aside the truth of either claim, neither of these is much like the types of coups that Luttwak analyzes. I think it is true that the Deep State, basically consisting of pushers of global neoliberal hegemony combined with pushers of vicious left-wing social politics, wants Trump gone. But just because Trump let his opponents create, in the Mephistophalean person of Robert Mueller, a witch-hunting task force of unlimited power devoted to the single goal of destroying him, doesn’t mean that, even if they succeed, there has been a coup. After all, Trump doesn’t even control most of the levers of government now—his opponents do. They are just trying to keep it that way.
I suppose there could be a coup in America someday. Certainly power is not as diffused as it used to be, which makes America increasingly “backward” in Luttwak’s definition. We have the possibility of well-armed militias. We have a politicized and hollowed-out military, where the best men are passed over for advancement in favor of women and homosexuals, doubtless causing the type of resentment Luttwak portrays as fertile ground for coup recruiting (as when recently the Marine Corps ended the career of the prominent and popular Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Mainz, for the sin of referring to administrative make-work as “faggot stuff”). And Luttwak himself identifies circumstances in which highly developed countries may become vulnerable to a coup, like France in 1961: “severe and prolonged economic crisis . . . a long and unsuccessful war or a major defeat . . . or chronic instability under a multiparty system.” But Luttwak is generally right—the principles of his book aren’t really relevant to America or modern Western Europe, whatever problems we may have. That doesn’t make his book any less interesting, and who knows, maybe it will rise in relevance to our situation. That’s certainly more likely than a zombie invasion!
February 24, 2011
If all political science books were of this caliber, I probably wouldn't regret having minored in it. This was a fascinating discussion of how a standard coup d'etat actually works, what is required to make one work, etc. I may have organized the book a little differently; some of the chapter headings didn't quite fit the material. But that's a really minor criticism, and this was the best political science book I have ever read.
March 2, 2022
Accurate title.
June 7, 2017
The 2016 edition adds some good new stuff on post-1968 events, especially the potential impacts of social media and other new technologies, but the core elements were already present in the original edition. Overall, a great read and interesting analysis of actual coups d'État and their common elements, rich in insight and wit.
July 27, 2019
اكثرما اثار عجبي مناقشة الكاتب للدول من حيث القابلية للانقلاب . دول العالم الثالث عندها قابلية عالية للانقلاب و يذكر ذلك بحديث مالك بن نبي عن القابلية للاستعمار .
الموضوع الثاني في الملحق عن التنمية الاقتصادية يتحدث الكاتب عن كيف تسيطر علي البلد و ان احد من ادوات السيطيرة عدم القيام بالتنمية . فالتنمية ترفع الوعي مما يؤدي بالاطاحة بالانقلاب و ان الصرف يجب ان يركز على اجهزة القمع و الدعاية لانقاع المواطنين بنجاح الدولة و هذا الامر يساعد علي خفض الدخل .الازم لبقاء الدولة
الموضوع الثاني في الملحق عن التنمية الاقتصادية يتحدث الكاتب عن كيف تسيطر علي البلد و ان احد من ادوات السيطيرة عدم القيام بالتنمية . فالتنمية ترفع الوعي مما يؤدي بالاطاحة بالانقلاب و ان الصرف يجب ان يركز على اجهزة القمع و الدعاية لانقاع المواطنين بنجاح الدولة و هذا الامر يساعد علي خفض الدخل .الازم لبقاء الدولة
March 8, 2019
It’s a classic for a reason. I took off one star because the writing was uneven. There were great sections and lines but there were also some really awkward sentence structures. All in all, a very interesting book, and I think it helps that the edition I read was recently updated.
January 21, 2022
In a way, I consider the last few weeks of reading
Memory, Sorrow, and Thorn
to have been a pleasant indulgence. Fantasy was my first true love in reading, even if it was the Little House on the Prairie series that pulled me into reading anything substantial; before that, all I would read were these little nonfiction pamphlets on things like circuits and zoology that were mostly pictures. It will probably always be my true reading love, no matter how much I enjoy classic science fiction, or am endlessly fascinated by the things I learn in the historical and nonfiction pieces that I read.
As they say, however, variety is the spice of life, and the herb is time, so while we ponder what the protein of this peculiarly seasoned dish of life might be, I knew fully well that I would be reading several nonfiction books after finishing my semi-accidental trilogy read. I was even looking forward to it, though I had yet to decide what I would read. Eventually, I settled on Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook , which has been on my reading list for so long that I no longer remember how it landed there in the first place. While it may not be a fantasy novel, it was absolutely an interesting book, and an excellent transition back into the "real world."
That title is no understatement. Bloodied copies of this book have been purportedly discovered amongst the most worn possessions of failed coup leaders, which Luttwak is quick to disclaim as being evidence that they did not amply take to heart his text’s lessons, and not a suggestion that his instructions are flawed. I’m inclined to support his assertion, as while the book can be quite granular in its instructions, I could well see it being difficult to properly execute all of these steps, and even a coup attempted perfectly compliant with these instructions might not succeed if certain pieces don’t behave appropriately.
This might be a good time for a disclaimer: I am not advocating for a coup d'état. I don’t have any intentions of staging a coup, of participating in a coup, or of supporting a coup, anywhere. Just as the author asserts that he originally wrote the book as a piece of political science attempting to explain the phenomenon that is the coup d'état, which he found other treatments failed to do adequately, I read this book for its historical and political science information, not for the ‘practical handbook’ side of the equation (although I would be curious to know how the author came up with the quite brilliant idea of framing his academic examination of coups as a self-help book for would-be coup masters). The closest I intend to follow this book’s instructions is in having my characters conduct more realistic government overthrows if the book and the plot and the world are appropriate for such a maneuver. Hopefully that will assuage the worries of any intelligence analysts who flagged this post; there’s no need to add me to any lists.
Speaking of the world being appropriate for such a maneuver, one of the most immediate and useful pieces of information in the whole book was a discussion on just what constitutes a coup d'état. The definition, according to Luttwak, is quite distinctive, and cleanly separates coups from other forms of government overthrow, like revolutions, civil wars, insurrections, putsches, and foreign takeovers. Three main factors make coups distinct in this paradigm: they are fundamentally non-ideological and serve purely to elevate the coup leaders and their associates without an associated significant change in governance, when properly executed they ought to be bloodless or close to it, and they are inextricably dependent upon the modern bureaucratic state apparatus.
So yes, while you might have preconceived notions of coups as violent overthrows of the rightful government by the evil forces of the far right military generals, I’m afraid that would actually be considered a putsch. You probably also have notions about what sorts of countries are likely to be susceptible to coups: they’re probably in places like Africa, South America, and the Middle East. While some of the Middle Eastern events could arguably be called something other than coups, that debate is beyond the scope of this post or of the book; I have several entire books on my reading list specifically studying the complexities of that region and why it has its current characteristics. More interesting to me were the mentions of coups in places that you probably don’t associate so readily with coups: places like Spain, or Italy, or even France (if I recall correctly, although I also think that particular coup failed).
Which bring us to the conditions that make a government ripe for a coup, which seems to be one of the main reasons that Luttwak wrote this handbook, and his discussion provides several fascinating insights. Key conditions he identifies include: an illiterate and/or poorly educated populace unaccustomed to political involvement, a complex state bureaucratic apparatus, and a minimally legitimate/active current government leadership. This is quite illustrative, I think, of why many of the states where a US-style constitution was put in place failed to become successful and stable democracies and ultimately fell victim to coups and other forceful changes in government. It also prompts the observation that, while today the post-colonial movement is viewed as a moral awakening, at the time it was a more economic consideration: the European colonial powers were broke following World War II, and could no longer sustain their colonial investments.
Mostly I’ve focused here on the theoretical discussions that this book includes about the underpinnings of coups, but it’s not referred to as a “Practical Handbook” for nothing; Luttwak is unafraid to dig into the gritty details of such technical matters as recruiting participants in your coup, avoiding the local intelligence services, picking and prioritizing targets, assembling a timeline, composing teams, and even where to place roadblocks. He provides thorough examples and references, and case studies of both successful and failed coups. The book as a whole is addressed and written as if the reader were in fact trying to plan a coup and conspiring with the author, and it is structured accordingly.
I don’t know if you looked at the title of this post and thought that it looked like an interesting book, or if you thought more “what crazy thing is he reading now,” but it really was a fascinating, and surprisingly quick read. Again, I don’t encourage you to plan to overthrow your government, but I do encourage you to read this book.
January 6, 2024
I first read this work at university shortly after it was published and have kept it near ever since. Edward Luttwak has in fact written a “handbook” that in five chapters offers clear and concise insights into the theory and the mechanics of the transfer of political power via the use or threatened use of armed force. In this surprisingly compact volume, he discusses what is a coup d’etat, when is it possible, and how to plan and execute a coup d’etat. Furthermore, he links this analysis to the historical record, repeatedly citing real world examples that were the basis for his work. Finally, he provides some 20 pages of appendices that provide much of the historical record and analytical background to the book’s main theses. I had an opportunity to test Mr. Luttwak’s work in December 1979. I was then on duty as an intelligence watch officer at the Department of State in Washington as Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. Although the Soviet Union claimed that its forces had been invited in by the regime in Kabul, the arrival and movement of those forces in Kabul made it soon evident that their actions, which meticulously followed Luttwak’s script, were intended to give them full and unimpeded sole control of Kabul and Afghanistan. This small volume represents a valuable contribution to the political scientist’s understanding of how armed political changes work and to the historian’s understanding of how such changes have taken place over the years – this book is highly recommended and may be one of the most valuable single volumes in your library.
September 21, 2020
Not sure I'd go taking practical advice on positioning troops from a college professor who never served a day in the military, but as with most things from Luttwak, this book on coups makes for very interesting reading. The meat of the work is in the analysis of what the actual strengths and weaknesses of the incumbent regime are, and he offers some not so obvious insights. As an example, a government may have a powerful military, but it may be of little use to the sitting president if a good portion of it is deployed overseas (and that would tend to be the most capable part). Or police forces may do little to protect the current government as they tend to be staffed with men looking mostly to their own careers and pensions as opposed to having any particular loyalty to whoever happens to be el presidente at the moment.
One idiosyncratic feature of the book is a frequent derogatory tone the author takes to individuals/groups that are not of his mindset. He adds the parenthetical quote of "Wrong as usual" to a comment by Hannah Arendt. He tosses in a thought that he is mystified why Islamists don't want to allow women full political rights. One gets the sense he finds political outlooks other than his own to be rather distasteful with coups being a symptom of a particular sort of brutishness. His analysis is interesting but be aware that his own provincial outlook may cloud some of his pronouncements.
One idiosyncratic feature of the book is a frequent derogatory tone the author takes to individuals/groups that are not of his mindset. He adds the parenthetical quote of "Wrong as usual" to a comment by Hannah Arendt. He tosses in a thought that he is mystified why Islamists don't want to allow women full political rights. One gets the sense he finds political outlooks other than his own to be rather distasteful with coups being a symptom of a particular sort of brutishness. His analysis is interesting but be aware that his own provincial outlook may cloud some of his pronouncements.
January 8, 2022
Luttwak är en av de där statsvetarna som det är svårt att ta sig runt, om man är intresserad av staters överlevnadschanser. Denna bok är en studie i hur framgångsrika kuppmakare strukturerade sina försök till maktövertaganden. Den är ärlig, genomarbetad och trevlig - i alla fall så trevlig en bok som hanterar det ämne denna gör kan vara. Detta sagt innehåller den inte speciellt mycket som är förvånande - kuppmakarnas behov av att rättfärdiga sitt brott och deras behov av att appellera till äldre värden som folket förstår är belagt av historien, och explicit i t.ex. den ärorika revolutionen i Storbritannien, såväl som i Sten Stures upprorsdeklaration här hemma.
Även om den inte är ny, är innehållet värdefullt, framförallt för de som är statsvetenskapsnördar men inte historienördar. Jag rekommenderar den för dessa.
Även om den inte är ny, är innehållet värdefullt, framförallt för de som är statsvetenskapsnördar men inte historienördar. Jag rekommenderar den för dessa.
September 11, 2018
Book remains quite theoretical and dry most of the time, would have been quite easy to base it's theories on facts from the dozens of revolutions that are listed in the appendix; unfortunately, real world examples are few and far between. My edition was updated recently and takes into account very recent developments such as social media, however I think the changes on the subject brought by those technological advances have a much more profound impact on the topic of this book as the author acknowledges. Interesting from a historical perspective at best.
December 11, 2011
Applied political science. Realistic treatment of statist institutions, and highly detailed with historical examples. Its dated by now (1968), but it was written in the heyday of coup d'etats, so its also sort of a historical book on how they went down (ideally).
October 7, 2023
The new edition is one third larger
.........
Chapter 2 When Is a Coup d’État Possible?
The process of decolonization that started soon after the end of the Second World War first doubled and then more than tripled the number of independent states, so that the opportunities open to us have expanded in a most gratifying manner. We have to recognize, however, that not all states make good targets for our attentions.
There is nothing to prevent us from carrying out a coup in, say, the United Kingdom, but we would probably be unable to stay in power for more than a short time.
Chapter 5 The Execution of the Coup d’État
if speed is very often important in military operations, in the coup it is an essential requirement
.......
Harvard blurb
Coup d’État astonished readers when it first appeared in 1968 because it showed, step by step, how governments could be overthrown. Translated into sixteen languages, it has inspired anti-coup precautions by regimes around the world. In addition to these detailed instructions, Edward Luttwak’s revised handbook offers an altogether new way of looking at political power—one that considers, for example, the vulnerability to coups of even the most stable democracies in the event of prolonged economic distress.
The world has changed dramatically in the past half century, but not the essence of the coup d’état. It still requires the secret recruitment of military officers who command the loyalty of units well placed to seize important headquarters and key hubs in the capital city. The support of the armed forces as a whole is needed only in the aftermath, to avoid countercoups. And mass support is largely irrelevant, although passive acceptance is essential. To ensure it, violence must be kept to a minimum. The ideal coup is swift and bloodless. Very violent coups rarely succeed, and if they trigger a bloody civil war they fail utterly.
Luttwak identifies conditions that make countries vulnerable to a coup, and he outlines the necessary stages of planning, from recruitment of coconspirators to postcoup promises of progress and stability. But much more broadly, his investigation of coups—updated for the twenty-first century—uncovers important truths about the nature of political power.
---
Acknowledgment
Preface to the 2016 Edition
Preface to the First Edition
Foreword by Walter Laqueur (1978)
1. What Is the Coup d’État?
2. When Is a Coup d’État Possible?
3. The Strategy of the Coup d’État
4. The Planning of the Coup d’État
5. The Execution of the Coup d’État
Appendix A. The Economics of Repression
Appendix B. Tactical Aspects of the Coup d’État
Appendix C. Statistics
Index
---
Figures
4.1. Alternative forms of government
4.2. The formal government and the real one
4.3. Telecommunication facilities available to governments
4.4. The physical targets of the coup
4.5. Physical targets in a coastal city
5.1. Operational sequence and timing
5.2. Intelligence “noise” and analysis
5.3. Lead time required by teams to reach their targets
5.4. Simultaneous penetration of the defensive warning system
A.1. Political survival limit on taxation
A.2. The Duvalier formula
B.1. “Sophisticated” seizure of major defended targets
B.2. General structure of blocking position
C.1. Frequency of coups d’état, 1950–2010
C.2. Proportion of successful vs. failed coups d’état, 1950–2010
C.3. Frequency of coups d’état by region, 1950–2010 (stacked)
C.4. Frequency of coups d’état by region, 1950–2010 (unstacked)
C.5. Distribution of coups d’état by region, 1945–1965
C.6. Distribution of coups d’état by region, 1966–2010
Tables
3.1. Formal structures and real chains of command
3.2. Country X: potential forces of intervention
3.3. Optimum infiltration strategy
3.4. The role of ethnic minorities in Syrian politics
3.5. Class of 19– at military academy of Country X: present career position
3.6. The Aref brothers in Iraq, 1958–1966: a study in loyalty
3.7. Battalion No. 1: recruitment prospects
3.8. Infiltration of the armed forces in Portugal
3.9. Infiltration of the armed forces in Germany
4.1. Groups that try to influence US policies in the Middle East
4.2. Alternative forms of government
4.3. Mass communications in the Middle East and North Africa, mid-1967
4.4. Police telecommunication facilities in Ghana, 1967
5.1. The mechanics of intervention of the loyalist forces
5.2. The first communiqué: a choice of styles
B.1. Eve of the coup: forces of the state fully subverted
C.1. Economic development and the coup d’état, 1945–2010
C.2. Basic list of coups and attempted coups, 1945–2010
C.3. The efficiency of the coup d’état, 1945–2010: outcome as a function of main party
C.4. The frequency of the coup d’état: region and time distribution of coup, 1945–2010
.........
Chapter 2 When Is a Coup d’État Possible?
The process of decolonization that started soon after the end of the Second World War first doubled and then more than tripled the number of independent states, so that the opportunities open to us have expanded in a most gratifying manner. We have to recognize, however, that not all states make good targets for our attentions.
There is nothing to prevent us from carrying out a coup in, say, the United Kingdom, but we would probably be unable to stay in power for more than a short time.
Chapter 5 The Execution of the Coup d’État
if speed is very often important in military operations, in the coup it is an essential requirement
.......
Harvard blurb
Coup d’État astonished readers when it first appeared in 1968 because it showed, step by step, how governments could be overthrown. Translated into sixteen languages, it has inspired anti-coup precautions by regimes around the world. In addition to these detailed instructions, Edward Luttwak’s revised handbook offers an altogether new way of looking at political power—one that considers, for example, the vulnerability to coups of even the most stable democracies in the event of prolonged economic distress.
The world has changed dramatically in the past half century, but not the essence of the coup d’état. It still requires the secret recruitment of military officers who command the loyalty of units well placed to seize important headquarters and key hubs in the capital city. The support of the armed forces as a whole is needed only in the aftermath, to avoid countercoups. And mass support is largely irrelevant, although passive acceptance is essential. To ensure it, violence must be kept to a minimum. The ideal coup is swift and bloodless. Very violent coups rarely succeed, and if they trigger a bloody civil war they fail utterly.
Luttwak identifies conditions that make countries vulnerable to a coup, and he outlines the necessary stages of planning, from recruitment of coconspirators to postcoup promises of progress and stability. But much more broadly, his investigation of coups—updated for the twenty-first century—uncovers important truths about the nature of political power.
---
Acknowledgment
Preface to the 2016 Edition
Preface to the First Edition
Foreword by Walter Laqueur (1978)
1. What Is the Coup d’État?
2. When Is a Coup d’État Possible?
3. The Strategy of the Coup d’État
4. The Planning of the Coup d’État
5. The Execution of the Coup d’État
Appendix A. The Economics of Repression
Appendix B. Tactical Aspects of the Coup d’État
Appendix C. Statistics
Index
---
Figures
4.1. Alternative forms of government
4.2. The formal government and the real one
4.3. Telecommunication facilities available to governments
4.4. The physical targets of the coup
4.5. Physical targets in a coastal city
5.1. Operational sequence and timing
5.2. Intelligence “noise” and analysis
5.3. Lead time required by teams to reach their targets
5.4. Simultaneous penetration of the defensive warning system
A.1. Political survival limit on taxation
A.2. The Duvalier formula
B.1. “Sophisticated” seizure of major defended targets
B.2. General structure of blocking position
C.1. Frequency of coups d’état, 1950–2010
C.2. Proportion of successful vs. failed coups d’état, 1950–2010
C.3. Frequency of coups d’état by region, 1950–2010 (stacked)
C.4. Frequency of coups d’état by region, 1950–2010 (unstacked)
C.5. Distribution of coups d’état by region, 1945–1965
C.6. Distribution of coups d’état by region, 1966–2010
Tables
3.1. Formal structures and real chains of command
3.2. Country X: potential forces of intervention
3.3. Optimum infiltration strategy
3.4. The role of ethnic minorities in Syrian politics
3.5. Class of 19– at military academy of Country X: present career position
3.6. The Aref brothers in Iraq, 1958–1966: a study in loyalty
3.7. Battalion No. 1: recruitment prospects
3.8. Infiltration of the armed forces in Portugal
3.9. Infiltration of the armed forces in Germany
4.1. Groups that try to influence US policies in the Middle East
4.2. Alternative forms of government
4.3. Mass communications in the Middle East and North Africa, mid-1967
4.4. Police telecommunication facilities in Ghana, 1967
5.1. The mechanics of intervention of the loyalist forces
5.2. The first communiqué: a choice of styles
B.1. Eve of the coup: forces of the state fully subverted
C.1. Economic development and the coup d’état, 1945–2010
C.2. Basic list of coups and attempted coups, 1945–2010
C.3. The efficiency of the coup d’état, 1945–2010: outcome as a function of main party
C.4. The frequency of the coup d’état: region and time distribution of coup, 1945–2010
June 20, 2023
Edward Luttwak’s “Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook,” first published in 1968, is an examination of the conditions, strategy, planning, and execution of the coup d’Etat. Several revised editions of the book have since been published, the latest in 2016. Luttwak, is a veteran of the Six-Day War and a political scientist who has also published works on strategy, military history, and international politics. He also has provided consulting services to foreign governments and enterprises, as well as the U.S. intelligence community and the U.S. military.
Luttwak is by nature a Machiavellian; his analysis is one that most American readers will deem unsettling. Although political reality is generally at variance with the moral, constitutional or legalistic rhetoric which surrounds political actions, most of us are still shocked by this fact. Aristotle notwithstanding, politics is not about “the common good" or other such rationalizations. In short, politics is about the process by which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.
Luttwak explains in clinical detail how to seize power in a variety of states, includes a vast array of historical illustrations, and shares numerous charts and tables to aid and abet the would-be man on horseback. And, as if to further flummox his critics, it was rumored that Luttwak was highly gratified to learn that a copy of Coup d’Etat was found on the General Mohamed Oufkir’s body following the failed 1972 Moroccan Coup.
Luttwak’s work has been recommended reading in courses organized by the CIA, and the State Department as a step-by-step guide to the efficient overthrow of inconvenient governments, but alas, its information was already widely understood by nearly every army and police officer in what was once derisively termed, the “Third World.”. Indubitably, plotters with a sardonic sense of humor probably benefited from the author’s incisive analysis of the different types of communiqué that can be employed to announce their nation’s pending political deliverance; however, once again, it is safe to assert that this information, albeit shocking to many in the West, was also common knowledge throughout the developing world.
In our hemisphere, Grenada served as a petri dish for Luttwak's observations. In 1974, the Grenadian Eric Gairy assumed the reigns of power following the country's decision to opt to become a Commonwealth nation. Gairy's invocation of nationalistic bombast, and his hackneyed calumny attributing all failures to neo-colonialism eventually wore thin. Gairy left Grenada in 1979, to address the U.N. General Assembly and warn of the imminent threat posed by UFOs. While in New York, Maurice Bishop, a communist ideologue, seized power in a nearly bloodless, textbook coup.
The subsequent behavior of this Marxist clique, led to direct U.S. intervention to oust Bishop's New Jewel Movement, along with their Cuban and East German overlords. In point of fact, the U.S. operational plan-Urgent Fury-cribbed heavily from Luttwak's "Coup d'etat." The need for speed informed all planning. With an absence of indigenous forces capable of action, and a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the political disposition of the PRA, U.S. troops seized the island's airports, blockaded key roads, captured the government house, sealed off two U.S. medical campuses, and occupied Grenada's sole radio station. After encountering surprisingly little resistance, U.S. forces promptly returned Governor Sir Paul Scoon to power. And, as per Luttwak, the new regime issued a communique which brought to bear a fulgent flower of lofty rhetoric to justify the violent incursion.
Luttwak's study predated the cyberage. Thus, his discussion of mass media, in general, and his prescriptive measures to control the dissemination of information, in particular, are no longer operative. That said, Luttwak provided us with a concise analysis of coups d'État that was both timely and important; moreover, Luttwak delivered his analysis with humility and wit.
Luttwak is by nature a Machiavellian; his analysis is one that most American readers will deem unsettling. Although political reality is generally at variance with the moral, constitutional or legalistic rhetoric which surrounds political actions, most of us are still shocked by this fact. Aristotle notwithstanding, politics is not about “the common good" or other such rationalizations. In short, politics is about the process by which values are authoritatively allocated for a society.
Luttwak explains in clinical detail how to seize power in a variety of states, includes a vast array of historical illustrations, and shares numerous charts and tables to aid and abet the would-be man on horseback. And, as if to further flummox his critics, it was rumored that Luttwak was highly gratified to learn that a copy of Coup d’Etat was found on the General Mohamed Oufkir’s body following the failed 1972 Moroccan Coup.
Luttwak’s work has been recommended reading in courses organized by the CIA, and the State Department as a step-by-step guide to the efficient overthrow of inconvenient governments, but alas, its information was already widely understood by nearly every army and police officer in what was once derisively termed, the “Third World.”. Indubitably, plotters with a sardonic sense of humor probably benefited from the author’s incisive analysis of the different types of communiqué that can be employed to announce their nation’s pending political deliverance; however, once again, it is safe to assert that this information, albeit shocking to many in the West, was also common knowledge throughout the developing world.
In our hemisphere, Grenada served as a petri dish for Luttwak's observations. In 1974, the Grenadian Eric Gairy assumed the reigns of power following the country's decision to opt to become a Commonwealth nation. Gairy's invocation of nationalistic bombast, and his hackneyed calumny attributing all failures to neo-colonialism eventually wore thin. Gairy left Grenada in 1979, to address the U.N. General Assembly and warn of the imminent threat posed by UFOs. While in New York, Maurice Bishop, a communist ideologue, seized power in a nearly bloodless, textbook coup.
The subsequent behavior of this Marxist clique, led to direct U.S. intervention to oust Bishop's New Jewel Movement, along with their Cuban and East German overlords. In point of fact, the U.S. operational plan-Urgent Fury-cribbed heavily from Luttwak's "Coup d'etat." The need for speed informed all planning. With an absence of indigenous forces capable of action, and a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the political disposition of the PRA, U.S. troops seized the island's airports, blockaded key roads, captured the government house, sealed off two U.S. medical campuses, and occupied Grenada's sole radio station. After encountering surprisingly little resistance, U.S. forces promptly returned Governor Sir Paul Scoon to power. And, as per Luttwak, the new regime issued a communique which brought to bear a fulgent flower of lofty rhetoric to justify the violent incursion.
Luttwak's study predated the cyberage. Thus, his discussion of mass media, in general, and his prescriptive measures to control the dissemination of information, in particular, are no longer operative. That said, Luttwak provided us with a concise analysis of coups d'État that was both timely and important; moreover, Luttwak delivered his analysis with humility and wit.
February 28, 2018
In contrast to my blazing speed the previous year, I'm five books behind schedule. I may be tired from the efforts I made last year, but that's no excuse, and I see myself improving.
One of the more curious phenomena in political maneuvering is the coup d'etat. In more recent years, those initiated against then-President Corazon Aquino were the most significant, and the 1989 one led by Gregorio Honasan was the most serious. A coup d'etat is an overthrow of the state with the use of military forces, or other state elites.
In this short work, Luttwak absolutely hit the nail on the head. Staging a coup d'etat is never easy, and the most important reason as to why it's difficult to execute is the exactness of its tempo. The coup must be executed explosively and efficiently, so as the opposition (the ruling government) cannot have time to establish defenses. Not only that, however, it must also have the support of the people, in addition to the support of the army. Any leakage of information, any loss of tempo, and any obstacles difficult to overcome will usually terminate the coup prematurely.
The 1989 coup failed because Aquino was a popular president, and a beacon of hope against the rampant corruption manifested during Marcos's era. Most importantly, however, the coup plotters failed to address among the most important issues in staging a coup: international aid and involvement must be prevented at all costs. Pertinent to this point was Luttwak's statement regarding the coup against Kwame Nkrumah, who was the dictator of Ghana during the early 1960s. As Nkrumah himself was not in his own homeland, it was much easier for his army to take control of even those "ceremonial" buildings such as Ghana's version of The White House. While essentially useless to their cause, it is symbolic of power, and according to Luttwak, must also be taken.
In spite of the fact that it is difficult to stage a successful coup, however, it was noted to be one of the most potent weapons of regime changes all over the world. It must also be noted that coups are only successful in "third-world" countries most of the time, because it will take so much more technicians in the first-world countries that it is almost impossible to execute. For example, it is much easier for disgruntled army men in Benin to revolt against a leader they dislike because there is a lack of Internet connectivity; in fact, there's even a lack of electricity. If contrasted to economic powerhouses such as the US and Germany, connectivity can never be stifled, and there simply have to be too many technicians and specialists to disable the entire political system that it is extremely difficult to realize.
To me, this book is a great work of modern political science that deserves examination for those discontented with the powers that be. While I'm not discontented, it's just illuminating to know about the machinations behind the coup d'etat, which Luttwak ably wrote about.
One of the more curious phenomena in political maneuvering is the coup d'etat. In more recent years, those initiated against then-President Corazon Aquino were the most significant, and the 1989 one led by Gregorio Honasan was the most serious. A coup d'etat is an overthrow of the state with the use of military forces, or other state elites.
In this short work, Luttwak absolutely hit the nail on the head. Staging a coup d'etat is never easy, and the most important reason as to why it's difficult to execute is the exactness of its tempo. The coup must be executed explosively and efficiently, so as the opposition (the ruling government) cannot have time to establish defenses. Not only that, however, it must also have the support of the people, in addition to the support of the army. Any leakage of information, any loss of tempo, and any obstacles difficult to overcome will usually terminate the coup prematurely.
The 1989 coup failed because Aquino was a popular president, and a beacon of hope against the rampant corruption manifested during Marcos's era. Most importantly, however, the coup plotters failed to address among the most important issues in staging a coup: international aid and involvement must be prevented at all costs. Pertinent to this point was Luttwak's statement regarding the coup against Kwame Nkrumah, who was the dictator of Ghana during the early 1960s. As Nkrumah himself was not in his own homeland, it was much easier for his army to take control of even those "ceremonial" buildings such as Ghana's version of The White House. While essentially useless to their cause, it is symbolic of power, and according to Luttwak, must also be taken.
In spite of the fact that it is difficult to stage a successful coup, however, it was noted to be one of the most potent weapons of regime changes all over the world. It must also be noted that coups are only successful in "third-world" countries most of the time, because it will take so much more technicians in the first-world countries that it is almost impossible to execute. For example, it is much easier for disgruntled army men in Benin to revolt against a leader they dislike because there is a lack of Internet connectivity; in fact, there's even a lack of electricity. If contrasted to economic powerhouses such as the US and Germany, connectivity can never be stifled, and there simply have to be too many technicians and specialists to disable the entire political system that it is extremely difficult to realize.
To me, this book is a great work of modern political science that deserves examination for those discontented with the powers that be. While I'm not discontented, it's just illuminating to know about the machinations behind the coup d'etat, which Luttwak ably wrote about.
March 7, 2023
I read this simply because I randomly ended up reading something else from Luttwak and decided to delve into his work a little more fully. I have to say, despite being over 50 years old, this handy little guide to running a coup still has something to say ... although I would be fascinated to see how many of Luttwak's principles hold up in an era where instant communications and multiple redundancies for key technology are the norm (especially for governments), where it is much, much easier to gather significant amounts of information about your citizenry, and where transportation options are faster and smoother than in the past. Even if there is a lot that wouldn't quite hold up, much of the psychology involved with a coup still seems to make a great deal of sense - especially the advice on who to target. And even though the internet has revolutionized communications and technology generally, those who are unwary may still find themselves vulnerable even to the more technologically minded advice like utilizing a small number of technical insiders to shut down communications. While a lot of what Luttwak says seems fairly clear or obvious once introduced, I'm not sure I would have thought to apply it in the way he does to the exercise of attempting a coup, which makes this an interesting and compelling read. Additionally, while some of his statements do seem somewhat simplistic, there's a great deal here that *isn't* necessarily obvious and presents some definite food for thought!
September 14, 2017
Straight ahead deep dive into the practical concerns of staging a coup. It reads very much as an academic text of the late 60's era. The author does a fine job right up front dispelling any romantic notions of fomenting a coup under any but a few optimal circumstances. He is clear the consequence of failure, and use historical examples to explain what does and does not work in planning a coup.
Principal among the prerequisites are access to principal players in existing government and intelligence about the nature of the government infrastructure. The book is good at being very politically neutral, appreciating that coups are coups irrespective of right or left leaning politics; his focus is squarely on the specific tactical aspects and planning of a coup more than, the philosophy or motivation behind a coup.
I learned a great deal about something I will never have the means or resources to achieve, nor am I sure it is a good lasting solution to present domestic political circumstances. In fact, reading the book makes it clear that the US governmental structure would make a coup almost impossible due to the high functioning and redundant lines of communication, disparate reporting lines of military and educated enough electorate schooled in expectations of governance. So there's that...
Principal among the prerequisites are access to principal players in existing government and intelligence about the nature of the government infrastructure. The book is good at being very politically neutral, appreciating that coups are coups irrespective of right or left leaning politics; his focus is squarely on the specific tactical aspects and planning of a coup more than, the philosophy or motivation behind a coup.
I learned a great deal about something I will never have the means or resources to achieve, nor am I sure it is a good lasting solution to present domestic political circumstances. In fact, reading the book makes it clear that the US governmental structure would make a coup almost impossible due to the high functioning and redundant lines of communication, disparate reporting lines of military and educated enough electorate schooled in expectations of governance. So there's that...
February 1, 2022
If you’re going to attempt to overthrow your government, then you could do worse than at least know what you’re getting into. Some books make no attempt at moralising and just tell you how it is - this is one such book. Again, it’s been on my shelf, unread for years and perhaps it was the recent speculation aired in The Crown that Mountbatten was involved in exploratory talks to stage a coup during Harold Wilson’s government in the 70s that reminded me once again that I should read Luttwak’s delightfully cynical and amoral guide.... He doesn’t deal in politics or the reasons for wanting to tackle the established order; he just wants you to know what you need to do to neutralise opposition and stage as bloodless and efficient a coup as possible. He also points out in a lengthy appendix just how many coups actually fail and what prevailing socio-political conditions need to exist for it to succeed. This was written in the late 60s in the heady aftermath of May ‘68 in France and a host of coups in relatively newly established post-colonial states. Rather hard to imagine this being widely published now.... and of course there’d be some rather different dynamics to contend with. #guehennoreads #booksofinstagram #booksof2020
December 27, 2023
One particular Americanism is the study of civics in high school. This is not something universal, and it is maybe instructive to reflect on why it isn’t, i.e. why some governments prefer their citizens not to understand the machinery of state. In any case, lacking such an education in civics, Coup d’Etat was a fascinating deconstructionist introduction to the subject – in this case, perhaps literally deconstructionist in that it gives a practical guide to penetrating and manipulating the state. Luttwak’s book has the unique honour of having been practically used as a guide in several coups, with bloodied copies of it found on the desks of recently deceased conspirators in the wake of failed coup attempts.
In reading Coup d’Etat, I had hoped for a selection of case studies along with distilled lessons. Unfortunately, the book is instead more of a step-by-step guide to orchestrating a coup, which goes into the prosaic details like giving you a table template to identify which figures of the government need to be neutralised – though I am fairly amused by the thought of modern coup conspirators setting this up in Notion. The book is therefore dry at times, and it is hard to feel like you are getting deep insight, but perhaps this highlights the important lesson is that coups are often technical feats of statecraft rather than violent military upheavals.
The most interesting part of Coup d’Etat is its preface, which strikes me as highly controversial, maybe even “cancellable” in some circles. He takes a remarkably reactionary view against decolonisation, not going so far as arguing that colonialism was a good thing, but unambiguously saying that many “backwards countries” (his words, to be clear) became independent too soon. If one can suppress outrage long enough to consider his argument, especially in the context of his deep study of the history of coups, his hypothesis is hard to immediately reject.
I could see the book being a useful reference to help understand an ongoing coup. Still, generally, I did not come away from Coup d’Etat feeling like I had a significantly richer knowledge of history or politics.
My highlights here.
In reading Coup d’Etat, I had hoped for a selection of case studies along with distilled lessons. Unfortunately, the book is instead more of a step-by-step guide to orchestrating a coup, which goes into the prosaic details like giving you a table template to identify which figures of the government need to be neutralised – though I am fairly amused by the thought of modern coup conspirators setting this up in Notion. The book is therefore dry at times, and it is hard to feel like you are getting deep insight, but perhaps this highlights the important lesson is that coups are often technical feats of statecraft rather than violent military upheavals.
The most interesting part of Coup d’Etat is its preface, which strikes me as highly controversial, maybe even “cancellable” in some circles. He takes a remarkably reactionary view against decolonisation, not going so far as arguing that colonialism was a good thing, but unambiguously saying that many “backwards countries” (his words, to be clear) became independent too soon. If one can suppress outrage long enough to consider his argument, especially in the context of his deep study of the history of coups, his hypothesis is hard to immediately reject.
If colonialism were a crime, its greatest offense was its abrupt undoing. It left fragile native cultures, embryonic modern societies, and minority peoples utterly ill equipped to protect themselves when power was abandoned into the hands of political leaders armed with the powerful machine of the modern state.
I could see the book being a useful reference to help understand an ongoing coup. Still, generally, I did not come away from Coup d’Etat feeling like I had a significantly richer knowledge of history or politics.
My highlights here.
June 16, 2020
I read it as a recommendation of a friend, years after I left my undergraduate studies in political science and after I got in a history masters. If had read it 10 years before, I would probably tried political science somewere else.
Man like Luttwak have a gift, they can explain things to everyone, even people that do not have the same political view. He dose it because he doesn't assume the other side for idiots our make strawman arguments. He writes better then most academics and that is a really low bar, but well is what it is.
The book is very smart, written as a so it your self guide for power changes, where we get a good and in depth analysis of the source of political power. If there is anything missing is an analyses on the economical power. Non the less, it's a great book for someone trying to understand politics a little better.
Man like Luttwak have a gift, they can explain things to everyone, even people that do not have the same political view. He dose it because he doesn't assume the other side for idiots our make strawman arguments. He writes better then most academics and that is a really low bar, but well is what it is.
The book is very smart, written as a so it your self guide for power changes, where we get a good and in depth analysis of the source of political power. If there is anything missing is an analyses on the economical power. Non the less, it's a great book for someone trying to understand politics a little better.
June 30, 2020
If you are expecting a "scientific" book that compares multiple case studies and data to draw conclusions about how coup d'etats work, you will be disappointed.
I thought this book would be similar to "How Democracies Die", "Why Nations Fails", "Why Civil Resistance Works", etc, in which scholars show systematic patterns and behaviors to defend their hypotheses.
This book however, looks more like a work of fiction. I am not saying it is not realistic, I am actually very interested in reading about this. The author is a respected scholar and there is probably a lot of technical knowledge in it, but the book is simply a narrative, really a handbook for a fictional coup d'etat. It draws historic comparisons sometime, but the bulk of the book is a fictional narrative about how the coup evolves.
I thought this book would be similar to "How Democracies Die", "Why Nations Fails", "Why Civil Resistance Works", etc, in which scholars show systematic patterns and behaviors to defend their hypotheses.
This book however, looks more like a work of fiction. I am not saying it is not realistic, I am actually very interested in reading about this. The author is a respected scholar and there is probably a lot of technical knowledge in it, but the book is simply a narrative, really a handbook for a fictional coup d'etat. It draws historic comparisons sometime, but the bulk of the book is a fictional narrative about how the coup evolves.
February 11, 2022
This book was a guilty pleasure. Guilty not in the "One more oreo" sense, but more in the "high crimes and misdemeanors" sense. Luttwak may be the single most cynical writer I have ever come across. However, that cynicism makes for a surprisingly excellent prose style. He manages to make this book on practical political technique rather funny and quite engaging. He also draws on a wide range of knowledge, both from his own experience and from extensive reading. For example, when discussing corruption he relates the anecdote, "In Accra I once saw speeding tickets handed out to drivers stuck in traffic."
As one might imagine, there are some truly horrendous views expressed in this book. That said, reading it has left me with a much greater understanding of the strategy of the coup, even if performing one is not my idea of a good time.
As one might imagine, there are some truly horrendous views expressed in this book. That said, reading it has left me with a much greater understanding of the strategy of the coup, even if performing one is not my idea of a good time.
February 6, 2019
A very intriguing book, which discussed all the practical aspects of the book in great details.
After reading this book, I analysed the coups in Pakistan, and surprisingly or incidentally, non of the ingredients were missing in any of them, that's why they all had been successful.
This book should be read by all law makers in every democracy, in order to look where are the breaches in system, which can give way to coup.
No set of rules or law or constitution can stop a coup from happening, only the institutions designed in certain way can do that.
A must read for all those, who are interested in dynamics of coup, what triggers it, how it is planned, how it's executed & the factors to stop it in middle or even after a coup already happened.
After reading this book, I analysed the coups in Pakistan, and surprisingly or incidentally, non of the ingredients were missing in any of them, that's why they all had been successful.
This book should be read by all law makers in every democracy, in order to look where are the breaches in system, which can give way to coup.
No set of rules or law or constitution can stop a coup from happening, only the institutions designed in certain way can do that.
A must read for all those, who are interested in dynamics of coup, what triggers it, how it is planned, how it's executed & the factors to stop it in middle or even after a coup already happened.
June 18, 2022
"Practical Handbook" is the veritable bible on coup methodology and has to be the most cited book on the subject. It is not a history, but a tactical manual. It served as a reliable tool throughout the cold war and into the early years of the 21st century, but Luttwak does not make a convincing point about social media in his 2016 edition. When coupists must control the narrative entire, and silence all communications from the incumbent, it is difficult to believe his claim that social media makes an insurrectionist's job easier. Especially considering that Edrogan of Turkey used social media to counter a coup the same year this edition was published.
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